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This thesis comprises three papers that investigate how organisations reproduce 
and alter their products in response to the tension between stability and change 
resulting from their interactions with the environment. 
The first two papers hold a knowledge management perspective. They use 
constant comparison methods to analyse qualitative data from two multinational 
corporations that have succeeded for decades in simultaneously standardising and 
customising systems of products and services delivered to business customers. 
These systems are studied as architectures of knowledge-embedding assets that 
are replicated and reused across time and space, but also adapted to fit the 
contexts of utilisation. The first paper identifies the process by which the two 
firms balance and combine the apparently diverging objectives of stable 
reutilisation and fit with changing conditions. The second paper finds that 
organisational knowledge undergoes similar patterns of evolutionary change 
independently of the specific type of asset in which it is embedded. Overall, 
findings advance our theory of organisational knowledge by opening a new 
perspective on the intrinsic nature of this resource. Context-dependence emerges 
as the only persistent and ineludible property of knowledge that characterises its 
transfer as search for fit between contexts, and makes replication and adaptation 
necessarily interdependent, and mutually enabling and reinforcing. Moreover, 
knowledge appears as the most elemental genetic material of organisational living, 
as the change and evolution of products, activities, routines and ultimately 
organisations can be explained and studied as evolutionary changes occurring in 
the underlying knowledge. 
The third paper holds a systems theory perspective, and reports a conceptual 
analysis of the interplay between two architectural properties of systems – 
modularity, and integrality – and their impact on the overall system’s behaviour 
and performance. The paper offers a reconceptualisation of modularity and 
integrality as coexisting and concurring properties of systems. A framework is 
presented within which the interplay between these two architectural properties 
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1.1 Background to the Thesis 
A major concern of management research in today’s ever-changing 
environment is to understand, for normative and predictive purposes, how 
organizations deal with change (Farjoun, 2007, 2010). As hypercompetition, 
globalization, information revolution, and technological innovation relentlessly 
transform the life of societies and organizations worldwide (Grant, 2003, 2010; 
Hamel, 2002; Hamel & Breen, 2007; Porter, 2008), it is increasingly important for 
academics and practitioners alike to identify new sources of business success, 
discern what makes competitive advantage permanent or transitory, and explain 
how organizations strive to adapt to changing environments. This dissertation 
investigates the role of knowledge in underpinning and differentiating the 
adaptive responses of organizations, and sustaining their performance. 
Organizational knowledge is often regarded as the most strategic of firm’s 
resources (Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Grant, 1996; Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000). It 
is so pervasive in organizational life that firms are widely conceived of as systems 
of knowledge assets (Grant, 1996; Helfat & Peteraf, 2003; Huber, 1991; Kogut & 
Zander, 1992; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Nonaka, 1994). But how are these systems 
built and maintained? What are their properties and dynamics? And how are 
they leveraged and adapted to sustain superior performance? We sought to 
answer these questions by delving into the empirical setting of the information 
and communications technologies (ICT) industry. This industry is particularly 
interesting to study organizational knowledge for its knowledge-intensiveness (von 
Nordenflycht, 2010). Knowledge is means and end of the productive processes 
carried out by ICT firms; and the creation, acquisition, and reutilization of this 
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fundamental resource occur within as well as across the firm’s boundaries. 
Moreover, the ICT industry is specially relevant because it hosts an ongoing 
tension between stability and change. On the one hand, it is characterized by 
relentless innovation (Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988; Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995; 
Ilinitch, D’Aveni, & Lewin, 1996), so that its firms’ survival depends on the 
ability to constantly change and adapt (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; D’Aveni & 
Gunther, 1994; Eisenhardt, 1989a; Galunic & Eisenhardt, 1996). Examples of 
technology-driven changes occurred over the past two decades include the 
convergence of television, consumer electronics, and telecommunications, the 
increasingly frequent battles for affirming industry standards, the emergence of 
an interconnected world, and the advent of a mobile digital lifestyle. On the other 
hand, innovation-based competition implies that sunk costs associated with 
learning, researching, and developing innovative products and services generate 
high incentives to leverage and reuse existing knowledge, in the quest for 
efficiency, profitability, and growth (Winter, 1995) . 
The specific setting for the study was offered by two multinational 
corporations that have dealt for decades with environmental changes and 
consequent organizational transformations. Originally a computer company and a 
telecommunications incumbent, these firms faced throughout their history 
technological, regulatory, and competitive pressures that challenged their very 
survival. In response, they acquired new capabilities and reinvented their business 
models to become global providers of ICT integrated solutions – systems of 
hardware, software, and related services designed as comprehensive and seamless 
solutions to a client’s business and/or operational problem (Davies, 2004). The 
provision of integrated solutions was part of broader relationships of strategic and 
operational consulting that the firms held with large client organizations in 
different industries, such as aerospace, defense, banking, chemicals, petroleum, 
construction, consumer products, financial markets, healthcare, insurance, media 
and entertainment. Clients in different industries and often based in different 
locations presented peculiar sets of geographic, social, market, business, industry, 
and organizational characteristics. As a result, both firms were exposed to 
enormous pressures to reuse but also to adapt the knowledge involved in the 
delivery of their solutions. Adopting knowledge management and systems theory 
perspectives, we studied the hardware, software, and services marketed by these 
organizations as systems of knowledge-embedding assets, and sought to 
3 
 
understand how they were replicated, altered, and recombined to fit ever new 
contexts of utilization. 
1.2 Structure of the Thesis 
In the following three chapters we address distinct but related research 
questions, and report a discussion of the respective contributions. Chapter 2 and 
3 are empirically based. Chapter 4 is a conceptual study inspired and informed by 
the field work presented in the previous two. We provide here a brief overview of 
each chapter. 
Chapter 2 - Knowledge Reuse within Fit: The Adaptive Replication 
Process 
This chapter builds on recent work in the strategy literature on replication 
(Jensen & Szulanski, 2007; Szulanski, Cappetta, & Jensen, 2004; Szulanski & 
Jensen, 2006, 2008; Winter & Szulanski, 2001; Winter, Szulanski, Ringov, & 
Jensen, 2012) and adaptation (Kostova, 1999; Kostova & Roth, 2002; Williams, 
2007; Yu & Zaheer, 2010), and draws insights from the theory of organizational 
knowledge creation (Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka & Teece, 2001; Nonaka, Toyama, & 
Konno, 2000a) to identify the process by which firms replicate and adapt existing 
knowledge simultaneously to support strategic objectives of rapid expansion and 
growth. The research process was inductive, and relied on theoretical sampling 
and constant comparison of qualitative data. The emerging process model of 
adaptive replication describes the reiteration of four activities centred on the use 
of templates and principles – template definition, template deployment, principle 
extraction, and principle enforcement – that allow replicating and adapting 
knowledge selectively, depending on its characteristics. 
The study contributes to a deeper understanding of the relationship between 
the process of organizational knowledge creation (Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka & Teece, 
2001; Nonaka et al., 2000a) and the corporate-level strategies of replication 
(Jensen & Szulanski, 2007; Szulanski et al., 2004; Szulanski & Jensen, 2006, 2008; 
Winter & Szulanski, 2001; Winter et al., 2012) and adaptation (Kostova, 1999; 
Kostova & Roth, 2002; Williams, 2007; Yu & Zaheer, 2010) by unveiling the 
interplay between templates and principles, and describing their twofold role in 
balancing and combining at the fine-grained level of the individual knowledge 
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assets the apparently diverging objectives of stable reutilization and fit with 
changing conditions. Findings also advance our theory of organizational 
knowledge by opening a new perspective on the intrinsic nature of this resource. 
Context-dependence emerges as the persistent and ineludible property of 
knowledge that characterizes the transfer as search for fit between contexts, and 
makes replication and adaptation necessarily interdependent, and mutually 
enabling and reinforcing. Finally, the study contributes to both evolutionary 
economics (Nelson & Winter, 1982) and the resource-based view of the firm 
(Penrose, 1959; Rumelt, 1984; Wernerfelt, 1984) by identifying knowledge-based 
mechanisms of evolutionary change in the sphere of economic activities that 
designate knowledge as the most elemental genetic material of organizational 
living. 
Chapter 3 – Knowledge-based Evolution and Organizational Change 
Chapter 3 reports a grounded theory investigation that tackles a central 
problem of evolutionary and resource-based approaches alike: gaining a deeper 
understanding of the process by which organizations acquire, develop, and alter 
idiosyncratic resources. Evolvability – the sustained capacity for adaptive 
evolution – emerged as resulting from the recursive interplay of knowledge-related 
activities across multiple levels. At the microlevel, structuring is the activity by 
which two specific types of knowledge – substantive knowledge and 
metaknowledge – are combined by individuals to form abstract knowledge 
structures. At the firm level, contextualizing is the activity by which such 
structures are put into context, and embedded into functional and interdependent 
knowledge assets that can be used and reused regularly. At the industry level, 
evolving refers to the reproduction, mutation, selection, and retention of the 
organization’s knowledge assets through interactions with the environment. To 
fully understand the dynamic interrelationships between knowledge-related 
activities, the chapter draws relevant and useful insights from recent advances in 
evolutionary biology (Kirschner & Gerhart, 1998, 2005; Wagner, 2005), and 
presents a knowledge-based evolutionary theory that regards the firm as an 
organism made of and controlled by knowledge, whose ultimate purpose is to 
grow and expand in its environment. 
This study advances strategic management research by integrating 
evolutionary and resource-based perspectives, and extending them in several 
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ways. First, it applies the evolutionary approach across levels (Hackman, 2003) to 
attain a deeper understanding of the micro, firm- and industry-level foundations 
of organizational behaviour. Second, it overcomes the routine-centric view by 
identifying in organizational knowledge the genetic material of organizational life 
that undergoes similar patterns of evolutionary change independently of the 
specific type of asset in which it is embedded. Finally, it explores the common 
grounds of three types of assets – artefacts, routines, and individuals – and puts 
forward a taxonomy of organizational knowledge that captures how substantive 
knowledge and metaknowledge are used to connect and contextualize them. 
Chapter 4 – Systems Architectures and Architectural Innovation: The 
Modularity-Integrality Framework 
The field work detailed in Chapters 2 and 3 inspired the conceptual 
investigation presented in the fourth and last chapter. We realised that, to better 
understand the systemic relationships among different types of knowledge assets, 
theories of organisational knowledge need to be complemented by a systems 
perspective. In particular, we examined two general architectural properties of 
systems – modularity, and integrality – to gain hints on why some systems are 
more easily altered, recombined, and adapted. Architectural studies of systems 
generally encountered in the management field – products, processes, 
organizations – have traditionally focused on the tradeoff between modularity 
and integrality as alternative, mono-dimensional properties, the first being 
associated with flexibility and adaptability, the latter with efficiency and control. 
However, empirical evidence and conceptual elaborations have showed that 
adopting the modularity-integrality tradeoff can be misleading. We have then 
reconceptualized modularity and integrality as multidimensional and concurring 
properties, whose interplay along multiple dimensions shapes four specific types 
of system architectures: 1) Recombinant systems (or recombinant architectures), 
characterized by high degrees of modularity and integrality; 2) Specialized 
systems (or specialized architectures), characterized by high degrees of integrality 
and low degrees of modularity; 3) Bundled systems (or bundled architectures), 
characterized by high degrees of modularity and low degrees of integrality, and; 
4) Chaotic systems, characterized by low degrees of modularity and integrality. 
Overall, the framework stresses the complexity of managerial choices in the areas 
of systems design and engineering activities, and provides new conceptual and 
analytical basis for appreciating the layered nature of modularity and integrality. 
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Taking these two properties out of a linear relationship shifts the focus of 
architectural investigation beyond the questions that scholars and practitioners 
have typically tried to answer so far, and prompts for capturing the interplay 
between multiple dimensions and degrees of each property as preconditions for 






KNOWLEDGE REUSE WITHIN FIT: 






In recent years, strategic management research has paid increasing attention 
to replication and adaptation as different approaches to knowledge transfer. 
Replication entails copying or reproducing knowledge across time and space, and 
reusing it as is, in order to enhance efficiency and sustain rapid expansion 
(Rivkin, 2000, 2001; Winter & Szulanski, 2001, 2002; Winter et al., 2012). 
Adaptation, instead, involves altering the transferred knowledge to fit local 
conditions (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Kostova & Roth, 2002; Szulanski & Jensen, 
2006) and improve the effectiveness of the transfer (Ansari, Fiss, & Zajac, 2010). 
As a result of the ongoing tension between stability and change (Ghemawat & 
Ricart Costa, 1993; Leana & Barry, 2000), organizations must be able to replicate 
and to adapt likewise. As Farjoun (2007) highlights, “across all industry contexts, 
firms need to balance the partially inconsistent requirements of static efficiency 
and commitment with those of dynamic efficiency and adaptability” (p. 207); 
hence, the ability to undertake both approaches at the same time is central to 
successful strategies. Yet extant literature has not investigated how organizations 
pursue simultaneously the strategic objectives of replicating and adapting. 
Pioneering studies in this field tended to ignore the problem, and rather treated 
replication and adaptation as separate, independent, and almost alternative 
options, in order to examine their respective impact in terms of effectiveness of 
the transfer, and of organizational growth (Szulanski & Winter, 2002; Winter & 
Szulanski, 2001). The implicit assumption behind such line of inquiry was that 
                                                 
1 The author acknowledges co-authors Andrew Davies and Andrea Prencipe for their guidance and 
helpful comments during the process of writing this chapter. 
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organizations engaging in knowledge transfer could always choose whether to 
replicate or to adapt, and that either approach could be undertaken and managed 
independently. Szulanski and Winter (2002), for example, warned that: 
 
“managers have to decide whether they want to leverage existing knowledge 
or create new knowledge. If they choose to leverage knowledge, exact 
replication is the way to go; there is limited leeway for modification. If they 
choose to innovate, they modify, they adapt – maybe they even invent a 
whole process. It is impossible to do both simultaneously to the extent that 
most people seem to imagine.” (p. 69). 
 
Studies of replication and adaptation as firm-level strategies have largely focused 
on multiunit firms a la McDonalds, Walmart, or Mail Boxes Etc. to ascertain 
whether those organizations grow more successfully by replicating their 
productive systems exactly or adapting them to local characteristics (Winter & 
Szulanski, 2001; Winter et al., 2012), or whether adaptation should be carried out 
straightaway, at the outset of the knowledge transfer, or rather pursued 
“cautiously and gradually in carefully designed steps that ideally involve only a 
single change at a time” (Szulanski & Jensen, 2006: 937-938). Such speculation 
builds on the particular experience of replication-based businesses like fast foods, 
hotels, banks, and franchise and chain companies in general (Winter & Szulanski, 
2001). These organizations seem to operate in relatively stable environments 
(Duncan, 1972), where the non-problematic nature of transactions, the 
homogeneity of demand and supply, and a lower rate of technological innovation 
pose moderate pressure for change. Moreover, the kind of knowledge transfer on 
which the above studies focus occurs within the boundaries of the organization. 
Recipients are newly established units that, although located in different 
geographic locations, have limited exchanges with the external environment and 
are faced with a relatively low variation of contextual conditions (typically, 
customer preferences). Not surprisingly, recent empirical findings have reinforced 
that in such industries, after a template has been carefully defined, its exact 
replication is critical to successful expansion and growth (Szulanski & Jensen, 
2008; Winter et al., 2012). 
Although chain organizations represent an important economic phenomenon 
and provide useful insights on the dynamics of knowledge reutilization, their 
experience is of limited help when it comes to faster change and variation. In 
fast-paced settings, factors such as complexity of business processes and 
transactions, volatility and differentiation of market demand, uncertainty of the 
supply landscape, and relentless technological innovation hinder the reiterated 
application of existing knowledge and reduce the value of the underlying assets 
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(Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988; Eisenhardt, 1989a; Stalk & Hout, 2003). In 
conditions of fast change and high variation, not only do firms find it impossible 
to pursue strategies of exact replication, but they may not even be able to define 
a comprehensive, ready-to-use template. Similarly, in the capital goods sector, 
highly differentiated and ever-changing customer requirements make strategies of 
pure reutilization largely impracticable. In project-based businesses, temporary 
organizations (Bechky, 2006; Lundin & Söderholm, 1995; Turner & Müller, 2003) 
can reuse existing bases of knowledge only to a certain extent, whereas the 
specificities of each project (whether related to the market, customers, or 
locations) entail considerable adjustments to match the new, often unique setting. 
For these organizations replication and adaptation are not a matter of choice, but 
rather imperative responses to simultaneous and opposing needs that constrain 
their strategic decision making: on the one hand, vital advantages associated with 
the reproduction and full exploitation of existing knowledge push firms to 
replicate as much as possible (replication is indispensable); on the other hand, the 
compelling need to ensure ongoing fit with fast-paced settings pushes them to 
adapt as much as possible, regardless of any template (adaptation is inescapable). 
More recent empirical findings have advanced our understanding of the transfer 
process by unveiling that replication and adaptation do not belong to mutually 
exclusive courses of action, but they are rather part of the same strategy, and 
therefore taken into account, pursued, and realized together, at the same time, 
within the same instances of transfer (Szulanski & Jensen, 2006; Williams, 2007; 
Winter et al., 2012). However, we still do not have a full understanding of how 
this is accomplished. 
Useful lenses to look at this problem can be borrowed from the knowledge 
management literature (Argote, 2012; Argote & Ingram, 2000; Argote, McEvily, 
& Reagans, 2003; Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Nonaka & Teece, 
2001; Nonaka et al., 2000a). In particular, Nonaka’s theory of organizational 
knowledge creation describes the process by which the knowledge created by 
individuals is made available, amplified, and connected with the organization’s 
knowledge system (Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Nonaka & Toyama, 
2003; Nonaka, Toyama, & Byosiere, 2001; Nonaka et al., 2000a; Nonaka, 
Takeuchi, & Umemoto, 1996b). According to the theory, organizational 
knowledge creation is understood by considering the iterative interplay between 
the tacit and explicit dimensions of knowledge (Polanyi, 1962, 1967). Such 
interplay unfolds recursively along the four modes of knowledge conversion of the 
SECI process (Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka et al., 2000a): 1) Socialization – tacit 
knowledge is exchanged by individuals through shared experience; 2) 
Externalization – individuals’ tacit knowledge is articulated and converted into 
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explicit knowledge; 3) Combination – different pieces of explicit knowledge are 
combined to create increasingly complex knowledge systems, and; 4) 
Internalization – explicit knowledge is embodied by individuals as tacit 
knowledge. 
The knowledge creation theory is relevant to an investigation of replication 
and adaptation for a number of reasons. First, although the focus of the theory is 
on knowledge creation – only one of the possible outcomes of knowledge 
management (see, for example, Argote et al., 2003) – the concept of knowledge 
conversion and the rich explanation of how conversion occurs in the SECI process 
improve our understanding of transfer as well. Second, Nonaka’s framework 
underlines the importance of contextual conditions – referred to as ba (Nonaka & 
Konno, 1998; Nonaka et al., 2000a) – as factors that can enhance or hinder 
knowledge creation. And indeed, the specific characteristics of the context have 
huge impact on the knowledge-related activities underlying both replication and 
adaptation strategies. Third, the theory describes some of the micro-foundations 
of knowledge assets, regarded at the same time as input, output, and moderating 
factors of the SECI process (Nonaka et al., 2000a). However, despite these merits, 
Nonaka’s theory does not allow us to draw a complete picture of how replication 
and adaptation are reconciled and carried out simultaneously as organization-
level strategies. In particular, the theory does not provide a systemic view of how 
assets are reused, replicated, and adapted once they become part of larger 
organization-level systems. In general, an idea of structure, or hierarchy, is 
missing in the theory that is instead necessary – according to the strategy 
literature – to organize the purposeful management of entire knowledge systems. 
This lack is somehow recognized by Nonaka et al. (2000a) when they underline 
that “we do not yet have an effective system and tools for evaluating and 
managing knowledge assets” as firm-level entities (p. 20). By contrast, extant 
strategy research has yielded significant theoretical and managerial insights into 
the economics of replication and of adaptation as firm level strategies – by 
addressing preconditions, costs, challenges, and advantages associated with either 
approach – but has overlooked the dynamics of the transfer processes that involve 
both. 
In this work we address this gap by asking: What is the process by which 
replication and adaptation are reconciled and realized simultaneously? To answer 
this question, we studied two multinational firms of the information and 
communication technology (ICT) industry that have been dealing with 
replication and adaptation for decades. We examined the interfirm transfer of 
systems of knowledge assets associated with the provision of ICT solutions to 
business customers in ten projects. The research process was inductive and relied 
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on theoretical sampling and constant comparison of qualitative data. We carried 
out multiple reiterations of joint collection and analysis, through which 
theoretical insights emerged from empirical evidence. Since it was necessary to 
collect and analyze in depth data from multiple sources, two parallel case studies 
appeared the most suitable research strategy (Yin, 2008). The emerging process 
model of adaptive replication describes the reiteration of four sets of activities 
that involve the use of principles and templates as carriers of existing and newly 
acquired knowledge: template definition, template deployment, principle 
extraction, and principle enforcement. 
The study contributes new insights into the relationship between the process 
of organizational knowledge creation (Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka & Teece, 2001; 
Nonaka et al., 2000a) and the corporate-level strategies of replication (Jensen & 
Szulanski, 2007; Szulanski et al., 2004; Szulanski & Jensen, 2006, 2008; Winter & 
Szulanski, 2001; Winter et al., 2012) and adaptation (Kostova, 1999; Kostova & 
Roth, 2002; Williams, 2007; Yu & Zaheer, 2010) by unveiling the interplay 
between templates and principles, and describing their twofold role in balancing 
and combining at the fine-grained level of single knowledge assets the apparently 
diverging objectives of stable reutilization and fit with changing conditions. 
Findings also advance our theory of organizational knowledge by opening a new 
perspective on the intrinsic nature of this resource. Context-dependence emerges 
as the persistent and ineludible property of knowledge that characterizes the 
transfer as search for fit between contexts, and makes replication and adaptation 
necessarily interdependent, and mutually enabling and reinforcing. Finally, the 
study contributes to both evolutionary economics (Nelson & Winter, 1982) and 
the resource-based view of the firm (Penrose, 1959; Rumelt, 1984; Wernerfelt, 
1984), by identifying knowledge-based mechanisms of evolutionary change in the 
sphere of economic activities that designate knowledge as the most elemental 
genetic material of organizational living. 
2.2 Theoretical Background 
Knowledge is a fundamental resource of organizations (Barney, 1991b; 
Drucker, 2009; Wernerfelt, 1984). Its transfer and reuse within and across firms 
underpins the realization of sustained competitive advantage (Argote, 1999; 
Spender, 1996; Spender & Grant, 1996; Zander & Kogut, 1995). However, the 
causal relationship between organizational knowledge and superior performance is 
not always fully understood, and scholars have been puzzled by the complex and 
fluid character of this resource (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; McEvily & 
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Chakravarthy, 2002). When it does not reside within individuals, knowledge is 
embedded in knowledge assets (Boisot, 1998; Hansen, Nohria, & Tierney, 1999; 
Nonaka et al., 2000a; Teece, 2000; Winter & Szulanski, 2001) that are 
intrinsically difficult to imitate (Reed & Defillippi, 1990; Winter, 1987, 1995), so 
that its effective exploitation can only be achieved by reproducing the asset itself. 
So far, indeed, studying knowledge transfer and reuse has essentially coincided 
with studying the transfer and reuse of different categories of tangible and 
intangible knowledge assets. For example, McDonald (1998) has illustrated Intel’s 
“Copy EXACTLY!” [sic] method as a way of reproducing faithfully entire 
semiconductor manufacturing plants in order to transfer and reuse successfully 
the technological knowledge therein embodied; Winter and Szulanski (2001) have 
examined the replication of a firm’s business model as an example of broad-scope 
transfer of organizational knowledge; and other studies have focused on the 
transfer of organizational routines (Szulanski et al., 2004), and organizational 
practices (Jensen & Szulanski, 2007; Kostova, 1999; Morosini, 1998; Morosini, 
Shane, & Singh, 1998; Rivkin, 2001; Szulanski, 1996, 2000; Teece, Pisano, & 
Shuen, 1997). A central problem addressed by this stream of research is whether 
the transfer and reutilization of knowledge in different times and/or locations 
should adhere faithfully to a working example, or depart from it in consideration 
of temporal and/or spatial specificities (Winter et al., 2012). Such question has 
triggered a comparison between replication and adaptation as different, 
alternative strategies. 
Replication entails copying or reproducing knowledge exactly (Nelson & 
Winter, 1982; Rivkin, 2001; Williams, 2007; Winter & Szulanski, 2001, 2002). 
When carried out systematically, this approach produces powerful results. It 
reduces uncertainty and risk (Nelson & Winter, 1982), enhances efficiency and 
profitability (Winter, 1995), sustains competitive advantage (Argote & Ingram, 
2000; Jensen & Szulanski, 2007; Rivkin, 2001; Szulanski & Jensen, 2006; Winter, 
1995; Winter & Szulanski, 2001), and accelerates organizational growth (Buckley 
& Casson, 2002; Hymer, 1976; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Szulanski & Jensen, 2008; 
Zaheer, 1995). In this regard, for example, Szulanski and Winter (2002) underline 
that one of the benefits of being a large firm resides in leveraging superior 
knowledge on a large scale. Apart from such intuitive economic and strategic 
gains, another important advantage associated with replication pertains to the 
intrinsic nature of organizational knowledge. A dominant tenet among scholars is 
that firms pursue replication because organizational knowledge is often complex 
(Rivkin, 2000; Szulanski & Jensen, 2006), sticky (Szulanski, 1996; von Hippel, 
1994), and ultimately, causally ambiguous (Lippman & Rumelt, 1982). As 
Szulanski and Jensen (2006) explain, causal ambiguity means that the 
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relationship between use of knowledge and associated outcome is not always well 
understood. For example, neither a parent organization nor its recipient 
subsidiary may be able to codify a transferred organizational practice and predict 
their impact on performance. Subtle changes of any asset involved in the transfer 
could modify the cause-effect relationship exponentially, making it “difficult to 
attribute specific effects to their specific alterations” (Szulanski & Jensen, 2006: 
938). If replication reduces uncertainty, enhances profitability, sustains growth, 
and allows overcoming the causal ambiguity of knowledge through the avoidance 
of hazardous alterations, how strict should such avoidance be? Although, the 
argument of exact replication has proved useful to theoretical reasoning (Baden-
Fuller & Winter, 2007; Nelson & Winter, 1982), evidence shows that at least 
some alterations almost inevitably accompany the reproduction of knowledge 
(Douglas & Wind, 1987; Onkvisit & Shaw, 1987; Robert, Probst, Martocchio, 
Drasgow, & Lawler, 2000; Rosenzweig & Nohria, 1994; Szulanski & Jensen, 2006). 
Adaptation refers to alterations applied to a knowledge asset in order to match 
the characteristics of the recipient setting (Ansari et al., 2010). Similarly to other 
formulations of the same concept in strategic management (Levinthal, 1997), this 
definition hints at a positive relationship between adaptive efforts and chances of 
desirable outcomes. For example, the interorganizational transfer of practices has 
been found more likely to succeed when significant adaptations to cognitive and 
normative rules of the host environment increase the local acceptance of the 
knowledge being transferred (Griffith, Hu, & Ryans, 2000; Kirkman, Gibson, & 
Shapiro, 2001; Luo, 2001; Morosini, 1998; Morosini et al., 1998). Theoretical 
contributions posit that some form of adaptation of reused knowledge be 
practically inevitable in any instance of transfer (Baden-Fuller & Winter, 2007), 
and empirical studies have found that, even when intended for exact replication, 
the transfer and reuse of knowledge almost invariably undergoes some changes 
(Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Szulanski & Jensen, 2006). Scholars tend to agree that 
the reason for the inevitability of adaptation in processes of knowledge transfer 
must be sought in another fundamental characteristic of knowledge: its context 
dependence (Argote & Ingram, 2000; Kostova & Roth, 2002; Prahalad & Doz, 
1999). Williams (2007) notes that context-dependent knowledge arises from the 
rich connections between organizations and their environment. In particular, the 
fact that organization-environment relationships determine the structure and 
composition of the resources within which organizational knowledge resides and 
accrues – for example, people, products, routines, practices – has important 
consequences. First, part of the organizational knowledge that connects and 
integrates assets and resources into interdependent systems tends to be tacit 
(Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Polanyi, 1962) and 
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embedded in a peculiar context of use. Second, context-dependent knowledge that 
cannot be transferred directly has to be recreated at the recipient setting (Kogut 
& Zander, 1992) in a way that reflects, in turn, the specificities of a new, 
different context. Third, when the transferred knowledge is employed in the new 
context, new requirements for adaptation are generated by problems and 
contingencies that were impossible to predict before the transfer (Dutton & 
Thomas, 1984; Rosenberg, 1983). 
Although replication and adaptation can be seen as organizational responses to 
distinct attributes of knowledge, they seldom appear separately in real instances 
of transfer (Szulanski & Jensen, 2006; Williams, 2007; Winter et al., 2012). 
According to Williams (2007) any “transfer will usually involve knowledge that 
requires replication and knowledge that requires adaptation”; and consequently, 
“we need to change our understanding of replication […] as the absence of 
adaptation” (p. 867). His findings of joint replication and adaptation in the 
telecommunications industry are consistent with the results of previous empirical 
studies on the cross-national transfer of organizational practices (Douglas & 
Wind, 1987; Onkvisit & Shaw, 1987; Robert et al., 2000; Rosenzweig & Nohria, 
1994). Likewise, studies of the international expansion of firms have showed that 
replication without adaptation increases local resistance to adoption (Kostova, 
1999), and decreases the effectiveness of the transfer (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; 
Prahalad & Doz, 1999). The need to combine together replicative and adaptive 
efforts as a way to relieve the ongoing tension between stability and change 
sounds like the leitmotif of organizational life (Christensen & Overdorf, 2000; 
Farjoun, 2007, 2010; Graetz & Smith, 2008; Schreyögg & Sydow, 2010). Settings 
such as the computer (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1995; Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995), 
microcomputer (Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988; Eisenhardt, 1989a; Eisenhardt & 
Bourgeois, 1988), information technology (Bogner & Barr, 2000), semiconductor 
(Nadkarni & Barr, 2008), biotechnology (Judge & Miller, 1991), biomedical 
(Smith et al., 1994), and health care (Stepanovich & Uhrig, 1999) industries 
provide numerous examples of firms that, while reusing existing knowledge 
extensively, must develop at the same time vital competences of fast adaptation 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a; Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995; Stalk & Hout, 2003). Change 
entails that information rapidly becomes inaccurate and obsolete (Bourgeois & 
Eisenhardt, 1988). Therefore, if replication is the first vocational approach to 
leveraging existing knowledge, pressing needs for adaptation soon arise, and 
organizations must be able to replicate and adapt at the same time. Yet, how is 
this accomplished? We have examined antecedents and advantages of replicative 
and adaptive choices, and ascertained that both tend to be involved in the same 
instances of transfer; but despite their centrality to organizational life and 
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survival, the dynamics of transfer processes that involve both replication and 
adaptation are not known. In this study, we address such problem by asking: 
What is the organizational process by which replication and adaptation are 
reconciled and realized simultaneously? 
2.3 Method 
Setting 
The general setting of the research was the ICT industry. This industry is 
particularly interesting to study issues of knowledge transfer and reuse because of 
its knowledge-intensiveness (von Nordenflycht, 2010). Knowledge is both means 
and end of productive processes carried out by ICT firms, and frequent and 
intense transfers of knowledge occur not just within but also across the firm’s 
boundaries. Moreover, this industry is specially relevant to this investigation   
because it hosts a structural tension between incentives to replicate knowledge 
and the need to adapt it. On the one hand, in fact, relentless innovation 
characterizes it as a highly dynamic industry (Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988; 
Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995; Ilinitch et al., 1996), where survival depends on the 
ability to change and adapt (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; D’Aveni & Gunther, 
1994; Eisenhardt, 1989a; Galunic & Eisenhardt, 1996). Examples of 
technologically-driven changes occurred over the past two decades are the 
convergence of television, consumer electronics, and telecommunications, the 
increasingly frequent battles for affirming industry standards, the emergence of 
an interconnected world, and the advent of a mobile digital lifestyle. On the other 
hand, innovation-based competition implies that sunk costs associated with 
learning, researching, and developing innovative products and services generate 
high incentives to leverage and reuse existing knowledge in a constant quest for 
efficiency, profitability, and growth (Winter, 1995) . 
Alpha and Beta, two Fortune Global 500 corporations that had been dealing 
for decades with simultaneous pressures to replicate and adapt, provided the 
specific setting for the study. As a result of rapid technological change, these 
firms underwent frequent, dramatic transformations throughout their history. 
Alpha, originally a computer firm, became a supplier of ICT business solutions, 
including infrastructure, hosting, and consulting services in areas ranging from 
data-centers to nanotechnology. Beta was a telecommunication company that, in 
response to the decline of traditional technologies caused by the advent of the 
Internet, transformed into a global provider of networked ICT services and 
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business solutions. In addition to fast change, both firms operated in conditions of 
high context variation, for they served business customers belonging to a broad 
range of different industries, such as aerospace, defense, banking, chemicals, 
petroleum, construction, consumer products, financial markets, healthcare, 
insurance, media and entertainment (Table 2.1 reports a list of the firms’ client 
sectors). Clients in different industries and often based in different locations 
represented each a different context and a peculiar set of company- and sector-
specific factors, such as geographic, social, market, regulatory, technological, 
business, organizational, and so on. However, even facing fast change and high 
variation, Alpha and Beta could not respond to local and spatial specificities by 
reinventing the wheel each time new customer needs arose. Despite the constant, 
enormous pressure to adapt, they also needed harvest as much as possible the 
economic and strategic advantages associated with leveraging and reusing 
knowledge across industries and customers. Such circumstances made both firms 
extremely interesting to study. 
 
Table 2.1. Alpha and Beta’s client sectors 
Alpha Beta 
Aerospace and Defense 
Automotive 
Banking 






Energy and Utilities 
Financial Markets 





Media and Entertainment 
Metals and Mining 
Retail 




Consumer Packaged Goods 
Defense and Security 
Financial Markets 
Financial Services Sector 








Media and Broadcast 
Oil and Gas 
Pharmaceutical 
Police 
Print and Publishing 
 
 
Finally, the choice of the two firms was driven by the logic of comparison and 
aimed at maximizing cross-case differences. Alpha and Beta had different 
characteristics in terms of corporate histories, organizational structures, corporate 
strategies, and roles played within the industry. Furthermore, they comprised 
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several divisions and a number of units within each division, which leads to a 
great organizational variety. Given cross-case differences and within-case variety, 
it seemed reasonable to expect that organizational processes and mechanisms 
associated with the replication-adaptation exercise within the two firms would 
take different forms, so that the phenomenon of study would be better observed 
and understood by comparing its diverse, firm-specific manifestations. 
Research Design 
The research process was inductive, in that it was necessary to start from key 
constructs – such as knowledge transfer, knowledge assets, replication and 
adaptation of organizational knowledge – and seek to identify specific categories 
and to unveil relevant relationships among them by examining incidents, events, 
and information from the case study firms about the occurrence of simultaneous 
replication and adaptation. The investigation started in July 2007 and ended in 
November 2010. In the first 6 months, preparatory, background information 
about the firms was acquired through publicly available documents such as 
websites and electronic archives, dedicated reports and books, industry papers, 
and academic case studies. Documentation on the firms’ recent history and 
organizational structures was used to delineate the overall corporate profiles. At 
the same time, information about the industry was collected from specialized 
magazines and webzines, books, and academic journals, and complemented with 
conversations with industry experts, both scholars and practitioners. This 
information allowed us to familiarize with the dynamism of the ICT industry, to 
select specific aspects that seemed relevant to study, and to gain some sense of 
the practical evidence of the categories that had inspired the investigation (e.g., 
transfer and reutilization of knowledge, replication, adaptation, environmental 
change, context variation, and so forth). Both firm- and industry-related 
information also served as background during initial meetings with the firms, and 
guided the selection of the first informants and the search for additional 
documentation. 
The field work started and proceeded at both firms in parallel. At the outset, 
we aimed to confirm, revise, update, and refine the company profiles and the 
firm-related information in general, gain a notion of the types of knowledge assets 
typically transferred by and within both firms, and identify examples of transfer 
that could provide relevant insights about the research problem. In particular, we 
wanted to spot real instances of simultaneous replication and adaptation. We 
focused on the interfirm transfer of knowledge associated with the provision of 
two families of ICT solutions to business customers. ICT solutions can be seen as 
bundles of various types of knowledge assets: organizational knowledge is 
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embodied in hardware and physical artifacts, codified in software applications, 
and embedded in related service routines such as consulting, training, and 
support (Argote, 1999; Argote & Darr, 2000; Darr, Argote, & Epple, 1995). Such 
assets are transferred as comprehensive and seamless solutions to a client’s 
business and/or operational problem (Davies, 2004). Although other knowledge 
transfer and reuse occurred also within and among other parts of the 
organization, the transfer towards customers appeared particularly interesting 
and relevant to study for the likely simultaneous presence of replication and 
adaptation exercises. If efficiency gains deriving from reutilization across clients 
represent powerful incentives to replicate, at the same time interfirm transfers – 
as opposed to intrafirm ones – are by nature subject to a higher variance of the 
recipient contexts – that is, the different customer organizations – which leads to 
more numerous, diverse, and pressing needs for adaptation. As found in previous 
research, product changes and innovations are a primary form of adaptation 
(Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995), and many firms adapt or even transform 
themselves by introducing new products or improving existing ones (Brown & 
Eisenhardt, 1995; Chakravarthy, 1997; Schoonhoven, Eisenhardt, & Lyman, 
1990). Two units, one in each firm, seemed especially interesting and relevant to 
study as “extreme cases” (Eisenhardt, 1989b) for a number of reasons. First, they 
were considered in their respective organizations as champions in the provision of 
ICT solutions to business customers, and had showed a special ability to 
implement successful transfer of knowledge assets consistently, across different 
customer industries. Second, they put in place an eminent example of interfirm 
transfer and reuse of organizational knowledge, since the systems they sold to 
clients had been originally designed, created, and developed in-house to address 
operational needs internal to the two firms. Third, as the two units exploited 
these assets by reusing and selling them across clients in different industries, they 
produced simultaneous efforts of replication and adaptation in a recurrent and 
consistent fashion, which provided clear and relevant evidence of the phenomena 
of study. Finally, all the projects delivered by the units had relied on joint 
replication and adaptation and led to successful transfer, as the implementation 
of the solutions had had very positive impact on the performance of the recipient 
organizations. 
To understand how the selected units dealt with replication and adaptation at 
the same time, while delivering successful knowledge transfer systematically and 
consistently across time and geographic locations, we first focused on their ICT 
solutions (product level) and collected data about: a) the kind of knowledge 
assets these solutions included; b) how those assets had been created or acquired; 
c) how they worked together; d) the practical problems they solved; e) how they 
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were transferred to clients, and; f) what impact their adoption and reuse had had 
on the recipient organizations. Subsequently, we carried out a closer scrutiny of 
concrete instances of transfer of these solutions, treated and referred to by 
managers of both units as distinct customer projects (project level). Given the 
systemic interrelationships that tied together the different types of transferred 
assets, we chose to follow the approach of that part of the literature that 
examines the whole transfer relationship (Rivkin, 2001; Williams, 2007) between 
the unit and its customers. While some scholars have analyzed the transfer of a 
single type of knowledge assets – for example, organizational routines, or 
organizational practices (Kostova, 1999; Szulanski, 1996; Winter et al., 2012) – 
we included in the analysis all types of knowledge assets involved in the transfer 
in order to ascertain what was replicated and what was adapted. 
Before starting the collection and analysis of project data, we established 
simple criteria for the selection of projects. First, we excluded current projects 
and focused instead on those that had already been delivered, in order to gather 
complete data about the whole transfer. Second, since the projects brought to 
completion by both units had all led to successful transfer – as demonstrated by 
the improved performance of the recipient organizations (Argote & Ingram, 2000) 
– we ordered projects by size and started examining two large ones, one in each 
unit, as their scope and content seemed likely to comprehend replicative and 
adaptive actions alike. We then kept adding new projects until new iterations of 
data collection and analysis, aided by the concurrent review of the pertinent 
literature, produced no development or refinement of the emerging theoretical 
insights. This condition of theoretical saturation (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) was 
achieved with ten projects: respectively, four at Alpha, and six at Beta. Referring 
to each project and to the transferred solutions in their entirety, we investigated: 
a) how the objectives of replication and adaptation were pursued and realized by 
the unit; b) what concrete actions or interventions were put in place in order to 
replicate or adapt; c) how such actions and interventions contributed to a 
successful transfer, and; d) whether and how the unit laid the basis for taking 
advantage from such actions and interventions in future projects. 
Although data collection and analysis were carried out jointly, we provide a 
separate account of each so as to illustrate the investigative process in detail. 
Data Collection 
We collected and analyzed qualitative data in the form of interviews, as main 
source of data, documents, and field notes. Both firms committed to disclose 
relevant information and assured reiterated access to data. Such availability 
proved crucial during the study, because it was necessary to return many times 
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to the field for further data gathering, coding, and analysis, in order to either 
revise or reinforce emerging insights. 
Before setting up initial interviews, we met our lead contact at each firm: 
Alpha’s chief technology officer for Europe, and a division vice president at Beta. 
These senior executives had decades of experience in their respective firms and 
could combine a deep knowledge of the organization with the broad outlook 
enjoyable from high hierarchical positions. Advised by them, we carried out a 
purposeful selection of informants (Guba & Lincoln, 1985), and first interviewed 
those who could help us obtain background information on the firm and identify 
those parts of the organization that appeared most likely to offer evidence of the 
phenomena of study. From this point onwards, we followed a snowball approach 
and selected informants by asking each interviewee who could provide useful and 
relevant data about transfer processes that involved replication and adaptation. 
A total of 92 interviews were conducted with 65 informants, either face-to-face 
during visits to the firms or by telephone. Some informants were interviewed 
more than once. In particular, we met the unit directors and some senior 
executives several times for follow-up questions and validation purposes (Denzin 
& Lincoln, 2011; Gibbert, Ruigrok, & Wicki, 2008) – for example, to validate the 
chronology of events reported by project-level managers but occurring at the unit 
and/or at the firm levels. Some project-level managers of Beta were also 
interviewed two or three times because they had been involved in as many 
projects. Interviewees were informed beforehand, via telephone and/or email, 
about the topic, purpose, and format of the interview. Interviews averaged an 
hour and ranged from 35 minutes to three hours. Of all interviews, 74 were audio-
recorded and transcribed within 15 days of interview; for the 18 non-recorded 
interviews detailed notes were taken during the interview and then ordered and 
complemented by additional notes within the following 36 hours. Most interviews 
were conducted by one member of the research group, 25 interviews by two 
members (Table 2.2 provides details of interviews and interviewees’ hierarchical 
position). 
At the outset, we interviewed executives and top managers as key informants 
(Kumar, Stern, & Anderson, 1993), ranging from senior vice president to head of 
subdivision and global industry experts. Although interviews were unstructured 
and questions could change depending on the respondents’ hierarchical position 
and understanding of the research problem, the conversation was guided by a 
clear set of goals. After an introductory part addressing the companies’ overall 
profiles and corporate structures, questions probed into the different types of 
knowledge assets typically detained, created, or acquired by the two firms, and 
elicited the illustration of concrete examples of transfer and reutilization. 
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Table 2.2. Details of interviews and informants 
Role/Job Title Informants Interviews Length 
Alpha 
Chairman Emeritus 1 2 1h45m 
Chief Technology Officer 2 10 12h20m 
Global Industry Director 1 1 1h 
Senior Strategy Consultant 1 1 1h 
Senior Managing Consultant 1 2 1h20m 
New Product Development Global Expert 1 1 50m 
Innovation & New Technologies Leader 1 1 45m 
Industry Technical Leader 3 3 2h25m 
Industry Technical Executive 2 2 2h 
Strategy Executive 1 1 1h 
Senior IT Architect 5 5 4h 
Client Technical Advisor 2 2 1h30m 
Unit Director 2 5 2h30m 
Business Development Manager 2 2 2h15m 
Product Development Director 1 1 35m 
Project Consultant 4 4 3h10m 
Services Manager 1 1 45m 
Systems Engineer 1 1 45m 
Total 32 45 39h55m 
 
Beta 
Division Vice President 1 1 1h 
Subdivision President 1 1 1h 
Subdivision Director 1 4 2h20m 
Senior Managing Consultant 1 1 1h 
Senior IT Consultant 2 2 1h15m 
Unit Director 3 6 6h30m 
Unit General Manager 1 1 1h10m 
Commercial Director 3 5 5h45m 
Program Manager 1 1 45m 
Product Manager 2 2 1h30m 
Project Director 1 2 2h10m 
Project Manager 6 8 7h10m 
Solutions Portfolio Manager 1 1 45m 
Product Development Manager 1 2 2h 
Head of Solutions Implementation 2 3 2h25m 
Commercial Manager 1 2 1h15m 
Solutions Implementation Manager 1 1 50m 
Customer Support Manager 1 1 1h10m 
Sales Manager 3 3 2h 
Total 33 47 42h 
 
This first round of interviews allowed us to appreciate interesting aspects of 
the transfer problem – for example, the different roles played by tangible and 
intangible assets – and to identify a number of key categories – such as, 
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“standardization”, or “customization” – that proved fundamental for generating 
and linking together theoretical insights throughout the rest of the research. 
Subsequently, we interviewed informants who either belonged to the two 
selected units or collaborated with them in the design, development, and transfer 
of the respective solutions. Informants included unit directors, commercial 
directors, project managers, product managers, and commercial managers. We 
conducted semistructured interviews to gather information about the unit, the 
solutions, and their transfer to customers. Introductory questions regarded the 
interviewees’ background, the details of their personal competence and 
experience, their current position and tasks, and the history and organizational 
background of the units. Subsequent questions concerned the characteristics of 
the solutions provided by the unit and of their transfer and reutilization across 
customers. In particular, the attention was on the different types of knowledge 
assets involved in the transfer, their interrelationships and interdependences, and 
the practical problems they aimed to solve for the recipient organization. As the 
interview progressed, the focus shifted onto the specific activities carried out by 
the unit for the creation, acquisition, management, transfer, and reutilization of 
those knowledge assets. In particular, informants where asked to think 
retrospectively about such activities, to describe them in detail, and to clarify 
why replicative and adaptive efforts had been necessary and how they had been 
accomplished. 
For each of the selected projects, we first interviewed the project manager to 
gain an overview of the project and then proceeded with other managers in 
charge of the design, development, implementation, delivery, and support, as long 
as a new informant could provide new, relevant data. Interviewees were asked to 
provide retrospective accounts of the project background, the resources and assets 
reused and deployed within the project, the requirements for alterations of those 
assets, the activities carried out to deploy existing assets and to implementation 
the alterations, the learning about altered and newly developed assets, and their 
reutilization in subsequent projects. Interview guides were employed across 
informants to keep consistency of collected data. In some cases, the guides were 
changed to meet the informants’ hierarchical position, degree of involvement in 
the unit, and role played in the transfer process. 
We endeavored to minimize informant bias in a number of ways. First, we 
used multiple knowledgeable informants at both firms to cross-check the 
information provided by each informant, and used follow-up questions to ensure 
that the emerging concepts and categories had the same meaning across 
informants. Second, informants were highly motivated to provide accurate 
information by virtue of the confidentiality that we offered, and of the relevance 
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and usefulness of the study to their own profession (Huber & Power, 1985). 
Third, we investigated concrete facts and events, which are less prone to 
cognitive biases than opinions or speculations (Huber & Power, 1985; Miller, 
Cardinal, & Glick, 1997). Fourth, we focused as much as possible on recent 
events to minimize recall bias (Golden, 1992; Koriat & Goldsmith, 2000), and 
triangulated factual accounts of the more remote past with documentation, 
archival data, and other informants. Fifth, we used open-ended questions within 
naturally-flowing conversations with our informants in a way that encouraged 
free reporting, and allowed the interviewees the right not to answer when they 
did not retain or could not recall the required information. 
We resorted to current documents and archival data to integrate the data 
collected through interviews. The search for relevant documents was facilitated 
by recurrent interactions with informants, whereas their selection was guided by 
emerging theoretical insights. Documents collected and analyzed throughout the 
research included organizational charts, annual reports, division and subdivision 
presentations, corporate brochures and booklets, press releases, printouts of non-
public company webpages, product brochures and specifications, examples of 
contracts with customers, project documentation, internal presentations, and 
reports. Besides providing a secondary source of data, these documents helped us 
to identify crucial elements of discussion to be addressed and deepened during the 
interviews. Table 2.3 provides a detailed account of the documents collected and 
analyzed throughout the study. 
 
Table 2.3. Details of documents 
 Alpha Beta Other sources Total 
Industry studies/reports - - 17 17 
News articles - - 7 7 
Case studies - 6 19 25 
Company profiles 12 26 12 50 
Corporate reports 18 17 - 35 
Unit reports 12 4 - 16 
Executive speeches and presentations 21 27 - 48 
Product brochures 2 28 - 30 
Project documents 78 91 - 169 





The study involved joint collection and analysis of data, review of the relevant 
literature, and examination of emerging conceptual insights in iterative fashion 
(Locke, 2001). By examining theoretically relevant incidents in the data, we drew 
indications for the sampling, mode of collection, and content focus of new data. 
As interviews transcripts, documents, archival data, and field notes were 
produced, we analyzed them inductively in accordance with naturalistic inquiry 
(Guba & Lincoln, 1985) and constant comparison methods (Glaser & Strauss, 
1967; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). For both cases, we 
carried out open, axial, and selective coding (Strauss & Corbin, 1998), and 
organized the data into chronological accounts (Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
Open coding. As we collected raw data, we read and broke them down into 
segments. For each case, we interpreted data segments, noted as many relevant 
incidents and ideas as possible, and organized them as first-order concepts 
describing “facts” in the data (Van Maanen, 1979). To label them, we used either 
brief, descriptive phrases or terms present in the data, generally referred to as in-
vivo codes (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Examples are the recurring expressions 
“some customization is always necessary”, or “we validate and reuse templates”. 
When we recognized similar codes, we grouped them together into broad, 
homogenous categories, and reviewed incidents and codes across categories several 
times until no new concepts emerged. 
Axial coding. Next, we compared categories, codes, and data incidents both 
within and across cases. We reordered and regrouped categories in systematic 
search for relationships among and patterns across them. As we refined categories 
one-by-one in greater depth, we kept pursuing, identifying, and coding their 
properties. For example, properties emerged as related to “modularization” 
included “architectural flexibility”, “efficiency gains offered by modular 
architectures”, and “clarifying the interdependencies among components”. 
Categories which appeared relevant to explain the process of study but whose 
properties could not be clarified in depth both within and across cases due to 
insufficient data triggered the sampling and collection of new data. We used 
visual maps to arrange codes and categories, and to link the related properties. 
Some categories began to stand out across cases as core, higher-order themes of 
the emerging model, capable of subsuming and integrating the first-order 
concepts; the other categories, instead, were reconceptualized and absorbed by 
the former, more abstract themes. 
Selective coding. Finally, we reviewed the data again with a few themes in 
mind to determine whether they could be exhaustively illustrated by the first-
order concepts. The refinement, selection, and illustration of the second-order 
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themes through first-order concepts and raw data went on recursively until we 
were able to isolate aggregate theoretical dimensions, and explain relationships 
among them. Figure 2.1 reports the resulting data structure, with examples of 
concepts from the empirical data (first column), core second-order themes, and 
aggregate dimensions. 
 
Figure 2.1. Data structure 
 
Chronological accounts. While we read and coded the data, we also 
organized them into chronological accounts – one for each case – in order to 
weave together interviews, documentation, and field notes, and to outline the 
sequence of events. We used the visual maps of codes and categories to make 
sense of the cross-case common patterns emerging from the chronological 
accounts. The joint use of visual maps and chronological accounts allowed us 
developing interpretations of the organizational process emerging from the data 




Trustworthiness of the Data 
We engaged in debriefing sessions during data collection and analysis in order 
to keep focus and clarity throughout this iterative process. To ensure accuracy 
and transparency of the coding process, we resorted extensively to reflective 
notes. As we read through and learned from the data, we produced 
methodological memos (such as reminders, amendments, and instructions about 
the analysis), theoretical memos (i.e., attempts to extract meanings from and 
identify patterns within the data), and conceptual diagrams, through which we 
explicated to ourselves the relationships among categories and their properties 
and dimensions. Memos and diagrams were particularly useful to spot gaps in the 
emergent framework and consequent needs for further collection and/or analysis. 
 
2.4 Findings 
The provision of ICTs by Alpha and Beta took place within broader 
relationships of strategic and operational consulting that both firms held with 
large client organizations worldwide. The knowledge transferred within such 
relationships was embedded in physical artifacts, hardware products, software 
applications, and related services. These worked as tangible and intangible 
components of complex ICT systems, and were acquired altogether by client 
organizations as comprehensive solutions to either improve ongoing operational 
processes or establish new processes that allowed seizing strategic opportunities. 
An executive from Beta explained how intertwined hardware, software, and 
service components are within an ICT solution: 
 
The best example I can give you is a network product. So, if you want some 
data network from us, you could just order wires, if you like, lines, circuits, 
from the data network product unit. But that’s exactly what you get. You put 
in one order for 20 lines, say, and you get 20 lines. Now, if you wanted on the 
other hand that to be run as a project, if you wanted that project managed, if 
you wanted the network integrated with maybe an application you were 
running, if you wanted a single point of contact, if you wanted to know the 
performance of that network, if you wanted a single bill, a single help number, 
and so on, you will come to us, because we would sort of add that service wrap 
on. 
 
In a knowledge management perspective, the transfer from the firm to the client 
was driven by the intent of maximizing both the advantages of reutilization 
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experienced by the former and the fit with the recipient context represented by 
the latter. The two families of solutions that we studied, respectively AlphaCore 
and BetaSuite, were outstanding examples of interfirm transfer of organizational 
knowledge, and provided revealing evidence of how replicative and adaptive 
efforts can be combined together within the same instances of transfer. Table 2.4 
displays exemplary configurations of AlphaCore and BetaSuite along three types 
of assets: hardware, software, and services. 
 








Data modeling applications 
Information modeling applications 
Function modeling applications 
Workflow modeling applications 
Process modeling applications 
Organizational modeling applications 
Business modeling applications 












Car diagnostics devices 
Measurement-performing devices 
Docking stations 
Communications integrating devices 
Satellite navigation devices 
 
Software 
Data management platform (server side) 
Data management platform (client side) 
Scheduling applications 
Laptop configuration software 
Assignment delivery applications 
Satellite navigation software 










Logistics and dispatch 
 
AlphaCore was purchased by multinational corporations to rationalize and 
standardize business and operational processes across the entire organization. 
Once acquired and implemented, it supported intensive codification of the 
business, operational, and technological knowledge owned by the adopting 
organization, after which huge repositories of data and information generated by 
the organization’s processes and activities could be stored, monitored, managed, 
and exploited in an integrated way through the use of specialized software and 
dedicated hardware. BetaSuite was acquired by large service and utility 
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companies to optimize the management of their mobile workforces and vehicle 
fleets, and to improve service efficiency and effectiveness. It hinged on centralized 
acquisition, storage, and management of information regarding both the job to be 
carried out (e.g., location, job description, timing, degree of urgency, and required 
skills and resources) and the workers to whom the job could be assigned (e.g., 
real-time localization, skills and qualifications, tools and resources endowment, 
and work-day schedule). 
Historically, both solutions had been developed in the 1990s by two units of 
the case study firms in response to internal needs. AlphaCore was first conceived 
to organize and manage artifacts such as texts, design documents, specifications, 
and models as parts of complex informational architectures. BetaSuite was 
implemented during a long period of organizational transformation with the 
result of dramatically improving the productivity and reducing the management 
costs of Beta’s large engineering workforce. Since both solutions had proved 
extremely valuable in terms of performance enhancement, the two firms decided 
to market and sell variable versions of them to other organizations. At that point, 
huge incentives to replicate the solutions as much as possible across clients and 
the concomitant need to adapt them to ever new sets of customer requirements 
triggered a process – emerged along a common pattern in both firms –  that led 
to treating replication and adaptation as mutually reinforcing and 
complementary, rather than opposing and contradictory. 
The organizational knowledge that was replicated and/or adapted in the 
selected customer projects was “contained” in the knowledge assets that formed 
the solutions. Specifically, it was embodied in personal computers, handheld 
devices, and other physical products; codified in product documentations, 
software applications, and modelling programs; and embedded in service routines 
for consulting, installation, training, maintenance, support, and so on. Altogether, 
these knowledge assets formed a working system, which could be reproduced and 
sold to new customers, and adapted to meet their specific requirements. 
Therefore, delivering a new solution meant for Alpha and Beta replicating an 
overall existing configuration of that solution that had worked in the past 
(replication at the system level), and reproducing each of its hardware, software, 
and service components (replication at the component level). Whereas adapting 
meant altering the overall configuration by adding, replacing, or excluding 
specific components (adaptation at the system level), or tweaking individual 
components so as to amend or expand part of the knowledge they embedded 
(adaptation at the component level). 
A great part of the organizational knowledge involved in the implementation 
of a new customer solution was explicit, hence ready to replicate, transfer, and 
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reuse. However, the tacit dimension of knowledge played an inevitably important 
role in each project to ensure fit with the client’s business and operational 
specificities. For example, the knowledge about the compatibility of 
configurations of the system deployed in the past with the requirements of a new 
client was entirely detained by experienced individuals. Similarly, knowledge of 
how a given service routine had to be changed in order to fit the client 
operational characteristics was also largely tacit, and often remained 
unarticulated during the whole implementation. For this reasons, both AlphaCore 
and BetaSuite could only be reconfigured and adapted respectively by Alpha and 
Beta once substantial knowledge about the client had been acquired through their 
experienced consultants. Over time and across projects, then, replication and 
adaptation of existing systems and components occurred in iterative fashion. 
We introduce the concept of adaptive replication to designate the process 
(modeled in Figure 2.2) by which the case study firms combined replicative and 
adaptive efforts together to resolve the continuous tension between stability and 
change. The process of adaptive replication involves four sets of activities: 1) 
Template definition; 2) Template deployment; 3) Principle extraction, and; 4) 
Principle enforcement. We describe in detail each of these activities and report in 
Table 2.5 examples of data incidents supporting our interpretations. 
 




Adaptive replication starts with the definition of templates as references for how 
systems of knowledge assets are to be reproduced and deployed in precise 
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scenarios of utilization. Defining the template for an object means specifying a set 
of features or characteristics of that object that can be used as a pattern for 
creating copies. At Alpha and Beta, templates were documents such as manuals, 
schemes, or blueprints that described specific configurations of the solutions and 
crystalized knowledge at two levels. At the level of the overall solution – the 
system of interdependent knowledge assets – they specified the number and types 
of components that participated in the system, and how such components linked 
and related to each other. At the level of the individual component, they 
provided a working example for the specific knowledge asset to be included, with 
information for its implementation. Typical statements of managers from the two 
firms explaining template definition sounded like: “The first thing we would try 
do was, can you create a standard set of design rules and guidelines? Can you 
define a number of essential scenarios that you’re going to encounter – a limited 
number, maybe – and then specify maybe three or four designs that would 
actually meet 80% of those requirements?” Defining a template meant searching, 
achieving, and maintaining internal coherence among the knowledge assets 
included in a system and crystalizing the outcome of such activities for 
subsequent reutilization. Two themes were tightly associated with the concept of 
template definition according to informants from both firms: 1) Thinking in terms 
of systems and architectures, and; 2) Creating reusable assets. 
Systems thinking. System thinking refers to the fact that the solutions 
started to be treated as systems of interrelated knowledge assets, and that a 
formidable effort of knowledge embedment, componentization, and 
standardization became necessary when the solutions had to be transferred to and 
understood and reused by people outside the unit that had developed them. This 
included not only new adopters within lead client organizations that served as 
test, but also sales people of the firm itself, because “you’re not going to achieve 
reuse across divisions or across geographies without some degree of 
normalization”. 
Service-related knowledge was embedded into formalized routines and 
procedures, whereas business, process, and technological knowledge was codified 
into software applications, and/or embodied into hardware components. In 
particular, digital resources played a major role in terms of codification, in that 
many technical and operational instructions, as well as service routines in the 
areas of training, assistance, and support, could be largely “embedded into 
software tools”, and more intuitively communicated to and actioned by new 
users. An informant at Alpha described knowledge embedment as an 
“incremental process of detail the step, standardize the step, detail the 
deliverable, standardize the deliverable, look across the steps in deliverables, see 
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if we can map these onto some kind of common item, and then aggregate that up 
[so that], if you can just write down the steps in enough detail, then the tacit 
knowledge won’t matter”. Similar objectives were also reported at Beta: “we’ve 
taken these matrices, these definitions, and these prices, and we’ve put them in 
sales tools so that a salesman can sit in front of the customer with a version of 
that matrix on the screen. They can select what they want, and it will sort of 
design and price for them there and then. That concept increases our reach and 
our ability to scale [sales] dramatically.” 
 
Table 2.5. Display of representative data supporting interpretations 
Themes Exemplary quotations 
Template Definition 
  
Thinking in terms  
of systems and 
architectures 
“Customers want something that is unique to them […] and the challenge is how you get that 
uniqueness upfront, but build that using the platform that you have […] because, as soon as 
you’ve done it for one, that gets baked back in the platform and keeps going round”. [So it’s a 
kind of uniqueness built around standardized modules and components?] “Exactly”. (Alpha) 
“That [figure] shows a range of products and services, and the customer works on a pick and mix 
[…] It very much works on pick the one that you want, plug that into your organization, and then 
get on with your business. […] It is very modular”. (Beta) 
“The functional blocks are pretty similar, that's pretty standard building blocks. It's just how those 




“We have to first be smart enough to say, here is an industry solution that we believe is going to 
be used or is going to be useful for a number of clients, therefore let’s build an asset around that 
solution and then reuse it in a number of client bases” (Alpha) 
“We’ve created the kind of repeatable approach and method behind each one of these, and 
defined which tools will be used”. (Beta) 
“[Our lab] helped do it for the first time with [the client]. They then took those ideas back and 
created a demo center which we then did with other organizations. […] So there are a number of 




Asset reutilization  “[Alpha] has a number of templates which ask you questions about methods you’re going to use. 
So, in theory, you can decide to opt out, you can say, I’m not going to use these methods, or, no, 
I’m not going to adopt the standard components. But in practice I think you would be forced into 
using them because the risk to the business would be seen as quite high”. (Alpha) 
“Off the shelf components, hand held devices, Wi-Fi connectivity, data networks, back-end 
processor, is standard”. (Beta) 
“We can deliver the same solution in multiple countries for a customer”. (Beta) 
 
Asset fine tuning 
 
“There always is a level of customization needed for the client, and that is adding the client’s 
unique value. And that’s where we see that’s obviously the kind of solution that we are designing 
with them, to bring that unique value to the market” (Alpha) 
“Each customer has their own set of requirements, so the things that are standard are the types 
of device that a customer would use, they’re pretty standard; the [data management platform] 
would be pretty standard, but what's on that [data management platform] in terms of the forms 
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Themes Exemplary quotations 
and the solutions that each customer will use will be different to that customer. The functional 
blocks are pretty similar, that's pretty standard building blocks. It's just how those building blocks 
look to each customer, they have to be customized”. (Beta) 







“We invite customers to get together with a minimal influence from [Alpha]. It's kind of, okay, why 
don't you [clients] get together and share your experience about using [AlphaCore], just 
yourselves, forget about [Alpha]. If you have had a good experience, say it. If you have had a 
bad experience, just say it, because somebody else is going to benefit from your experience. […] 
So, that is another big source of topics that we want to include in our next release of [AlphaCore]. 
Now, there is a committee where you consider what the customers are saying, what Sales is 
saying, what, Services is saying. And you identify, kind of, a list of potential topics that are going 
to be included in the next release”. (Alpha) 
“I’m constantly looking at feedback that we get from customers, from the vendors themselves, 
from our team and our sales teams, as to what would be good initially, to take forward to keep 
the products at the forefront of technology”. (Beta) 
“What we then realized we should have done was, rather than say, okay, what are the options? 
What are the sort of standard LAN [Local Area Network] scenarios? And then what are the 
standard security on the internet scenarios, then what are the standard voice scenarios? What 
we should have done is look at it and say, okay, what are the standard blends for all three? What 
would a big retail outlet be, for example? […] And that led us to have to sort of deconstruct the 




“In terms of [Alpha’s] overall focus, industry and industry knowledge is becoming much more a 
requirement for everyone across the board. That’s very much the way that business is moving, 
and [Alpha] is moving in correspondence with that. There is a much bigger focus on everything 
from an industry point of view. […] Technology and software is a big part of it, but you also need 
to clearly have the business industry view to relate the solution to the client”. (Alpha) 
“There are competitors there, and they do a very good job; I cannot say something different. But 
the key point for [Alpha] is that we have an end-to-end capability from the content, consultancy, 
technology point of view that is difficult to match for somebody else” (Alpha) 
“Our consultants know that it’s not just about technology, there’s a huge piece about getting, you 
know […] they [clients] could go to another telecoms provider, and they might sell you a bunch of 
broadband for home workers, but actually the biggest challenge you’ve got is the kind of change 
management, and the people aspect, and if you don’t get the people aspect right then you might 
as well not bother spending your money on the technology”. (Beta) 









“There are constraints that mean you can't necessarily do everything the same way […] 
Inevitably, local cultural and legal differences end up having impacts on how you do service 
delivery. More so than on products. Products we can, to a large degree, standardize around the 
world”. (Alpha) 
“Typically core consulting is highly customized and pretty close to bespoke. […] System 
integration is much more highly componentized and regulated through the use of consultancy 
methods, and application management services is probably the most componentized of them all. 
[…] Within core consulting, again, there’s probably a hierarchy, something like, you know, 
business strategy is relatively low on standardization and something like, you know, some of the 
supply chain consulting, or financial management consulting is pretty high in terms of its 
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Themes Exemplary quotations 
standardization”. (Alpha) 
“And we already knew some limitations. We knew that, if the technology was very new or very 
immature, they wouldn’t [like] this approach. And we also knew that in some cases, as a result of 
that thing, a technology was quite difficult to standardize. […] We're now pushing up against 
another limit, which says, for certain types of products and service, by all means, standardize, 
that's fine, but the sales approach mustn’t be standardized. You know, the customer prefers the 
personal, the guys who are going to do the delivery and that kind of thing, that information, and I 
guess it’s whether you can create some kind of hybrid approach there, where you’ve got like a 
custom sales approach, but a standardized back end”. (Beta) 
 
Enhancing asset 
reutilization in new 
templates 
“So in the end, you add all of those products in some shape or form, and for each customer, 
actually, the combination that they want might be slightly different. What we need is a solution 
design for that kind of customer, and so what we’ve done is, we’ve basically produced some 
templates on average”. (Beta) 
“There certainly is effort to create an architecture that’s relevant to [our company] as a whole […] 
sort of a method framework that really does apply across the divisions”. (Alpha) 
 “It’s a replicable solution that can be, you know, easily taken out; and the hard work’s now all 
been done with regards to the integration piece between all of the component parts. So the easy 
bit now is to replicate that and there are pockets of replication going on across different industry 
sectors within [Beta]”. 
 
Ensuring fit via 
context 
relatedness 
“We’re actually looking at a couple of other sectors right now to look at the deployment of the 
same concept there”. (Alpha) 
“The second [problem] is selection of the right industry domain to create an asset around. So use 
it in insurance, use it in Telco provisioning system, you know, you can go on and on as to which 





Embedding knowledge supported an increasing componentization of the 
solutions. This means that the role played by each component became more 
easily identifiable as the knowledge-embedding process proceeded, and that the 
systematic interdependences among components were made increasingly explicit. 
Each component could be treated as a separate asset capable of performing a 
precise function and contributing to a system made of many different assets. 
Informants from the studied units used expressions such as “mix-and-match”, 
“plug and play”, or “we cut it into pieces” to refer to the possibility of relying on 
modularity and modular architectures to employ resources flexibly and use assets 
available not just within the units but across the whole organization. 
Componentization concerned not just hardware and software but also service 
components, whose underlying routines were progressively formalized and treated 
as “packages” that contributed to broader offerings. For example, AlphaCore was 
visualized as an architecture that “provides a set of plug-and-play-component 
services” and BetaSuite as a matrix where “each of the boxes has a specific 
definition, a specific price, […] and a written description of what the service will 
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be, if you decide to buy it. And the customer can then pick, broadly, whatever 
mix he wants.” 
Executives and managers interviewed at both firms used the terms “standard”, 
“standardize”, and “standardization” to designate assets designed to be directly 
reused across projects over time, as well as the process by which such assets were 
created. Solution templates were “standard”, because they were conceived to be 
recognized and employed as models both within the unit and across the company. 
But increasingly, also the individual assets that formed the solutions became 
“standard”. An executive at Alpha, for example, explained that “the modern 
currency of any of these systems is really data; that data has to be formatted in 
standard processes, standard datasets that allow you to repeat it. […] If the 
market changes, are my systems flexible enough that I can actually gear them up 
and gear them down? […] A dynamic system which has got a bunch of component 
modules in effect that allows you to do anything that you like with it.” And the 
possibility to flexibly manage standard, interchangeable components put 
architectural thinking and “system architects” on central stage. As an executive 
at Beta highlighted, “the idea of architects is they’re interested in the shape and 
structure of systems, at a relatively high level, as opposed to a technical, 
specialist level.” 
Creating reusable assets. The second theme associated with the concept of 
template definition is the creation of “reusable assets”. The word “asset” was 
recurrently used by informants at Alpha to refer to solution components that 
embodied knowledge, or “intellectual capital”, and whose value resided in their 
“reusability” across multiple client projects. At Beta, terms such as “tools”, 
“models”, and “blueprints” were used to express the same idea. Creating reusable 
assets involved preparing solution components for both reutilization (i.e., within 
the unit and/or across the firm) and transfer into context (i.e., the client 
organization). Managers from the studied units provided their own views about 
how assets were prepared for reutilization. 
 
I’d say the approach that dominates is what I would call a procedural 
approach. […] It’s a process of really identifying the procedural steps that are 
involved in delivering some kind of service, and then examining each of those 
steps to say, does that step have associated with it something tangible that we 
can then standardize? [...] And so there’s this kind of incremental process of 
detail the step, standardize the step, detail the deliverable, standardize the 
deliverable, look across the steps in deliverables, see if we can map these onto 




So we needed to take the learning from the solutions that we’ve already sold, 
such as [client A] and say, which elements of these are repeatable? And can we 
design them in such a way where we can have a standard pricing structure and 
a standard set of terms and conditions? And then what we can do is we can 
take these building blocks and combine them in different ways to meet 
customers’ requirements. (Beta) 
 
Asset reusability was usually spotted by the units during the delivery of client 
projects. Components designed to meet a specific client’s needs but deemed likely 
to be employed again and again in future projects were purposefully endowed 
with “generic” or “common” features. As a result, such components would have 
been not only reusable by the firm as internal “standards”, but also more likely 
to fit by design similar client contexts. To this purpose, the collaboration with 
“lead clients” early on in “pilot projects” played a major role in helping prepare 
assets for transfer. Clients benefited from the collaboration because “they could 
have the application that mirrored their requirements”; the firm’s advantage 
resided instead in the possibility of reselling the components and the solutions 
elsewhere. Interviewees with different roles in the two firms provided different 
flavors of the tight collaboration with lead clients on pilot projects: 
 
There is a partner [the lead client] in play who really does understand that 
marketplace. There is a business partner we are working with which is quite 
unique in the first place. [The client’s] customer set is big enough to be able to 
define the standard. […] Because they have a lot of volume they can drive the 
standard to a slightly higher level. And take a huge share. […] So, there is a 
chance of creating a utility out of this which we can re-use in many situations. 
(Alpha) 
 
We did it as a team activity, between the [the client and us]. So, there was 
always a close bond between us through the whole life of that project. (Beta) 
Template Deployment 
After a template has been defined, its deployment in multiple instances of 
transfer gives it structure and stability. Deploying templates as “working 
examples” sustained successful expansion. Informants from Beta clarified that, 
“once we proved this worked, we found a number of contracts [that] wanted to 
use it. […] If you pick banking, for example, we were in the big four [banks], 
whereas this kind of approach took us into all the other banks”. And similarly at 
Alpha, “we have a standard [AlphaCore] that is applied across the world. The 
only difference is where customers may have some translation, but the actual 
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[solution] is the same.” Template deployment involves intertwined replication and 
adaptation, as showed by data collected about the two emerging themes of: 1) 
Asset reutilization, and; 2) Asset fine tuning. 
Asset reutilization. When a system template is replicated and deployed in 
multiple instances of transfer, most of the knowledge assets it comprises are 
reused extensively, because “different end users can use the same bits, so the bits 
are the same, they are standardized” (firm-wide, at Alpha). For example, 
“professional services that are used around data capture, data interrogation, 
integration, bang, bang, bang, they will be standard” (firm-wide, at Beta). And 
within BetaSuite, “the things that are standard are the types of device that a 
customer would use; the data management platform would be pretty standard […] 
so in terms of the high level, the functional blocks, i.e. a device, support for that 
device and [data management] platform with or without tracking etc., now that’s 
all pretty standard” (for the firm). 
Asset fine tuning. However, template deployment is not just about 
replication. At the same time, it generally involves some adaptation to the 
requirements and specificities of the client context. Such requirements may lead, 
for example, to recoding part of a software application, to replace or upgrade the 
devices of a computer, or to altering the routines of service activities. As 
managers from both firms pointed out: “there are always good reasons why you 
need a local variant, and inevitably these things get customized locally”; “what 
we do is, every single deployment to the customer, we change it slightly”; “so the 
mechanism remains the same but the actual application varies on a customer-by-
customer basis”. With the term fine tuning we refer to adaptive mutations of the 
template during its deployment, which are obtained by altering or replacing 
individual assets, or components, without modifying the overall template, or 
system architecture. Fine tuning is a crucial activity that aims at ensuring fit 
with the recipient context within a given client project, or instance of transfer, 
because “there always is a level of customization needed for the client, and that is 
adding the client’s unique value.” 
A number of factors made adaptive fine tuning necessary, the most important 
of which, at least initially, was the need to enrich the solutions and expand their 
functionalities.  
 
The first reason [for adaptation] has to do with coverage. We estimate that at 
least for retail banks [AlphaCore] covers about 70% of the needs for the 
standard project. So we don’t claim that we have 100% of every piece of 
information that might be required by every bank. And that’s just because, 
you know, different banks collect different kinds of information or different 
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countries have different requirements. […] So there will always be probably a 
percentage, that it’s just too detailed for us to have collected earlier. And also, 
as we expand, for example, as we move from pure retail banking to maybe 
corporate banking or financial markets, then we discover that we need to 
expand [AlphaCore]. (Alpha) 
 
Every sale is slightly different. The software is slightly different. But over time, 
as we’ve sold it to different customers, we’ve actually added that bit in. So 
you’ve got a position where, first time, we nearly had to decide to write the 
simple application from scratch, second time it’s about 60% of what a 
customer wants, and now we’re in a position where 90% of that are ready. 
(Beta) 
 
Later on, more recipient-specific factors included the client’s established routines, 
and their interest to differentiate from competitors. Executives from Alpha, for 
example, explain that clients “don’t want to buy a standard service. They want a 
service that is customized to the way that they have traditionally run their 
business. And that is not so much a question of competitive advantage, as really 
simple habit. Thinking of many of the things that we end up debating with them, 
when you come down to it, they can't really defend in terms of there’s a really 
good business reason why we have to do it this way. It’s just the way they do it 
today, and that’s the way they want [us] to do it.” Other factors arose from the 
economic, social, legal, and cultural environment. For example, “telemetry, i.e. 
how is the vehicle performing, is becoming more important [as part of BetaSuite] 
because diesel prices have gone up, carbon emissions, and all that, so that’s 
become more important. [And also] we’ve added, since last time something called 
‘duty of care’, looking after singleton workers, because some European legislation 
has come into force which says that company directors can be accused of 
corporate manslaughter if they haven’t done something to help individual workers 
that work away from the base.” Similarly at Alpha, adaptive fine-tuning 
responded to “constraints that mean you can’t necessarily do everything the same 
way. These tend to show up in places you might not expect. For example they 
may show up in things like privacy laws. I know, for example, in Germany, which 
has very strong privacy laws, we've often had debates with the customers about 
who can replenish paper in a printer. Because if you can replenish paper in the 
printer, you could probably see some of the output from that printer, and, you 
know, should [Alpha] employees be able to see healthcare records printed out on 
a printer? Or you have labor laws that say in one country people can essentially 
work 40 hours, 60 hours. In France they might only be able to work 35 hours. Or 
in Germany, if you want someone to work on a weekend, you may have to go to 
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the works council, and get specific permission for the effort. So, inevitably, local 
cultural and legal differences end up having impacts on how you do service 
delivery.” And finally, fine tuning was also driven by particular behavioral 
attitudes towards the idea of fit. An informant at Beta explained that “many 
people [employees] in this type of environment have an A type personality, [they 
are] slightly aggressive, they want to get stuff done, they want to be heroes […] 
To say, I’m not going to build it exactly just using my brain power, I’m going to 
use somebody else’s brain power and adapt it for my customer, now, that is quite 
difficult, because people like to do stuff perfectly, and they always think, I’m the 
best at doing it, and I’ll do it perfect for my customer.” 
Fine tuning produces benefits in term of enhanced fit that can go well beyond 
the specific project in which it is accomplished. As assets get “tweaked”, 
modified, and adapted, and as new assets are created, additional features and 
novel functions are added to a system. As a result, the solution becomes more 
and more capable of meeting the characteristics of new clients and contexts. So, 
“if our team implements this in a customer and we learn some new business 
processes, we then come back to the center and start to look at [AlphaCore] to 
take some of that learning back into the [solution] and that becomes the next 
release”. And “those newer packages are, in most cases, some custom solution 
that’s been put into a client and then turned into a package which will then go 
on to sell [to other clients].” This progressive enrichment entails that, as 
components gets altered and adjusted, needs for further fine tuning tend to 
decrease over time. 
Principle Extraction 
Fine tuning often leads to unveiling new principles behind systems functioning 
or performing in a specific way. Principles are basic rules that explain why a set 
of factors produce certain results. They capture knowledge about the causal 
relationships between factors employed (the components included in a system) 
and results obtained (the system’s behavior or performance). Some principles, for 
example, take into account the systemic interdependencies among components, so 
that “it doesn’t make sense, for example, unless you actually have a remote line 
into the customer and are actually managing the devices, you can't offer 
performance reporting and configuration management, because you physically 
haven't got a link to get the data.” Other principles refer to commercial and 
financial constraints, and prescribe, for example, the achievement of “a sensible 
mix” of hardware, software, and service components, “because if we’re not careful 
and we sell too many [hardware components], the margins will be lower as an 
effect.” And yet other principles reflect strategic choices about industrial 
39 
 
relationships, such as the firm’s neutrality towards the use of third-party 
components, so that “it is irrelevant to us if the system that the company has is a 
[Brand X], an [Alpha] product, or [a Brand Y] product”; and that an “ 
[AlphaCore component] is totally independent and intentionally pure. […] What 
we didn’t want to do is go to an independent software vendor or [to a client] and 
say, take [AlphaCore] and therefore you have to buy it all, because they would 
never do that. So we had to create something which was completely agnostic.”  
Extracting new principles from an altered template means identifying emergent 
logic and rules that explain why a system of assets functions in novel ways. The 
new logic and rules are then used to generate new templates. Managers of the 
two firms referred to events like this with expressions like: “we’re actually looking 
at a couple of other sectors right now, to look at the deployment of the same 
concept there” and “[after] probably about a year of doing [a solution], that went 
down quite well, customers liked that; but then, we started to get requests for 
doing other things in the same way, the same model.” Generic principles can 
certainly originate from multiple sources other than the deployment of a 
template. They can arise from the external environment in the form, for example, 
of financial constraints, technological innovation, or legal requirements, or in the 
internal environment when new principles are put forward by research and 
development divisions at both Alpha and Beta. However, the new principles 
extracted through fine tuning are far more specific and intimately coherent with 
existing and working systems of knowledge assets and, for this reason, more likely 
to trigger new waves of reutilization. 
Principle extraction draws on two main themes: 1) Acquiring metaknowledge, 
and 2) Knowledge integration. 
Acquiring metaknowledge. As we investigated the role of principles in 
activities of replication and adaptation at Alpha and Beta, we learnt that people 
responsible for the management and development of the solutions – intended as 
overall, constantly evolving offerings – strove to acquire essential knowledge 
about the knowledge assets involved in the systems and their mutual 
interrelationships and interdependencies. This “knowledge about knowledge” 
concerned, for example, the impact that the addition of a software component 
simultaneously had on the technical, commercial, business, organizational, and 
strategic layers, or the cascade effect that alterations in hardware components 
could produce on other, interrelated assets. 
Metaknowledge was largely detained by senior individuals at both firms, and 
was acquired during very long professional experience and through constant 
interaction with multiple sources, both internal (technical as well as commercial 
areas) and external (chiefly customers, suppliers, and technological and service 
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partners). For example, two informants with about 30 years’ experience and 
directly involved in the study of the high-level, systemic interdependencies among 
knowledge assets, provided the following details about their role. 
 
I developed some abstraction skills which seemed to me to be useful. And from 
that I realized that we could actually start to develop a hierarchy of 
abstractions from the business problem we were trying to solve, the application 
shape that would solve that problem, the run time, the middleware shape, 
logical shape, that would solve the problem, and ultimately product 
instantiations of those patterns that would help solve the problems. (Alpha) 
 
Broadly speaking, what would you do? What would you deliver? What base 
circuits would you use? What [control program] would you use on the end of 
it? What kind of pricing would you use? What service would you offer? (Beta) 
 
Besides the role of select experts at both firms and their day-to-day interactions 
with various sources of metaknowledge, we observed in one of the units an 
additional, more structured approach to the acquisition of metaknowledge. In 
fact, the AlphaCore unit organized yearly user-group events to intercept client 
needs for change and innovation of the AlphaCore solution. User groups were 
organized by industry and attended by clients within each industry. On those 
occasions, clients shared and discussed together their experiences in the 
implementation and adoption of AlphaCore. Positive experiences reinforced client 
acceptance of the solution, while negative ones allowed Alpha’s unit to identify 
areas of further improvement, and to spot new needs for change and adaptation. 
Knowledge integration. The second theme central to principle extraction 
and intimately linked to the use of metaknowledge is knowledge integration. 
Principle extraction, indeed, can only be accomplished through the integration of 
multiple domains of knowledge, such as business, operational, technological, and 
architectural knowledge. Knowledge integration is required to understand the 
principles behind a system, to deconstruct, based on those principles, the system 
into diverse knowledge assets, and to construct new systems that embody the 
same principles but in novel and non-obvious ways. This theme included, for 
example, numerous statements about the importance of bringing together 
technological and non-technological knowledge. We learned, for example, that the 
team responsible for managing AlphaCore components is “an unusual bunch of 
people, in that they have that sort of weird combination of really understanding 
the technical computer science detail and the business analysis. So, we find it 
hard to get people, obviously, with those skills.” And the same ability to “know 
and understand” across domains was equally emphasized by executives and 
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managers at Beta, when they stated: “We don’t try to sell the technology. We 
sell the fact that we understand how to improve your operations, and then the 
technology just drops in behind it. […] The easy bit is actually the software, the 
hard bit is getting the people [such as the client’s employees] to accept that 
there’s going to be a major change. And that’s where we sort of specialize in.” In 
another set of statements, also labeled as “knowledge integration”, interviewees 
referred to “end-to-end capabilities” as the strategically relevant ability to seize 
principles through multi-domain knowledge. 
 
The key strength that we have analyzed, and we articulate, is bringing 
together the business solution and business point of view all the way through 
to the end. It’s the full end-to-end view of the solution. (Alpha)  
 
It is very easy to describe a piece of technology […] It’s a little harder to talk 
about the softer issues, because they happen to be the most important part of 
any solution delivery. The people aspects, the cultural change, the 
transformation within the business will all be affected by the deployment of 
the solution. And ultimately, it is that that will drive a successful solution as 
compared to the technology. (Beta) 
Principle Enforcement 
The reason why at both the unit and the firm levels resources are constantly 
devoted to principle extraction was that extracted principles could then be 
enforced into new families of templates, in order to start new waves of 
replication. We saw the idea of “enforcement” emerging from the fact that it 
always took decisional power and organizational control at the firm level to put 
forward principles for the generation of new templates. For example, executives 
from both organizations used statements like “we’ve put business rules in for 
commercial reasons, to actually make sure the profitability of what we were 
selling was good enough”, or “the levers are in the [solutions] themselves, the 
control points are the architectural principles on which the [solutions] are built, 
those are the control points”. 
Three themes provided insights into principle enforcement: 1) Translating 
principles into design rules; 2) Enhancing asset reutilization in new templates, 
and; 3) Ensuring fit via context relatedness. 
Translating principles into design rules. The first theme of principle 
enforcement is the translation of principles into design rules. Such rules can be 
then used to realize new knowledge assets (component level). An executive at 
Alpha, for example, described his job as one that aims to “understand the types 
of issues that [clients] would have, to be able to articulate back to them their 
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issues and the proposed technological solutions around that, but have that 
embedded in the software. So it’s much easier or quicker for us to say to [a 
client], here’s how this particular database would help you with your [legal] 
requirements, and so on”. But the most powerful way to employ principles via 
design rules is applying them to entire generations or families of templates 
(system level) that are adopted within and/or across units, well beyond the scope 
of the system from which the principle had been originally extracted. An example 
of broadly-applied design rule at Alpha was the “separateness between format 
and content” of technologies, so that “any technology decisions we take is done 
once through our [formats], and the content becomes packages that come within 
that. So the two, [formats and content], while integrated, should be separated. So 
technology should not take into account whether that’s for [industry X, industry 
Y], or whatever: we have standardized formats”. And a similar example at Beta 
was the “productization of service components”, on the basis of which “we did 
[solution A] first, and then we said ‘actually, we need to have this formalized 
package around the professional services perspective, for all of the portfolio areas’ 
[…] We’ve created the repeatable approach and method behind each one of these, 
and defined which tools will be used. Then we have trained all of the consultants 
who will deliver it, so not only do we have consistent articulation of our 
professional services capability, which is core to all of our propositions, but we 
also will deliver it consistently. When we launch into each country, we train the 
consultants up, so it’s kind of productizing professional services […] The reason we 
made them productized is because professional services need to be made tangible 
for customers.  
Enhancing asset reutilization in new templates. Principles are 
translated into design rules in a way that enhances the reutilization of existing 
knowledge assets in new system templates. Direct asset reutilization can be 
achieved via reconfiguration of portfolios of assets that are rearranged as 
“building blocks” of novel templates, as it emerged from statements like: “we are 
trying to provide standard solutions that are configured; a subtle difference from 
developing bespoke solutions”, or “what we normally find in these propositions is, 
what are the building blocks, and how I mass customize them”. 
At Alpha, asset reutilization through reconfiguration paved the way for rapid 
and successful expansion. New versions of AlphaCore were rapidly created and 
adapted so as to gain dominance in one industry and to conquer considerable 
market shares in four other industries. Reconfiguration allowed Beta not only to 
create a new version of BetaSuite for sales forces (as opposed to work forces), but 
also to define new templates for new types of solutions that addressed similar 
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operational problems in other industries, such as the optimization of logistics and 
tracking of goods in retail and parcel services. 
The theme of asset reutilization through the generation of new templates was 
also reinforced by other informants that reported the same dynamics occurring in 
other units and divisions of both organizations. In particular, principle 
enforcement as a way to balance replication and adaptation is today a mantra in 
Alpha’s global strategic agenda, as “there certainly is effort to create an 
architecture that’s relevant to [Alpha] as a whole […] sort of a method framework 
that really does apply across the divisions”. Albeit carried out in a slower and 
less coordinated fashion than at Alpha, principle enforcement drove also Beta’s 
cross sector expansion. An executive explained that “we’ve taken the same 
principle and applied it where we have good repeatable [resources] within some of 
our [client] sectors. For example, in financial services, we’ve found that we were 
doing a lot of work around enabling a new site to be set up quickly, be it a new 
site out in Asia for [Bank A], and our consultants were helping customers 
understand how to get all the coms in, how to set up the infrastructure, how to 
look at the data centers, and how would you do your call centers, and all these 
sorts of things. So we’ve actually packaged that up into something called, 
[solution X]. And, actually, what we’ve found is that it’s not just applicable to 
financial services, it’s applicable to retail, construction, anywhere where they 
have remote sites, so [now] we’ve got six of those [solutions]. 
Ensuring fit via context relatedness. Just like template deployment, 
principle enforcement is not just about replication and reutilization of assets in 
new templates; it also involves adaptation. The third theme of principle 
enforcement – ensuring fit via context relatedness – refers to meeting the 
fundamental requirement that new systems of replicated assets match the 
characteristics of their recipient contexts. To ensure dynamic fit between 
replicated knowledge and context of use, the studied firms relied on extracted 
principles to explore and select new contexts that presented similar 
characteristics, so as to allow the transfer of slightly adapted versions of the same 
solution. In the experience of our informants, this idea of proceeding by context 
relatedness and sustaining expansion through an adaptive selection of the 
solutions was rendered by expressions like: “we’re actually looking at a couple of 
other sectors right now to look at the deployment of the same concept there”; “in 
many of the sectors, we decided to invest in creating generic [solutions] for 
industries”, and; “over the last twenty years, [Alpha] has moved more and more 
towards being industry-led”. For example, it was well clear within the AlphaCore 
unit that “insurance and banking have the same content. Both will have data 
warehouses, processes, and services. Of course they are industry oriented, and 
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they have some differences between them. But the banking family [of solutions] is 
called [AlphaCoreB] and the insurance family [of solutions] is called 
[AlphaCoreI]”. An similarly at Beta, “what’s happening now is, this is [BetaCore], 
there’s now a [solution] been developed called [BetaCoreS], which obviously is 
almost the same thing, but for sales, let’s say for white-collar workers, because 
like a blue-collar worker, a salesman might start [their work] at home”. 
2.5 Discussion 
The ongoing tension between stability and change permeates organizational 
life (Thompson, 1967; Weick, 1979). An area of organizational activities crucially 
affected by such tension is the transfer and reutilization of knowledge. When 
engaging in systematic knowledge transfer, organizations face the challenge of 
being able to reuse what they “know” into novel and changing contexts. Previous 
research has found that firms engage in both replication and adaptation within 
the same instances of transfer (Szulanski & Jensen, 2006; Williams, 2007), but 
how they balance and combine the two was largely unexplored. We found that 
the case study firms resort to a set of interrelated activities to replicate and 
adapt selectively, but simultaneously, different types of knowledge assets. The 
four activities comprised in the process of adaptive replication – template 
definition, template deployment, principle extraction, and principle enforcement – 
are intertwined and sequential. In fact, templates can be deployed only after they 
have been carefully defined, principles must be identified and extracted before 
being enforced in new generations of templates, and the identification and 
extraction of new principles follows from fine-tuning interventions carried out 
during template deployment. 
The emerging process model contributes to the knowledge management 
literature on replication (Jensen & Szulanski, 2007; Szulanski et al., 2004; 
Szulanski & Jensen, 2006, 2008; Winter & Szulanski, 2001; Winter et al., 2012) 
and adaptation (Kostova, 1999; Kostova & Roth, 2002; Williams, 2007; Yu & 
Zaheer, 2010) by unveiling the interplay between templates and principles, and 
describing how their twofold role allows balancing and combining – at the fine-
grained level of the individual knowledge assets involved in the transfer – the 
apparently diverging objectives of stable reutilization and fit with changing 
conditions. In fact, apart from acting as carriers of replication (Baden-Fuller & 
Winter, 2007; Jensen & Szulanski, 2007), templates and principles support 
adaptation too. In particular, our data show that, beyond their crucially 
prescriptive value as “working examples” that can be followed closely to create 
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replicas (Jensen & Szulanski, 2007; Szulanski & Winter, 2002; Winter & 
Szulanski, 2001), templates play a fundamental role in channeling adaptation and 
change, for they provide a reference for screening various options of fine tuning 
interventions and selecting the ones that are internally consistent. Before the 
transfer, templates crystalize the outcome of intense activities aiming at 
searching, achieving, and maintaining internal fit among existing knowledge 
assets. During the transfer, they foster the reutilization of those internally 
coherent assets, and offer guidance for adaptive mutations that realize external fit 
with the characteristics of the recipient context. Just like templates, principles 
support replication and adaptation alike, but their contribution to the alignment 
of internal and external fit is different. Enhancing the replication of existing 
assets into new families of templates is certainly the most intuitive role played by 
principles. We have learned that principles subsume metaknowledge about the 
template, its internal composition and functioning, and the connections between 
the template and the context. Therefore, their enforcement into novel templates 
as design rules triggers the direct reutilization of existing assets that are known 
to comply with the rules. At the same time, however, principles also act as tools 
of adaptive selection, for they provide criteria for determining context relatedness 
and orienting the search for and the identification of potentially matching 
contexts. On the dual and complementary roles of templates and principles the 
whole process of adaptive replication hinges to ensure effective transfer and 
generate innovation and change through reutilization of existing knowledge. 
The study also contributes to our theory of organizational knowledge by 
opening a new perspective on the intrinsic nature and characteristics of this 
resource. Our data from consistently successful cases of interfirm transfer show no 
evidence of stickiness or causal ambiguity. The kind of transfer put in place by 
the case study firms entails that all causal relationships between a given 
configuration of assets within the template and the template’s performance be 
identified and deeply understood. Causal relationships are captured and explained 
by principles; and seizing and extracting principles systematically allows to unveil 
the rules that hold together the template, and to remove obstacles to both its 
reproduction and rapid alteration. Such evidence suggests that stickiness and 
causal ambiguity may not be necessarily and intrinsically related to the very 
nature of knowledge. Instead, they appear as extrinsically and incidentally 
consequent to specific modes of knowledge management. In particular, leveraging 
metaknowledge enables the organization to understand and influence how 
different knowledge assets interact, and to predict how the knowledge context 
will affect the knowledge content; but it also determines how knowledge ‘works’, 
and how sticky or ambiguous it ‘appears’ to managers. The crucial function of 
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metaknowledge is more clearly evident if we consider the differences between 
“pure replication” – as it would be pursued, for example, by chain organizations – 
and the adaptive replication undertaken by our case study firms. While the 
former allows reproducing knowledge that is causally ambiguous or “partially 
understood at the source” (Winter & Szulanski, 2000, p. 208), “and enables the 
transfer of those activities without the need to understand their causes, 
consequences, and interdependence” (Williams, 2007), the latter requires that 
causalities are fully clarified in order to satisfy what Szulanski and Jensen (2008) 
identify as prerequisites of local adaptation: an adequate understanding of 1) the 
recipient context; 2) the knowledge contained in the template, and; 3) the 
interactions between the template and the context. Our findings suggest that 
these different ways in which knowledge is ‘treated’ descend not from differences 
in the intrinsic characteristics of this resource, but rather from different ways of 
conceiving and pursuing content-context fit. In the view of replicators, multiple 
local contexts are simply probed through trial-and-error strategies, but not 
understood. Since the incentives to adapt do not exceed the costs of adaptation, 
the failure and quick dismissal of newly established units is a viable option which 
does not endanger corporate survival. By contrast, our case study firms transfer 
their knowledge to large client organizations; so large and strategically important 
to the firm that “things simply can’t go wrong”. In their experience, the process 
of adaptive replication is shaped simultaneously by huge incentives to replicate 
and to adapt, in a way that generates “organizational understanding” (Williams, 
2007) of the content-context fit conditions. We argue that such understanding 
resides in the metaknowledge acquired through principle extraction and accrued 
over time within template-principles combinations. These considerations hint at 
the possibility of a hierarchical order among the characteristics of knowledge. If 
complexity, stickiness, and causal ambiguity can be eluded or resolved through 
informed choices of knowledge management, the same cannot be said of context 
dependence, which seems to be the ultimate and ineluctably constitutional 
characteristic of knowledge. Not only because it persists independently of how 
knowledge is managed, but especially because it characterizes the transfer as 
search for fit between contexts (the source and the recipient). To a close scrutiny, 
in fact, the template and its set of contained principles represent a particular 
footprint of the source context. And each combination of template and inset 
principles works as a multidimensional fitness landscape within which the 
organization searches for and realizes a matching between the internal and the 
external context. From this point of view, context dependence can ‘explain’ why 




From a knowledge management perspective, the model offers new insights into 
the relationships between the different but fundamentally intertwined processes of 
creation, replication, and adaptation of organizational knowledge. The four modes 
of knowledge conversion that form the SECI process proposed by Nonaka and 
colleagues (Nonaka, 1991; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; von Krogh, Ichijo, & 
Nonaka, 2000) are certainly at the basis of most knowledge-related activities, 
including those carried out around templates and principles. We have learnt from 
our case studies that the definition and employment of templates involves the use 
of both tacit and explicit knowledge. Within teams, individuals share tacit 
knowledge about the system components that have to be included in a template, 
and their characteristics; they articulate part of such knowledge into formalized 
examples that can be communicated and exchanged across teams, and; compare 
and combine the knowledge codified in different templates to extract lessons and 
indications for future reutilization. Similarly, extracting and enforcing new 
principles entails internalizing part of the explicit knowledge embedded in 
adapted templates, and leveraging it to trigger new waves of template definition 
and employment. However, by relying solely on the concept of knowledge 
conversion we cannot fully understand how the selective leveraging and 
reutilization of knowledge allows reconciling objectives of replication and 
adaptation, and carrying out both practices simultaneously as organization-level 
strategies. To capture this crucial aspect of the knowledge-related activities 
underlying adaptive replication, it is necessary to appreciate the role of templates 
and principles as tools that drive and direct the interactions and exchanges 
between individuals towards common purposes of knowledge reproduction and 
transfer. Intended and employed as formal representations of systems of 
interrelated assets, templates provide a systemic view of how and when assets 
need to be assembled, reused, and altered once they become part of larger 
organization-level systems. Likewise, using principles entails establishing a 
structure, or hierarchical order, among different knowledge assets to organize and 
optimize their purposeful utilization within complex systems. Taking into 
consideration such special properties of templates and principles triggers our 
reflection on the possibility of integrating the business strategy and the 
knowledge management perspectives. While studies of knowledge creation have 
focused on the interplay between the tacit and explicit dimensions along a process 
that links the interactions of individuals and teams with organization-level 
outcomes (Nonaka, 1991; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; von Krogh et al., 2000), the 
literature on replication and adaptation has examined the firm-level reutilization 
and alteration of knowledge for the strategically-oriented reproduction of 
organizational units as systems of knowledge assets (Jensen & Szulanski, 2004; 
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Szulanski, 1996; Szulanski & Jensen, 2006, 2008; Winter, 1995; Winter & 
Szulanski, 2001; Winter et al., 2012). A crucial difference between the two 
perspectives concerns the role of managerial control and strategy. Nonaka and 
colleagues point out that leadership plays a crucial role in knowledge-related 
activities (Nonaka et al., 2000a; von Krogh, Nonaka, & Rechsteiner, 2012), but 
they also recognize that “the knowledge-creating process cannot be managed in 
the traditional sense of ‘management’, which centres on controlling the flow of 
information” (Nonaka et al., 2000a: 22). Leaders can provide a knowledge vision, 
define incentives, build around individuals and teams favorable contextual 
conditions, and even “take an inventory of the knowledge assets and on that 
create a strategy to build, maintain and utilise the firm’s knowledge assets 
effectively and efficiently (Nonaka et al., 2000a: 24)”, but the guidance they offer 
hardly goes beyond a generic sense of direction for the knowledge-creation 
process, where the process itself appears as the ultimate end of leadership. And 
even the layered system of centralized and distributed leadership recently 
conceptualized by von Krogh et al. (2012) does not provide illustration of specific 
actions and activities that strategies of knowledge reutilization should involve. By 
contrast, the reproduction of entire technological systems at the firm level studied 
by the strategy literature is led by, and instrumental to, clear objectives of 
dimensional growth and geographic expansion. It has to follow precise strategic 
directions, so that knowledge is either replicated or adapted, or both, in 
purposeful processes of transfer that act as means of the firm’s broader strategy 
(Winter & Szulanski, 2001). Between the two levels, the template- and principle-
related activities seem to act as a control mechanism that links the knowledge 
creation spiral (Nonaka et al., 2001; Nonaka et al., 2000a) to the firm’s specific 
strategies of asset reutilization. In other terms, templates and principles represent 
an intermediate conceptual layer between the knowledge creation process and the 
systematic reutilization of specific knowledge assets generated by that process. If 
“the open ended value of knowledge assets means that there is no one-to-one 
correspondence between the effort required to create them and the value of the 
services that they yield” (Boisot, 1998: 3), the adaptive replication process serves 
the managerial intent of ensuring that systems of knowledge assets systematically 
deliver value that is coherent and instrumental to the firm’s overall strategy 
(Nonaka & Toyama, 2002; Teece, Rumelt, Dosi, & Winter, 1994). To that 
purpose, adaptive replication seems to transcend the tacit-explicit and individual-
collective distinctions (Nonaka, 1994; Polanyi, 1962, 1967), and rely on 
combinations of other, strictly functional dimensions of knowledge. In particular, 
templates appear as ideal tools for storing and reproducing the declarative (know-
what) and procedural (know-how) dimensions, whereas principles subsume the 
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causal (know-why), conditional (know-when), and relational (know-with) 
dimensions (Alavi & Leidner, 2001; Demarest, 1997; Quinn, Anderson, & 
Finkelstein, 1996; Tiwana, 2000). 
Finally, the study contributes to both evolutionary economics (Nelson & 
Winter, 1982) and the resource-based view of the firm (Penrose, 1959; Rumelt, 
1984; Wernerfelt, 1984), and provides fresh insights into how these two strands of 
thought relate to each other. Our model of adaptive replication unveils how the 
interdependences and complementarities among replication, selection, and 
mutation govern technological and organizational change. From an evolutionary 
perspective, the evidence of templates and principles as carriers of knowledge that 
can be reproduced and reconstructed reiteratively suggests that knowledge is the 
most elemental genetic material of organizational living. Our findings show that 
this ever-fluid resource (McEvily & Chakravarthy, 2002) undergoes processes of 
replication, mutation, and selection at a more fine-grained level than knowledge-
embedding assets do, and that change and evolution in products, technologies, 
and routines appear, simply and essentially, as the change and evolution of the 
underlying knowledge. From a resource-based point of view, the evolutionary 
dynamics of adaptive replication constitute an important source of idiosyncratic 
and difficult-to-imitate competences and capabilities of the firm. In particular, 
acquiring and leveraging metaknowledge enriches and preserves the firm’s 
idiosyncratic stock of assets and resources (Dierickx & Cool, 1989) in three ways. 
First, the use of metaknowledge generates understanding of how context-related 
knowledge works. By bringing such learning back into the organization’s 
activities, and assimilating it into ever new configurations of reusable assets, the 
firm nurtures and enhances its combinative capabilities (Kogut & Zander, 1992). 
Second, the new configurations of knowledge assets obtained by principle 
enforcement are exclusive to the firm, for they result from a peculiar fit between 
the external and the internal context. Third, the dynamic use of templates and 
principles increases the reusability of existing knowledge and delays its 
depreciation (Argote, 1999; Darr et al., 1995) by renewing and strengthening the 
functional connections between the knowledge endowment and the environment. 
Implications of the Adaptive Replication Process Model 
Our work offers two considerations about interpretive and analytical vantage 
points for the study of knowledge transfer and reuse. First, our findings confirm 
Williams’s (2007) intuition that a deep understanding of replicative and adaptive 
phenomena can only be achieved by holding a dualistic view (Farjoun, 2010; 
Graetz & Smith, 2008) of the transfer process. Extant research that maintained a 
specific focus on either replication (Jensen & Szulanski, 2007; Szulanski et al., 
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2004; Szulanski & Jensen, 2006, 2008; Winter & Szulanski, 2001; Winter et al., 
2012) or adaptation (Kostova, 1999; Kostova & Roth, 2002; Yu & Zaheer, 2010) 
has produced invaluable insights, but it has also missed the synergistic effects 
resulting from the interplay between the two. In this study we have learned that 
knowledge depends on and interacts with both the context of its production and 
the context of utilization, and that a deep understanding of the transfer process 
requires capturing the balance of contradicting requirements as a way to attain 
fit between contexts. 
Second, our findings highlight the advantages of holding a holistic or system 
approach to the study of knowledge transfer and reuse. With just few exceptions 
(Rivkin, 2001; Williams, 2007), previous research has largely focused on single 
types of knowledge assets, with the greater part of scholars’ attention specifically 
devoted to routines and practices (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Winter & Szulanski, 
2001). In our interactions with the field, we have learned that focusing on just a 
single type of knowledge asset would have resulted in a biased interpretation of 
the transfer, as replication and adaptation were applied selectively to different 
types of assets. In several instances, for example, service routines and practices 
were reproduced faithfully and transferred as were, while fine tuning alterations 
of software components within the same solution played a major role in adapting 
the whole system to the specific context. Based on this consideration, we argue 
that the mutual interdependences among the different types of knowledge assets 
participating in the transfer matter, and must be taken into account in order to 
capture the interplay between replicative and adaptive practices, and to 
understand their equally important contributions to successful transfer. 
Limitations and Future Research 
Interpretive studies that focus on a limited number of organizations often raise 
questions about the transferability (Guba & Lincoln, 1985) of the findings to 
other domains. In particular, case studies allow for thick and accurate 
observations, and support relatively simple and effective conceptualizations, but 
they generally entail a compromise in terms of generalizability (Thorngate, 1976; 
Weick, 2005). A few considerations about the characteristics of the empirical 
setting as situational boundary conditions of the study may help future 
researchers assess transferability. 
When we started our investigation, the experience of two organizations that 
had been dealing with replication and adaptation for decades soon appeared an 
especially interesting, ideal case for new theorizing (Siggelkow, 2007). However, 
simultaneous pressures to replicate and adapt are ubiquitous across industries, 
organizations, and functions. Despite the possible peculiarities of both the ICT 
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industry and our case-study firms – respectively the general and the specific 
setting of our investigation – we believe that the findings and the model reported 
here are applicable to organizations in many different settings. The model can be 
applied to multiple types of knowledge content and context, as its focus is not on 
individual knowledge assets or on their specific aggregations, but on the 
underlying knowledge-metaknowledge endowment, and on the organizational 
activities aiming at leveraging, reproducing, altering, and extending it. Indeed, 
processes of replication and adaptation resulting from the combined use of 
templates and principles do not seem unique to Alpha and Beta. Although there 
might be differences among firms in the specific features and timing of the 
process, the four template- and principle-based activities that allow balancing 
stability and change – as well as efficiency and flexibility – in the reutilization of 
existing knowledge are likely to be found in organizations in general. A crucial 
empirical circumstance that might affect how the model works in other settings is 
the magnitude of change. Change, as we observed it during our research, occurred 
in small and continuous shifts, with new fit conditions attained by fine tuning 
adjustments, principle-driven reconfigurations, or both. From this point of view, 
the adaptive replication model offers complementary interpretive lenses to the 
capability-based literature that studies how continuous adaptations and product 
innovations lead to corporate transformation (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; 
Eisenhardt, Furr, & Bingham, 2010; Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995; Galunic & 
Eisenhardt, 1996). Yet, does the model work in a punctuated equilibrium scenario 
(Gersick, 1991, 1994; Romanelli & Tushman, 1994)? Our data do not allow us to 
determine whether principles and templates would be employed differently during 
quick and dramatic changes, when new and relatively durable structures arise out 
of sudden and overhauling events which impede proceeding by context 
relatedness. While we can argue that such scenario would plausibly emphasize the 
role of knowledge reconfigurations through principle enforcement over template 
fine tuning, further research is necessary to explore how the magnitude and pace 
of change affect the use of metaknowledge for selecting existing knowledge assets 
that are still replicable within completely new and unknown content-context 
connections. 
In general, a study of change that does not rely on longitudinal analyses 
typical of process research (Pettigrew, 1990, 1997; Van De Ven, 2007; Van de 
Ven & Huber, 1990; Van De Ven & Poole, 1995) bears the inherent risk of 
missing firm- or time-specific variation (Bowen & Wiersema, 1999; Tsoukas & 
Hatch, 2001). To overcome this limitation, we elicited historical and processual 
data from our interviewees, and used them in combination with real-time data 
and with data from other sources to build, compare, and contrast the ‘stories’ of 
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our cases (Langley, 1999, 2007). This allowed us to trace the logical and 
chronological series of events that constituted the structures of our model, and to 
explicate the overall pattern that such events described across the two firms (Van 
de Ven & Poole, 2005). However, future longitudinal research might help us 
understand how contextual factors affect each of the activities of the adaptive 
replication process, and identify other boundary conditions for our findings. For 
example, during the study we found that, especially in one of the firms, not 
always were extracted principles employed to generate new templates, with major 
constraints being posed by transitory financial and/or political decisions at the 
corporate level. A promising path of longitudinal investigation could explore the 







KNOWLEDGE-BASED EVOLUTION  





The quest for the nature of interfirm differences has driven theoretical 
advancement in strategic management research for about three decades. Among 
the strands of thought that have contributed to such development, evolutionary 
economics (Nelson & Winter, 1982) and the resource-based view of the firm 
(Barney, 1991b; Wernerfelt, 1984) have probably provided the most powerful 
insights. By virtue of partial overlapping and complementarities (Montgomery, 
1995; Winter, 1995), the two approaches often draw on each other to attain a 
deep understanding of why firms behave and perform differently (Mahoney, 
2005). However, many scholars argue that they still need to be developed further 
to form a fully-fledged theory of the firm (Dosi & Marengo, 2007; Kraaijenbrink, 
Spender, & Groen, 2010; Stieglitz & Heine, 2007). On the one hand, evolutionary 
approaches based on the concept of organizational routines as unit of analysis of 
processes of change are often considered not comprehensive enough, and 
constitutionally unable to extend the scope of theorizing to other types of firm 
resources that play an equally important role in shaping and differentiating 
organizational behavior (Dosi & Marengo, 2007; Montgomery, 1995; Witt, 2008). 
On the other hand, the resource-based approach is deemed less focused and too 
static (Stieglitz & Heine, 2007; Winter, 1995). It recognizes that a host of 
different types of resources concur to determine the firm’s behavior, but leaves 
the processes by which such resources are created, acquired, and deployed largely 
unexplored (Kraaijenbrink et al., 2010; Ray, Barney, & Muhanna, 2004). 
We report the results of a grounded theory investigation that tackles a central 
problem of evolutionary and resource-based approaches alike: gaining a deeper 
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understanding of the process by which organizations acquire, develop, and alter 
idiosyncratic resources. The starting point of this investigation was knowledge. 
Among all resources, knowledge is largely considered the most strategically 
relevant (Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Grant, 1996; Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000; 
Nonaka, Toyama, & Nagata, 2000b), and a so pervasive one that the 
reconceptualization of firms as bundles of knowledge is widely accepted across 
multiple perspectives (Grant, 1996; Helfat & Peteraf, 2003; Huber, 1991; Kogut & 
Zander, 1992; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Nonaka, 1994). We focused on the 
organizational knowledge embedded in the hardware, software, and services 
provided by an information technology (IT) firm to its business clients, and 
studied how it was acquired, developed, and altered over time. The research 
process was inductive, and relied on theoretical sampling and constant 
comparison of qualitative data. In accordance with the guidelines of grounded 
theory building methods (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), we carried out multiple 
reiterations of joint collection and analysis, through which theoretical insights 
emerged from empirical evidence. Since it was necessary to collect and analyze 
data from multiple sources, an in-depth case study appeared the most suitable 
research strategy (Yin, 2008). We found that evolvability – the sustained capacity 
for adaptive evolution – resulted from the recursive interplay of knowledge-
related activities across multiple levels. At the microlevel, structuring is the 
activity by which two specific types of knowledge – substantive knowledge and 
metaknowledge – are combined by individuals to form abstract knowledge 
structures. At the firm level, contextualizing is the activity by which such 
structures are put into context, and embedded into functional and interdependent 
knowledge assets that can be used and reused regularly. At the industry level, 
evolving refers to the reproduction, mutation, selection, and retention of the 
organization’s knowledge assets through interactions with the environment. To 
fully understand the dynamic interrelationships between knowledge-related 
activities, we have drawn relevant and useful insights from recent advances in 
evolutionary biology (Kirschner & Gerhart, 1998, 2005; Wagner, 2005), and 
induced a knowledge-based evolutionary theory that regards the firm as an 
organism made of and controlled by knowledge, whose ultimate purpose is to 
grow and expand in its environment. 
Our study advances strategic management research by integrating 
evolutionary and resource/knowledge based approaches, and extending them in 
several ways. First, by “crossing levels” (Hackman, 2003), it brings the 
evolutionary approach below the level of the firm to attain a deeper and more 
complete understanding of the micro, firm- and industry-level activities that 
generate the firm’s specific resources. Second, it overcomes the routine-centric 
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view by identifying in organizational knowledge the elemental genetic material of 
organizational life that undergoes similar patterns of evolutionary change 
independently of the specific type of asset in which it is embedded. Finally, it 
explores the common grounds for the evolution of three types of assets – artifacts, 
routines, and individuals – and identifies in the interplay between substantive 
knowledge and metaknowledge a fundamental but largely unexplored activity of 
knowledge creation. 
3.2 Theoretical Background 
Why do firms differ? The nature and origins of inter-firm differences have 
been a fundamental area of investigation for management theorists for decades. 
Among the strands of thought that have addressed this crucial question, 
evolutionary economics (Nelson & Winter, 1982) and the resource-based view of 
the firm (Barney, 1991b; Wernerfelt, 1984) have probably provided the most 
powerful insights into the antecedents of varying organizational performance and 
behavior, and have inspired the way most scholars see, conceive, and study 
organizations today. The evolutionary approach draws on the biological concepts 
of variation, mutation, and selection to study social and economic phenomena as 
processes of change. In the management field, processes of change that evoke 
close biological counterparts include, for example, technological innovation, the 
replication of routines, and market selection. Hinging on the concept of 
organizational routines, the evolutionary perspective outlined by Nelson and 
Winter (1982) paved the way for much empirical research and theory building. 
Since then, routines have been described as showing a multifaceted nature 
(Feldman & Pentland, 2003), playing a manifold role as repositories of 
organizational memory, knowledge, and learning (Argote & Darr, 2000; Darr et 
al., 1995; Grant, 1996; Karim & Mitchell, 2000; Kogut & Zander, 1992, 1993, 
1996; Mitchell & Shaver, 2003; Zollo, Reuer, & Singh, 2002), and constituting the 
micro-foundation of organizational capabilities (Dutta, Zbaracki, & Bergen, 2003; 
Nelson & Winter, 1982; Peng, Schroeder, & Shah, 2008; Teece et al., 1997; 
Winter, 2000, 2003; Zollo & Winter, 2002). Today, routines are widely recognized 
as an important, foundational concept for the study of organizational change and 
specificities (Parmigiani & Howard-Grenville, 2011). However, when used as the 
central unit of analysis (Becker, 2004: 643; Felin & Foss, 2009), they constrain 
the scope of evolutionary theorizing to the repeated, or regular, patterns of action 
occurring in organizations. In particular, they do not take into account: 1) non-
regular patterns of action that are equally important to explain differences 
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interfirm differences (cf. Felin & Foss, 2009), and; 2) regular structures such as 
physical objects, software, and artifacts in general (D’Adderio 2003) that are also 
a form of organizational memory (Walsh & Ungson 1991) and definitely concur to 
determine interfirm differences. 
The non-comprehensiveness of the routine-based evolutionary approach 
seemed to be clear to Nelson and Winter (1982) when they recognized that “there 
is a great deal of business behavior that is not, within the ordinary meaning of 
the term, ‘routine’”, and that “much of the business decision making that is of 
the highest importance, both from the point of view of the individual firm and 
from that of society, is nonroutine” (p. 14). However, in their neo-Schumpeterian 
attempt “to understand the dynamics of the larger system” (p. 15) – that is, how 
organizations drive innovation processes in the economy – routines worked well as 
“unit of selection in economic contexts” (Witt, 2008: 557). In fact, they could 
usefully subsume a number of behavioral and cognitive constructs (cf. Becker, 
2004, 2007; Felin & Foss, 2009), including “the relatively constant dispositions 
and strategic heuristics that shape the approach of a firm to the nonroutine 
problems it faces” (Nelson & Winter, 1982: 15) [emphasis added]. But despite 
inclusive definitions and flexible use of the basic constructs, routine-based 
approaches have often been criticized for not providing a complete explanation of 
the internal dynamics of organizations (Dosi & Marengo, 2007; Montgomery, 
1995). Montgomery (1995) clarified that such approaches are in biological terms 
phylogenetic, that is, conceived for studying the evolution of populations 
(industries), as opposed to ontogenetic, or concerned with changes in a single 
organism (the firm). Notwithstanding the numerous attempts to develop a firm-
oriented perspective (e.g., Nelson, 1991; Winter, 1988; Winter, 1987), the 
industry logic and the importance placed on industries as selection environments 
remain dominant in evolutionary theories (Montgomery, 1995; Witt, 2008). Witt 
(2008) underlined that “the assumption of selection operating on routines and 
population thinking makes it difficult to account for individual learning, problem 
solving, and strategic reorientation—as important as they may be for the firms’ 
adaptations to changing market conditions” (p. 558). According to Montgomery 
(1995), it is necessary to bring the analysis and the theorizing down to the firm 
level because “it is on this level that analogies to heredity should be found, [in 
that] concepts like adaptation, learning, search and path-dependence mostly 
relate to the level of the firm” (p. 5-6). An industry-oriented and routine-based 
evolutionary theory “offers only a relatively narrow description of the firm” and 
its nonroutine resources, such as physical assets, patents, and software, “but 
there is no a priori reason why they should not be included in a more 
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comprehensive evolutionary theory of the firm. Indeed they should be, as they 
may contribute to the further enhancement of the theory” (p. 6). 
A robust shift of attention from the industry level to the firm level (Hoskisson, 
Hitt, Wan, & Yiu, 1999) has been driven over the past twenty years by the 
resource-based view (RBV) of the firm (Barney, 1991b; Wernerfelt, 1984). 
Focusing on the internal aspects of organizations, proponents of the RBV have 
explained firm differences in terms of impediments to (or costs of) imitation and 
acquisition of valuable, rare, and nonsubstitutable resources, and of 
organizational ability to absorb them (Barney, 1991b, 1991a; Barney, 2010; 
Wernerfelt, 1984, 1995). The search for factors of competitive advantage inside 
the organization has increasingly emphasized the role of knowledge-related 
constructs, such as routines (Nelson & Winter, 1982), organizational capabilities 
(Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Helfat & Peteraf, 2003; Teece et al., 1997; Winter, 
2003), core competences (Hamel & Prahalad, 1996), and knowledge assets 
(Boisot, 1998; Nonaka et al., 2000b; Teece, 1998, 2000; Winter & Szulanski, 
2001). The idea that the determinants of firm-level characteristics and outcomes 
must be sought in knowledge as a key organizational resource has been stressed 
by proponents of the knowledge-based view (KBV) of the firm (Grant, 1996; 
Kogut & Zander, 1992; Spender, 1996; Spender & Grant, 1996), and has 
attracted great interest in many areas of management studies such as knowledge 
management, international business studies, strategic human resource 
management, and innovation and technology management (Eisenhardt & Santos, 
2002; Foss, 2011). In particular, the body of studies around the notion of 
organizational knowledge creation (Nonaka, 1991, 1994; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 
1995; Nonaka et al., 2000a; Nonaka et al., 2000b; Nonaka & von Krogh, 2009) 
offers a powerful theoretical framework for understanding organizational 
knowledge as an ever-changing resource that integrates and amplifies the 
knowledge created by individuals. And the related concepts of knowledge 
conversion and ba provide “the building blocks of a knowledge-based theory of 
the firm” (Nonaka, von Krogh, & Voelpel, 2006). Today, the resource/knowledge-
based view is arguably the dominant strand of thought on firms’ heterogeneity in 
strategic management (Foss, 2011; Stieglitz & Heine, 2007). Benefitting from the 
generality and semantic ductility of constructs such as resources, knowledge, and 
capabilities, this approach is certainly “more comprehensive than the 
evolutionary view, but also less focused” (Winter, 1995: 158), and “essentially 
static” (Stieglitz & Heine, 2007: 1). Scholars have pointed out that knowledge 
and other resources are not antecedents of competitive advantage by themselves, 
but they need to be used in processes (Kraaijenbrink et al., 2010; Ray et al., 
2004). Therefore, the main object should be to explain how such processes lead to 
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the creation, development, and dismissal of new, idiosyncratic resources (Stieglitz 
& Heine, 2007). 
In sum, both evolutionary economics and the RBV provide useful 
conceptualizations and powerful analytical lenses. By virtue of their partial 
overlapping and complementarities (Montgomery, 1995; Winter, 1995), the two 
approaches often draw on each other to attain a deeper understanding of why 
firms behave differently (Mahoney, 2005), but both still need to be developed 
further to form a fully-fledged theory of the firm (Dosi & Marengo, 2007; 
Kraaijenbrink et al., 2010; Stieglitz & Heine, 2007). In particular, further 
investigation is needed to understand how changes in the resource bases occur, 
and why they lead to specific, peculiar resource configurations (Ray et al., 2004). 
In this study, we held organizational knowledge as the starting point of such 
investigation. Among all resources typically available to organizations, knowledge 
is largely considered as the most strategically relevant (Dierickx & Cool, 1989; 
Grant, 1996; Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000), and a so pervasive one that the 
reconceptualization of firms as bundles of knowledge is widely accepted across 
multiple perspectives (Grant, 1996; Helfat & Peteraf, 2003; Huber, 1991; Kogut & 
Zander, 1992; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Nonaka, 1994). We sought to unveil how 
idiosyncratic knowledge bases are built and maintained. To this purpose, we 
focused on the organizational knowledge embedded in the hardware, software, 
and services provided by an IT firm to its business clients, and sought to identify 
the process by which such fundamental resource was acquired, developed, and 
altered over time. 
3.3 Method 
Empirical Setting 
The empirical setting for the research was offered by a multinational company, 
hereafter referred to as Coral, leader in the provision of ITs to business clients. 
As an IT firm, Coral was particularly relevant to a study of organizational 
knowledge for the knowledge-intensiveness of its activities (von Nordenflycht, 
2010). Furthermore, the firm was especially interesting for an idiographic study of 
knowledge-related processes because it had been engaging for two decades in the 
creation, and reutilization of the knowledge assets that formed its IT systems. In 
fact, IT systems can be seen as bundles of various types of assets embedding 
organizational knowledge (Hansen et al., 1999; Nonaka et al., 2000a; Nonaka et 
al., 2000b; Teece, 2000), such as hardware, software, and related service routines 
in the areas of consulting, training, and support (Argote, 1999; Argote & Darr, 
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2000; Darr et al., 1995). These systems of knowledge assets are transferred 
altogether to client organizations within dedicated projects for the provision of 
comprehensive, seamless solutions to business and/or operational problems 
(Davies, 2004) – Table 3.1 details the types of components of an IT solution seen 
from both a technical and a knowledge-based point of view. 
Coral provided its solutions to businesses in a broad range of industries, such 
as aerospace, defense, banking, chemicals, petroleum, construction, consumer 
products, financial markets, healthcare, insurance, media and entertainment. 
Clients from different industries, and often based in different locations, presented 
each a peculiar set of organizational, business, industrial, geographic, social, 
regulatory, and technological factors. Exposed to such variety, Coral had to 
change and adapt its solutions incessantly to stay competitive (Brown & 
Eisenhardt, 1995; Chakravarthy, 1997; Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995; Schoonhoven 
et al., 1990). By constantly leveraging, altering, and renewing knowledge 
relentlessly, the firm attained extraordinary market success, as demonstrated by 
its position of dominance in several industries, and consistently increasing market 
shares in others. Such circumstances made this case extremely interesting for an 
inductive, theory building investigation (Dyer & Wilkins, 1991; Eisenhardt, 
1989b). 
 
Table 3.1. IT systems as systems of knowledge assets 
Technical perspective Knowledge-based perspective 
IT Systems (or IT Solutions)  
are made of three  
types of components: 
These are knowledge-embedding  
assets (or resources), 
as organizational knowledge is: 
Hardware components Embodied in physical artifacts 
Software components Codified in software applications 
Service components Embedded in service routines 
 
Research Design 
The research process was inductive: it started from key constructs – such as 
organizational knowledge, knowledge assets and resources, knowledge reutilization 
and adaptation – and sought to identify specific categories and unveil relevant 
relationships among them. In preparation for the fieldwork, we collected 
background information about the firm and the IT industry through publicly 
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available documents – such as specialized magazines and webzines, websites and 
electronic archives, dedicated reports and books, industry papers, and academic 
case studies – and conversations with industry experts, both scholars and 
practitioners, to delineate the overall corporate profile and history. This 
information allowed us to select specific aspects that seemed relevant to study, 
and seize some practical evidence of the categories that had inspired the 
investigation. Both firm- and industry-related information also served as 
background during initial meetings with the firm, and guided the selection of the 
first informants and the search for additional documentation. Although the 
investigation involved moving back and forth across multiple levels of analysis 
(Hackman, 2003; Salvato & Rerup, 2011), our specific focus was on the product 
level, as we sought to understand how organizational knowledge about IT 
products and services was developed, altered, and leveraged over time. 
At the outset, we aimed to confirm, revise, update, and refine the firm-related 
information. Subsequently, we sought to gain a notion of the types of knowledge 
assets that could provide relevant insights into the research problem, and 
identified a family of IT solutions – hereafter referred to as CoralSet – which 
seemed especially interesting and relevant to study as an “extreme case” 
(Eisenhardt, 1989b) for two main reasons. First, these solutions were the evident 
outcome of Coral’s ability to leverage and alter knowledge assets successfully 
across different customer industries. Second, as the solutions were reproduced, 
altered, and upgraded, an overall process unfolded which provided clear evidence 
of the phenomena of study. 
To  study such process in depth, we collected data about: a) the types of 
assets it involved; b) how those assets had been created or acquired; c) how they 
worked together; d) the practical problems they solved for the client, and; e) how 
they were altered and adapted to the clients’ needs across a number of customer 
projects. Before starting the collection and analysis of project data, we 
established simple criteria for the selection of projects. We excluded current 
projects and focused instead on those that had already been delivered, to be able 
to gather complete data about all the activities involved, and their outcome. We 
ordered projects by size and started examining the largest one, as its scope and 
content seemed likely to provide comprehensive evidence. We then kept adding 
new projects until new iterations of data collection and analysis, aided by the 
concurrent review of the pertinent literature, produced no development or 
refinement of the emerging theoretical insights. This condition of theoretical 
saturation (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) was achieved with four projects. We referred 
to each project and to the provided solutions in their entirety to investigate: a) 
the number and types of knowledge assets employed; b) the interventions carried 
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out to replicate and/or adapt such assets; c) the contribution of such 
interventions to the success of the project, and; d) whether and how such 
interventions were translated into learning for future projects. Although data 
collection and analysis were conducted jointly, we provide a separate account of 
each for a detailed illustration of the investigative process. 
Data Collection 
We collected and analyzed qualitative data in the form of interviews, as main 
source of data, documents, and field notes. The firm committed to disclose 
relevant information and assured reiterated access to data, which allowed holding 
the flexible approach to the field work typical of grounded research. Such 
availability proved crucial during the study, as it was necessary to return many 
times to the field for further data gathering, coding, and analysis, in order to 
revise or reinforce emerging insights. Before setting up initial interviews, we met 
our lead contact, the chief technology officer for Europe. This senior executive 
had decades of experience in the firm and could combine a deep knowledge of the 
organization with the broad outlook of his hierarchical position. Advised by him, 
we carried out a purposeful selection of informants (Guba & Lincoln, 1985), and 
first interviewed those who could help us obtain background information on the 
firm, and identify those parts of the organization that appeared most likely to 
offer evidence of the phenomenon of study. From this point onwards, we followed 
a snowball approach and selected informants by asking each interviewee who 
could provide useful and relevant data. A total of 45 interviews were conducted 
with 32 informants, either face-to-face during visits to the firms or by telephone. 
Some informants were interviewed more than once. In particular, we interviewed 
the unit director and some senior executives several times for follow-up questions 
and validation purposes (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011; Gibbert et al., 2008) – for 
example, to validate the chronology of events reported by project-level managers 
but occurring at the unit and/or at the firm levels. Interviewees were informed 
beforehand, via telephone and/or email, about the topic, purpose, and format of 
the interview. Of all interviews, 34 were audio-recorded and transcribed within 15 
days of interview. For the 11 non-recorded interviews detailed notes were taken 
during the interview and then ordered and complemented by additional notes 
within the following 36 hours. 20 interviews were conducted by one member of 
the research group, and 25 interviews by two members. Table 3.2 provides details 
of interviews and interviewees. 
We first interviewed executives and top managers as key informants (Kumar 
et al., 1993), ranging from chairman to chief technology officer and global 
industry experts. Although interviews were unstructured and questions could 
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change depending on the respondents’ hierarchical position and understanding of 
the research problem, the conversation was guided by a clear set of goals. After 
an introductory part addressing the company’s overall profile and corporate 
structure, questions probed into the different types of knowledge assets typically 
detained, created, or acquired by the firm, and elicited the illustration of concrete 
examples of reutilization. This first round of interviews allowed us to appreciate 
interesting aspects – for example, the different roles played by tangible and 
intangible assets – and to identify a number of key categories – such as, 
“standardization”, or “customization” – that proved fundamental for generating 
and linking together theoretical insights throughout the rest of the research. 
Subsequently, we interviewed informants who had been involved in the design, 
development, and transfer of the CoralSet, such as product developers, business 
development managers, project consultants, and client technical advisors. We 
conducted semistructured interviews to gather information about the solutions, 
and the reutilization, alteration, and transfer of their components. Introductory 
questions regarded the interviewees’ background, the details of their personal 
competence and experience, their current position and tasks, and the history and 
organizational background of the units. Subsequent questions concerned the 
characteristics of the solutions and the reutilization of their components across 
client projects. In particular, the attention was on the different types of 
knowledge assets forming the solutions, their interrelationships and 
interdependencies, and the practical problems they aimed to solve for the 
recipient organization. As the interview progressed, the focus shifted onto the 
specific activities carried out by the unit for the creation, acquisition, 
management, transfer, and reutilization of those knowledge assets. Informants 
where asked to think retrospectively about such activities and describe them in 
detail. 
Finally, we focused on the four selected projects, and interviewed the project 
managers to gain an overview. We then proceeded with other managers in charge 
of the design, development, implementation, delivery, and support, as long as a 
new informant could provide new, relevant data. Interviewees were asked to 
provide retrospective accounts of the project background, the knowledge assets 
reused and deployed within the project, the requirements for alterations of those 
assets, the activities carried out to deploy existing assets and to implement the 
alterations, the learning about altered and newly developed assets, and their 
reutilization in subsequent projects. 
Interview guides were employed across informants to keep consistency of 
collected data. In some cases, the guides were adjusted to the informants’ 
hierarchical position, degree of involvement, and role played in the project. We 
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endeavored to minimize informant bias in a number of ways. First, we used 
multiple knowledgeable informants to cross-check the information, and used 
follow-up questions to ensure that the emerging concepts and categories had the 
same meaning across informants. 
 
Table 3.2. Details of interviews and informants 
Role/Job Title Informants Interviews Length 
Chairman Emeritus 1 2 1h45m 
Chief Technology Officer 2 10 12h20m 
Global Industry Director 1 1 1h 
Senior Strategy Consultant 1 1 1h 
Senior Managing Consultant 1 2 1h20m 
New Product Development Global Expert 1 1 50m 
Innovation & New Technologies Leader 1 1 45m 
Industry Technical Leader 3 3 2h25m 
Industry Technical Executive 2 2 2h 
Strategy Executive 1 1 1h 
Senior IT Architect 5 5 4h 
Client Technical Advisor 2 2 1h30m 
Unit Director 2 5 2h30m 
Business Development Manager 2 2 2h15m 
Product Development Director 1 1 35m 
Project Consultant 4 4 3h10m 
Services Manager 1 1 45m 
Systems Engineer 1 1 45m 
Total 32 45 39h55m 
 
Second, informants were highly motivated to provide accurate information by 
virtue of the confidentiality that we offered, and of the relevance and usefulness 
of the study to their own profession (Huber & Power, 1985). Third, we 
investigated concrete facts and events, which are less prone to cognitive biases 
than opinions or speculations (Huber & Power, 1985; Miller et al., 1997). Fourth, 
we focused as much as possible on recent events to minimize recall bias (Golden, 
1992; Koriat & Goldsmith, 2000), and triangulated factual accounts of the more 
remote past with documentation, archival data, and other informants. Fifth, we 
used open-ended questions within naturally-flowing conversations in a way that 
encouraged free reporting and allowed the interviewees the right not to answer 
when they did not retain or could not recall the required information. 
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We resorted to current documents and archival data to integrate the 
information collected through interviews. The search for relevant documents was 
facilitated by recurrent interactions with informants, whereas their selection was 
guided by emerging theoretical insights. Documents collected and analyzed 
included organizational charts, annual reports, division and subdivision 
presentations, corporate brochures and booklets, press releases, and printouts of 
non-public company webpages, product brochures and specifications, examples of 
contracts with customers, project documentation, and internal presentations. 
Besides providing a secondary source of data, these documents helped us identify 
crucial elements of discussion to be addressed and deepened during the 
interviews. Table 3.3 provides a detailed account of the documents collected and 
analyzed throughout the study. 
Data Analysis 
The study involved joint collection and analysis of data, review of the relevant 
literature, and examination of emerging conceptual insights in iterative fashion 
(Locke, 2001). By examining theoretically relevant incidents in the data, we drew 
indications for the sampling, mode of collection, and content focus of new data. 
As interviews transcripts, documents, archival data, and field notes were 
produced, we analyzed them inductively in accordance with naturalistic inquiry 
(Guba & Lincoln, 1985) and constant comparison methods (Glaser & Strauss, 
1967; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). We carried out open, 
axial, and selective coding (Strauss & Corbin, 1998), and organized the data into 
chronological accounts (Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
Open coding. As we collected raw data, we read and broke them down into 
segments. For each case, we interpreted data segments, noted as many relevant 
incidents and ideas as possible, and organized them as first-order concepts 
describing “facts” in the data (Van Maanen, 1979). To label them, we used either 
brief, descriptive phrases or terms present in the data, generally referred to as in-
vivo codes (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Examples are the recurring expressions “we 
put intellectual capital into physical artifacts”, or “we are driving an asset-reuse 
program”. When we recognized similar codes, we grouped them together into 
broad, homogenous categories, and reviewed incidents and codes across categories 
several times until no new concepts emerged. 
Axial coding. Next, we compared categories, codes, and data incidents. We 
reordered and regrouped categories in systematic search for relationships among 
and patterns across them. As we refined categories one-by-one in greater depth, 
we kept pursuing, identifying, and coding their properties. Categories that 
appeared relevant to explain the process of study but whose properties could not 
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be clarified in depth due to insufficient data triggered the sampling and collection 
of new data. We used visual maps to arrange codes and categories, and to link 
the related properties. Some categories began to stand out across cases as core, 
higher-order themes of the emerging model, capable of subsuming and integrating 
the first-order concepts; the other categories, instead, were reconceptualized and 
absorbed by the former, more abstract themes. 
 
Table 3.3. Details of documents 
 
Firm Other sources Total 
Industry studies/reports - 17 17 
News articles - 7 7 
Case studies - 19 19 
Company profiles 12 12 24 
Corporate reports 18 - 18 
Unit reports 12 - 12 
Executive speeches and presentations 21 - 21 
Product brochures 2 - 2 
Project documents 78 - 78 
Total 143 55 198 
 
Selective coding. Finally, we reviewed the data again with a few themes in 
mind to determine whether they could be exhaustively illustrated by the first-
order concepts. The refinement, selection, and illustration of the second-order 
themes through first-order concepts and raw data went on recursively until we 
were able to isolate aggregate theoretical dimensions, and explain relationships 
among them. Figure 3.1 reports the resulting data structure, with examples of 
concepts from the empirical data (first column), core second-order themes, and 
aggregate dimensions. 
Chronological accounts. While we read and coded the data, we also 
organized them into a chronological account to weave together interviews, 
documentation, and field notes, and to outline the sequence of events. We used 
the visual maps of codes and categories to make sense of the patterns emerging 
from the chronological account. The joint use of visual maps and chronological 
account allowed developing interpretations that were at the same time 




Trustworthiness of the Data 
We engaged in debriefing sessions during and at the end of each round of data 
collection and analysis in order to keep focus and clarity throughout this iterative 
process. To ensure accuracy and transparency of the coding process, we resorted 
extensively to reflective notes. As we read through and learned from the data, we 
produced methodological memos (such as reminders, amendments, and 
instructions about the analysis), theoretical memos (i.e., attempts to extract 
meanings from and identify patterns within the data), and conceptual diagrams, 
through which we explicated to ourselves the relationships among categories and 
their properties and dimensions. Memos and diagrams were particularly useful to 
spot gaps in the emergent model and consequent needs for further collection 
and/or analysis. 
 





The provision of the CoralSet was part of long-term relationships of strategic 
and operational consulting that the firm held with large client organizations 
worldwide. From a technical point of view, the solutions were systems of 
interrelated hardware, software, and service components seamlessly implemented 
to build, run, manage, monitor, and maintain vast and complex repositories of 
corporate data – Table 3.4 reports a typical configuration of the CoralSet. Once 
acquired and deployed by the client, these systems supported intensive 
codification and rationalization of business, operational, and technological 
knowledge, so that huge quantities of data generated by the organization’s 
processes and activities could be stored, managed, and exploited in integrated 
fashion. This enabled the adopting organization to understand and leverage 
valuable information rapidly, whereas creating a similar system internally would 
have taken much longer, distracted resources from the company’s core business, 
and entailed the risk of never yielding the same benefits. 
Historically, the first versions of the CoralSet had been created in the 1990s in 
an effort to standardize, organize, and manage artifacts such as texts, design 
documents, specifications, and blueprints, and overcome the phenomenon of 
organizational knowledge “hoarding in silos” within different parts of the firm. 
The subsequent development of the solutions was driven by large clients that, 
involved in waves of mergers and acquisitions across the globe, needed to 
standardize and integrate their heterogeneous informational systems. As an 
interviewee pointed out: 
 
The larger the [client], the more likely that they don’t have one or two 
systems running their business, they have twenty or thirty, or hundreds of 
systems. [For example], one system treats the customer as just a person you 
deliver to. Another treats the customer in a CRM [Customer Relationship 
Management] style, [so that customers] are the most important entities, the 
business as a relationship. And another billing system says the customer is a 
delinquent who hasn’t paid us for 90 days. But it’s the same customer! […] 
So, how to get the simple view? The boardroom view, the dashboard that 
tells the executive everything that’s going on in the company: green lights, 
red lights, amber lights. 
 
The frequent and intense interactions between Coral and its clients for the 
implementation of the CoralSet led to reiterated activities of deployment, 
development, alteration, improvement, and redeployment of the knowledge assets 
concurring to the solutions. By focusing on these activities, we identified the 
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process that linked micro, firm-, and industry-level changes in organizational 
knowledge resources. We model such process in Figure 3.2, and describe hereafter 
the four conceptual dimensions that underpin it: 1) Structuring; 2) 
Contextualizing; 3) Evolving, and; 4) Evolvability. Table 3.5 reports examples of 
data incidents supporting our interpretations. 
 














Data modeling applications 
Information modeling applications 
Function modeling applications 
Workflow modeling applications  
Process modeling applications 
Organizational modeling applications 
Business modeling applications 




The starting point of the study was to investigate the dynamics of the firm’s 
knowledge endowment around the studied solutions. We wanted to understand 
whether and how the knowledge detained by people in various domains – 
technology, business, industry, and so on – changed over time. The first evidence 
of such changes appeared at the microlevel. We found that employees involved in 
the provision of the CoralSet associated and combined basic elements of their 
knowledge endowment into abstract “structures” to solve variable problems. For 
example, knowledge structures concerning the design of a data center were built 
by linking pieces of knowledge from the domains of technology, business, and 
strategy, as showed in Figure 3.3. The first hints to the concept of combining 
knowledge to form structures seeped out from statements like, “I’ve been focused 
very strongly on abstracting assets, multiple assets into a family”, and “people 
start to map out specific domains of knowledge where there is a high degree of 
overlapping”. As we kept questioning our interviewees, we gained a clear 
understanding that the basic elements of that structuring activity were two 
different types of knowledge: substantive knowledge, and metaknowledge. 
Acquiring substantive knowledge. Substantive knowledge is knowledge of 
contents, facts, and concepts that are specific to a field or domain. For example, 
knowledge about a business allows “working with the [client’s] business 
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community”, whereas knowledge about technology allows designing hardware and 
software components, and “working with the technology people in [client] 
organizations to either implement new technologies, or make more effective use of 
technologies”. Similarly, substantive knowledge for the design of a new software 
application for the optimization of a given process will include knowledge of the: 
process phases, activities, and interfaces with other processes and activities; tools 
and technologies employed; skills and competences of the people involved, and; 
higher-order requirements and constraints posed, for example, by organizational 
objectives such as competiveness, sustainability, environmental friendliness, and 
so on. 
 
Figure 3.2. Emerging model of knowledge-based evolution 
 
 
Managers at Coral had a clear understanding of the substantive knowledge 
that had to be acquired and used to solve specific problems, and expressed it in 
statements like: “we have the skills to manage and maintain the software”; “we 
need a banker who can validate these models, to make sure that what we’re 
defining is accurate, and it makes sense to a banker”; “one of the people on the 
team came with a management accounting background, so they would have been 
very familiar with what you need to track from a financial, monetary point of 
view”, and; “the project leader came from the development lab [and] knew how to 
project manage a development project”. Substantive knowledge also included 
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knowledge about a market or an industry. For example, an executive of the unit 
responsible for the development of the CoralSet explained that “there are two 
types of change happening [in a given industry]: one is industry deconstruction, 
from integrated organizations to industry networks, and the second type of 
transformation happening is enterprises [becoming increasingly] process-optimized 
and enterprise-optimized”. 
 
Figure 3.3. Example of knowledge structuring 
 
 
Employing metaknowledge. While substantive knowledge provided the 
building blocks, or basic elements that pertained to one or more domains, a 
different type of knowledge was needed to hold the bits together and clarify 
which logical interrelationships among them had to be taken into account in 
order to solve a specific problem. Therefore, people responsible for the CoralSet 
strove to develop and leverage essential knowledge about such interrelationships 
and interdependencies among elements of substantive knowledge. This 
metaknowledge – or “knowledge about knowledge” – was expressed in statements 
like “we know how this particular asset works in this environment”, and 
concerned, for example, the impact that the addition of a software application 
simultaneously had on the technical, commercial, business, organizational, and 
strategic layers, or the cascade effect that alterations in an hardware component 
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could produce on other interdependent assets. Metaknowledge was especially 
detained by senior managers and executives, who had acquired it by long 
professional experience and through constant interaction with multiple sources, 
both internal to the firm (for example, technical or commercial areas) and 
external (chiefly customers, suppliers, and technological and service partners). 
For example, a manager with about 30 years’ experience who studied the 
interconnections among different knowledge domains provided the following 
details about his role. 
 
I developed some abstraction skills which seemed to be useful. And from that 
I realized that we could actually start to develop a hierarchy of abstractions 
from the business problem we were trying to solve, the application shape that 
would solve that problem, the runtime, the middleware shape, logical shape, 
that would solve the problem, and ultimately product instantiations of those 
patterns that would help solve the problems. 
 
To facilitate the acquisition of metaknowledge, the firm held yearly user-group 
events to intercept clients’ needs for change and innovation of the solutions. User 
groups were organized by industry, and attended by clients to share and discuss 
their experiences in the implementation and adoption of the CoralSet. Positive 
experiences reinforced client acceptance of the solutions, while negative ones 
allowed the firm to identify areas of further improvement, spot new needs for 
change and adaptation, and grasp a complete understanding of how assets 
worked within and across customer industries. Technical leaders that had 
attended a series of these user-group events showed the enthusiasm of who has 
“really drilled into each industry and created a definition of that simplistic 
statement” common to all industries. For example, they said, “our banking 
[solutions], our insurance [solutions], our retail [solutions], our healthcare 
[solutions] have four, five, six thousand individual information elements. Why are 
they about the same? […] Because most industries are very similar; they have 
different labels on things, but they are still very similar”. 
Metaknowledge is chiefly architectural knowledge that allows identifying and 
making purposeful use of commonalities and differences among pieces of 
substantive knowledge. It is also regulatory knowledge, as it specifies which bits 
of substantive knowledge need be actioned in a given situation, and exactly when, 
how, and why. An executive provided an example of metaknowledge at work 
when he explained how and why different types of competences needed to be 
employed to ensure successful delivery of the solutions: “some of the training is 
for the users, to understand how to use the reports, for the architecture guys to 
adapt the [components], and some of the training is for developers to help 
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customize this. This is the challenge: you need to have a wide range of people 
who can communicate with all these different types of folks, and it’s quite a skill 
that you have to have to understand the communities that you’re trying to 
influence, because if you don’t, you fail. If any one of those communities doesn’t 
buy into this, it fails”. Individuals employed their metaknowledge to establish 
hierarchies among elements of substantive knowledge as components of overall 
knowledge architectures. For example, “we had four different roles, and people 
came in and out to fill those different roles, so that we had continuity. But 
throughout it all, I was the only person who was always there, so the banking 
knowledge was always there”. 
Contextualizing 
By leveraging metaknowledge to connect elements of substantive knowledge, 
people created abstract structures useful to make sense of specific situations. 
Contextualizing refers to the translation of these abstract structures into tangible 
and intangible assets that formed the firm’s knowledge context. As such, these 
assets could be identified, transferred, used and reused regularly to perform target 
functions. The following passages provide examples of how this was accomplished 
for two components of the CoralSet, respectively a software application for data 
management and a service routine: 
 
They built a data dictionary. At that time I think it had originally as much 
as 2,000 data entities, attributes and relationships. […] We needed the nouns 
as a dictionary to say, what are we operating on in business? What are the 
elements, the items of information that we need to track in order to be able 
to do business? […] So they basically went through a banking dictionary of 
terms, and came up with all the nouns that they would want to use in order 
to define information requirements. The whole idea was that we want to start 
with a glossary of terms, and it became like a dictionary of nouns, and this 
became the basis for the [other components such as] function, process, object, 
and data warehouse [components]. [It] then grew to be about 4,500 data 
entities, attributes, and relationships. 
 
It’s a process of really identifying the procedural steps that are involved in 
delivering some kind of service, and then examining each of those steps to 
say, does that step have associated with it something tangible that we can 
then standardize? So, first of all, identify the steps, the procedure, and then 
try and standardize that, and then look at what’s consumed and produced at 
each step and decide whether those things can be standardized as well. […] 
All of those things instantly look very similar, and […] get lifted out and 
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turned into some kind of highly componentized and highly standardized 
guidance. 
 
Three themes underlay the dimension of contextualizing: Creating knowledge 
assets, Clarifying interdependencies, and Establishing regularities. 
Creating knowledge assets. The concept of knowledge assets was central to 
the daily experience of our interviewees. Some of them clarified that, “when we 
talk about assets, we are talking about intellectual capital assets, things that 
were created […] in such a way as to be reusable”. Assets were conceived as 
containers of organizational knowledge, which could be “built”, labeled, moved, 
transferred, and reused within as well as beyond the organization’s boundaries. 
Unlike abstract structures, the notion of asset as part of an overall context 
conferred organizational knowledge a sense of tangibility. And the perception that 
individuals had of assets as valuable knowledge-embedding entities was paralleled 
by the fact that the firm had three divisions in place specialized in the creation, 
utilization, and improvement of specific categories of assets: respectively 
hardware, software, and services divisions. 
 
Table 3.5. Display of representative data supporting interpretations 






“We have technical communities, […] communities of technical interest groups, maybe hardware 
engineers, or systems management engineers, or application development engineers. They 
fulfill this role of globally propagating this kind of knowledge.” 
“The content team is an unusual bunch of people in that they have that sort of weird combination 
of really understanding the technical computer science detail and the business analysis.” 
“Industry knowledge is becoming much more a requirement for everyone across the board. […] 
Technology and software is a big part of it, but you also need to clearly have the business 




“When you [put] abstract knowledge in the patterns, you actually produce visual shortcuts and 
textual shortcuts to help people navigate them. If you take the visual shortcuts in particular, not 
everybody thinks visually. So when you draw diagrams and say, here’s a pattern at a very high 
level of abstraction describing the solution, some people look at it very blankly and say, well, 
how does that help me write a line of code? Whereas other people who do think visually find that 
a visual cue is very helpful in guiding them to picking the right assets.  So that’s just a separate 
little challenge that we have in terms of explaining to people what assets exist.” 
“Most people, especially business people, say, it’s IT job to make common business definitions, 
and I’m sometimes unpopular with [Coral] salespeople who like to say the right things in the 
boardroom. I would always assert in the boardroom, guys, it’s your job. I’ll deliberately pick the 
banking [industry for instance], because it’s the one I’m most familiar with. If you’re the head of 
retail banking, and you say, I don’t care about commercial banking, I don’t care about the 
common crossover of address standardisation between commercial clients and retail clients, 
well, you should! Each side should worry about the others, because […] you need to have this 
set of common definitions, and you need to know what’s common and what’s not common. […] 
But you will never get better information standards from IT, if the business is going in seven 
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Themes Exemplary quotations 
different directions.” 
“The architects, particularly the more senior architects […] have to be able to create those 
[system] designs, implement those designs for our customers, but they have also to be that 
communications channel back into the business, to be knowledgeable on the one hand about 
what centralised standards we have developed for these kinds of architectures, but also to be 







“We tend to call physical, although you can’t touch it, the code that runs, we call that the physical 
level, by comparison with what we call the logical or the conceptual level, which are the just the 
designs. So when a code is written and it’s in production and all that, we call that physical.” 
“What we deliver to any one organization when you buy the [CoralSet] is the conceptual view 
and the logical view. And what we do as a first engagement is to translate these into the specific 
physical view.” 
“Let’s build an asset around that solution and then reuse it in a number of client bases.” 
“Software testing has progressively become like a ‘product’, as there are now testing factories.” 
“What we’ve done is we’ve productized the services as service-product lines.” 
“[We use] standard terms for what we call work products or artifacts.” 
“You really have people who are very, very specialized, say, in the warehouse world, because it 
has its own tools, and people who live in the object oriented world, it’s a different mindset.” 
“Within the [CoralSet components], once you are inside one of those bubbles, you need to know 
the entire [component]. You can’t be there and say well, you know, in the business process 
[component], I know only those five processes and not the others. That wouldn’t work.” 
“I’m an architect, I might produce what’s called a software architecture, my friend might create 
an operational [component], which is the infrastructure, hardware architecture, and if we get a 
new colleague that comes and joins the project, and we want to say to him, can you please 
update the operational [component] because we’ve learnt of these new requirements, he knows 
what an operational [component] is and he’s off and running.” 





“Everything on there is a different product, but it’s obviously all linked together.” 
“There is no separation between the software and services, in the sense that I am always 
referring to the services arm of [Coral] leveraging software assets as part of the solution.” 
“If we sell some of our hardware products, usually have maintenance tied into the back end of 
those contracts […] A lot of our own hardware assets come with built-in maintenance.” 
“Our product is not that kind of product that you can just switch on and now it’s working. It’s not a 
toaster. I mean, you buy a toaster and you just plug it in and it’s working already.  It’s not as 
simple as that. Usually, you have to do a project to implement our models and projects are 





“We are driving an asset reuse program across [the division].”  
“About five years ago we established the global asset architecture board. […] We developed and 
put in place a global depository.” 
“People are incentivised to use assets so that their risk rating would be lower and their solution 
will pass through the review.” 
“[Our lab] helped do it for the first time with [the client]. They then took those ideas back and 
created a demo center which we then did with other organizations. […] So there are a number of 
sites that are now showing the same kind of design.” 
“We have started to have asset enablement teams, which means sometimes the people are 
75 
 
Themes Exemplary quotations 
resistant to using [existing assets], because they don’t know about the assets. So we are 
beginning to educate people on how to use these assets. Plus I’ll also go in and say to an 
engagement team, take these two resources from me, they’re free. Go and use them as you 
need, to understand whether a given asset is applicable to your solution or not. And if you find 
that it is applicable, let us help you build it properly into the solutions, so that you will learn from 
it.” 
“If you look at how they build the solutions and what they use to build them, you can easily 
identify segments, components, you know, repeatable steps.” 
“You have the challenge of how do you, essentially, harvest that value back into the business, so 






“The assets will have been developed somewhere in the world, on a project. They then take it 
on, fully document it, and harden it, so it can be reused across the planet.” 
“How do we create these reusable assets so that they can be consumed rather easily by the 
practitioners, so that they can use them in their solutions?” 
“[Coral] has a number of templates which ask you questions about methods you’re going to use. 
So, in theory, you can decide to opt out, you can say, I’m not going to use these methods, or, 
no, I’m not going to adopt the standard components. But in practice I think you would be forced 
into using them because the risk to the business would be seen as quite high.” 
 
Mutation “There are always good reasons why you need a local variant, and inevitably these things get 
customized locally.” 
“Customers that want to do things that don’t align directly to our existing portfolio of services and 
technology, from software perspective, from our hardware, and so on.” 
“[Customers say], we don’t want to do it the standard way, we have our own objectives, we want 
to do it our way.” 
 
Selection “The point is, can I replace some of that software with prefabricated assets? […] So that I don’t 
have to spend time developing it, but I can say [to the client], here is something that I have 
developed that helps you integrate 20 of these systems.” 
“Many clients would like […] to have it put in the next release of the model, and keep it alive, and 
keep it fresh. […] But for something of unique commercial value to the client, they are very 
unlikely to want [Coral] to harvest that back into the [CoralSet].” 
“Some industries are prone to accepting [existing] assets as part of the solution.” 
“[During] the contracting for the solutions that we build, there’s always a part which says, this set 
of assets we believe are reusable elsewhere, we will own the IP [Intellectual Property] for those, 
[…] and that part of the IP is then harvested.” 
 
Retention “As soon as you’ve done it for one [client], that gets baked back in the [CoralSet] and keeps 
going round.” 
“Bank A has done a project with us, we’ve learnt from that, and we updated that part of the work 
products.” 
“Our job is to try and understand the types of issues that the banks and insurance companies 
would have, to be able to articulate back to them their issues and the proposed technological 
solutions around that, but have that embedded in the software, so that it’s much easier or 
quicker for us to say to [another bank, for example], here’s how this particular database would 










“The modern currency of any of these systems is really data, that data has to be formatted in 
standard processes, standard datasets that allow you to repeat it.” 
“Today’s problem is subprime mortgages, for argument sake. Tomorrow’s problem might be, you 
know, Eastern European loans. In designing and developing a system, how would that work 
best? […] If the market changes, are my systems flexible enough that I can actually gear them 
up and gear them down? […] A dynamic system which has got a bunch of [components] in effect 
that allow you to do anything that you like with it.” 
“[While working on a customer project,] we might get an idea of a subject area, and some ideas 
of how different [clients in the same industry] approach the same subject, and we put our heads 





“We moved into being a software product, so we hardened the [CoralSet] significantly, and 
they’re now sold through the software organization as a product. That doesn’t change the fact 
that they’re still sold in a consultative way.” 
“What we are really selling is intellectual capital. So there are several teams in [Coral] taking 
advantage of that intellectual capital, and they are putting that into physical artifacts, into 
solutions, in order to provide to the customer not just intellectual property but something physical 
that they can implement and they can use in a more tangible way.” 
“We’re building what I would call very rigorous productized models, we sell them today on a CD 




“Six or seven years ago, when Basel II was taking off, we sat down with a number of our key 
customers and kind of white-boarded with them what we intended to do with the [CoralSet], got 
their buy-in, and then went back to the lab and fleshed that out.” 
“When times were bad in the dotcom bust back in 2001, that’s when we actually invested more 
in the [CoralSet].” 
“In addition to the components that I’ve talked about – the best hardware, the best software, the 
skills and capabilities – is our ability to orchestrate and co-ordinate these in a meaningful way for 
clients.” 
“There are competitors there, and they do a very good job, I cannot say something different. But 
the key point for [Coral] is that we have an end-to-end capability from the content, consultancy, 
technology point of view that is difficult to match for somebody else.” 
“We developed an asset in the United Kingdom a while ago which has been extremely 
successful; […] We then worked to lift this asset out of the United Kingdom, [and] we’ve now 
taken that to the global level. It’s been further documented and so on, and it will now be 




Artifacts like hardware, software, or documents were described by informants 
as the most intuitive types of knowledge assets. When asked for detailed accounts 
of what they meant, they answered, “we have data encryption built into our 
hardware”, “we have a lot of stuff built into the operating system, in the 
middleware”, or “they took that model and they created a physical artifact, they 
put some codes on that, and now that is [a Coral] product”. And interviewees 
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also underlined that, once the content is embedded into an artifact, it becomes 
difficult to distinguish between the two. For example, a member of the software 
division highlighted that “the reality of selling [a CoralSet component] is that it’s 
deployed in a piece of software. [For instance,] a process [component] is a diagram 
essentially, which defines a workflow. Now, you can write it out on a piece of 
paper […] or you can put in into a development tool […], and these tools actually 
allow you to model a process. So, you have your nice diagrams, you can simulate 
how data flow through the process and so on, and you can optimize that process; 
[…] a piece of software where people manipulate these [diagrams]. But it’s very 
difficult – and this is an important characteristic of the [CoralSet] – it’s very 
difficult to separate the tool from the [diagrams]; so, features in the tool can often 
dictate the content of the [diagrams]”. The same concept of tangibility, almost 
physicality, of embedded organizational knowledge was delivered by informants 
with regard to other types of assets. Members of the services division described 
the routines underlying the provision of services as “a set of plug-and-play 
components”. As a matter of fact, “when we think about services, we are 
physically thinking about something that’s generally built around [Coral’s] 
products, but then has been hardened for physical use in a customer, and then 
packaged so it can be reused on another customer going forward”. Finally, 
individuals regarded themselves and were regarded by the organization as 
knowledge assets that, just like artifacts and routines, could be deployed and 
redeployed across client projects. In the words of an industry technical expert, “if 
I am respected because I have a level of knowledge about something, […] there is 
no incentive for me to codify something and put it down on paper, because I’m 
detracting from my value”. And a client consultant added that “this is very much 
a trend for the knowledge worker, the feeling that the world is flat, so individuals 
need to be utilized. If you codify knowledge, you are almost commoditizing 
yourself”. The same concept of individuals as definite knowledge assets was 
shared by informants at lower hierarchical levels. A consultant who used to 
contribute to customer projects with his own sectorial competences, for example, 
said that “for many years I worked primarily on the object [components]. I know 
some of my friends or colleagues who have worked almost exclusively on the 
warehouse [components], I know people who have worked pretty much exclusively 
on the process [components]. So, each of those [components] is a little world of its 
own, and it could be used independently of the others depending on what the 
objectives are”. And his project director added that “consultants are specialists: 
[…] we have data specialists, process specialists, and we have also enough object 
oriented or SOA [Service Oriented Architecture] consultants, who are also 
specialists. […] What we need to make sure is that for whatever project the 
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consultant is allocated, his skills and knowledge and experience fit the 
requirements and expectations the customer has”. 
Clarifying interdependencies. Structural, technological, functional, 
process, and business interdependencies tied together artifacts, routines, and 
individuals as reusable assets. A banking industry leader explained that a 
solution is a system “that the client will place an economic premium on because 
of the combination of things: 1) it has to have an underlying asset that will either 
accelerate the time to market for the client, or shorten the time of execution, or 
add value around the capability; 2) it has to have people who are skilled in the 
deployment of that asset. Those are two of the critical ingredients that we have 
to have in a solution”. Similarly, service routines in the areas of training and 
support almost inevitably accompany the implementation of software 
components, because “[clients] don’t understand the [CoralSet] well enough to be 
able to get the adoption right”. And yet other interdependencies arise from 
technological factors and pose the problem of ensuring ongoing integration among 
different categories of assets. For example, project managers typically wondered 
“what is the referenced set of hardware and software that we would put together? 
[Because] those architectures clearly evolve over time, as the products evolve, 
driven by customer need”. And in fact, “the main challenge from a technical 
point within [Coral] is integration with a very large and complex technology 
landscape, […] to understand that landscape in terms of which set of tools we 
should be aligning with, and then making sure our content fits correctly within 
those tools. […] We are a technology organization; we have a lot of technology. 
Keeping track with all of that technology that is constantly shifting is something 
that is by far and away our single biggest challenge, [because] we’re not just 
selling content, we’re selling content which can sit within the [Coral] software. […] 
That for us is by far the single biggest challenge”. 
Establishing regularities. Across the divisions, knowledge assets were 
conceived of and treated as forming comprehensive “repositories” to which project 
leaders could resort repeatedly for specific needs, so that “the business thinker 
can create a unique solution to his problem based on a common set of 
capabilities”. Managers and executives alike provided several accounts about “a 
single asset repository that’s got loads of assets in it” and that made it easier to 
search for, identify, and reuse the same knowledge assets every time it was 
needed. The main reason for constituting repositories from which drawing 
regularly was that: 
 
We don’t have ten different insurance companies coming to us at the same 
time saying, I want to develop this, this is my problem, help me solve it. We 
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will get one or two, maybe, across the globe, and then three months will go 
by, six months will go by, and then we will get one or two more. By that 
time the institutional knowledge is long forgotten, because we did this three 
months ago, and we don’t remember that anymore. […] So one of the things 
we have also started to do, and quite successfully, is to capture this in a 
standard codified form, and then put them in the repository that we call the 
asset hub. So anyone can go in and search and find out so what exists in this 
domain, and if they go in and search, they will be able to find three or five 
things that are already there, or maybe 15 things that are already there, and 
then you can now peruse that and figure out what you want to use.  
 
Informants detailed that “the first version of the asset hub did not have the right 
level of search capabilities, but with feedback, we have improved it, […] and now 
it’s reasonably well established, and people find it easy to go in and search for 
what they want”. In fact, “the biggest problem is how do you […] catalogue, 
organize, and make searchable and discoverable an effective set of assets without 
giving people more work than the time they save?  Because if it takes you more 
work to find something to reuse it than the time it saves you, then the return on 
your investment of doing the search is just not worth it”. New assets were 
admitted into the repository by a “worldwide asset architecture board”, after a 
process in which “you can come along to the asset board and, as long as you 
propose the asset in a pretty standardized way, say, okay, if customer X is going 
to use this asset, how much would it save them, where does it de-risk the client, 
what’s it going to cost to build or harden or harvest the asset from wherever it’s 
coming from, and, you know, what are its unique selling points so that we can 
market it internally. So, there’s a workflow for doing that, and the architecture 
asset board are effectively the governors that say, okay, we don’t think that’s a 
very good asset or, yes, we want to use this asset, but let’s make sure it gets 
packaged or hardened in a particular way”. 
The same idea of a common repository for regular reutilization was applied not 
just to hardware, software, and formalized service routines but also to 
individuals. For example, a chief technology officer responsible for asset 
management worldwide across divisions shared with us that “late last night, I 
realized I needed to find someone in [Coral] in China who was interested in 
environmental issues. Now, you know how many thousands of people we have in 
China, and I don’t know any of them, but within about an hour this morning I 






The third dimension of the emerging theoretical model captures the evolution 
of the firm’s knowledge context as a result of the interactions with other 
knowledge contexts (the clients’) and the broader environment. In particular, as 
the study went on, we observed that the firm’s assets underwent similar and 
recurrent patterns of change described by the following four themes: 
reproduction, mutation, selection, and retention. 
Reproduction. The reshaping of the knowledge context around the CoralSet 
was driven primarily by the logic of dimensional growth through reutilization of 
existing assets. This was consistent with the firm’s overall strategy, as top 
executives wanted Coral “to be this globally integrated enterprise; we want to be 
able to […] move seamlessly from place to place. That has driven us into the way 
of developing standardized methods”; and “instead of recreating a mini [Coral] in 
every country that we do business in, we accept the fact that our products are 
going to be made in Japan, or in China, or in Germany, and then shipped 
everywhere in the world, and our services may be produced in, or the actual 
implementation of the services might be done in South Africa or India or Brazil 
or Russia, and delivered anywhere in the world. If you’re going to try to get to 
that kind of model, which has a lot of attraction, you know, [Coral employees] in 
Brazil are going to struggle if you tell them that people in Korea want to do 
printing differently from people in Belgium”. 
To foster expansion, the firm searched for and tested customer industries as 
portions of the broader environment, and looked for industries that provided 
better conditions for reproducing fast and extensively the knowledge assets that 
formed the CoralSet. Statements supporting our interpretations sounded like, “we 
are moving towards industry-specific enablement, and that is benefitting both 
services as well as software”, “[we] have begun to look more and more into, what 
can I build and codify within industries?”, or “there is an overall focus within 
[Coral] across the board on industry solutions, and now people are beginning to 
realize that this level of repeatability is essential, not just for [the services 
division] but also for [the software division]”. After selecting industries that 
presented propitious conditions for knowledge reproduction, “how do we know 
which areas within an industry are prime for reuse? Because you create these 
assets with the primary intention that you will be able to reuse them a number of 
times, […] so that we can realize the value of that, which means that we have to 
go and look at standardized areas within an industry to create a solution around 
it, or an asset around it, and then replicate it”. Lead clients played a key role in 
helping introduce, adapt, and spread the CoralSet across the industry. The firm 
always started engaging with a small number of so-called “charter customers”, 
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“early customers”, or “partners”, and worked closely with them “to harvest their 
knowledge and experience and try and build new [CoralSet components] in a 
collaborative way”. Rewarded with favorable terms and conditions, those 
customers transferred critical knowledge about their business and the industry, 
and helped prevent the solutions to become “very skewed”, that is, too compliant 
with the specificities of a single client. According to the chief technology officer 
for Europe, for example, “there is a partner in play who really does understand 
that marketplace. […] The customer is big enough to be able to define the 
standard [for the industry]. So, there is a chance of creating a utility out of this 
which we can reuse in many situations [across the industry]”. 
Finally, reproduction also occurred across industries that presented similar 
characteristics. These new target industries were spotted with “what we would 
call the opportunity identification, [which means] we’re actually looking at a 
couple of other sectors right now to look at the deployment of the same concept 
there”. Besides the obvious advantages in terms of better fit between the 
knowledge context and the environment, the industry-based approach allowed 
reducing risk and uncertainty. As a matter of fact, clients preferred to “buy a 
solution which many other people have deployed, [and not] something that’s 
completely unproven. It’s proven technology […] that’s been deployed hundreds of 
times at other organizations. Therefore they get the feeling that they are buying 
best practice”. However, it also entailed strategic rigidity. An informant defined 
the industry-based approach as “a typically structured process that makes more 
difficult for us to sit back and look more broadly about the market”. 
Mutation. The implementation of the solutions entailed alterations of the 
knowledge assets to match specific characteristics of the client. Such alterations 
were necessary because the CoralSet “are not turnkey solutions, not ready-to-use 
components that you just decide which one you want, and here is your solution. 
They need to be customized, they need to be adapted. And in order to do that, 
you need basically to bring together perfect knowledge of the [CoralSet] and a 
perfect understanding of the [client] requirements. And you have to work through 
the process of adapting the [CoralSet] to the specific requirements”. According to 
an experienced executive, “in all cases without exception” every client project 
“requires customization: […] some of it would be country specific, some of it might 
be [due to] regulatory uniqueness, and some of it will be [necessary because 
clients] have unusual products, or they’ve different ways of looking at the world, 
or they have some unique value in their organization that we haven’t thought 
of”. Another informant clarified that organization-specific differences and 
peculiarities were a major driver of mutation. In fact, clients “want a service that 
is customized to the way that they have traditionally run their business. And 
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that is not so much a question of competitive advantage, as really simple habit. 
Thinking of many of the things that we end up debating with them, when you 
come down to it, they can’t really defend in terms of, there’s a really good 
business reason why we have to do it this way. It’s just that’s the way they do 
it”. As a result, the CoralSet, “in general, represents about 80% of standard 
across the board, but where it is the unique client value would be in the 
additional 20% where they need to focus their customization efforts on. There 
always is a level of customization needed for the client, and that is adding the 
client’s unique value”. 
Selection. The reproduction of acquired and reusable knowledge was subject 
to and limited by two selective forces. On the one hand, new knowledge assets 
were selected by clients based on the ability to sustain their operation efficiency, 
consistency, and growth. Assets deemed “reusable”, “prefabricated”, or 
“standardized” were preferred to assets that had to be developed ex novo, 
because they sustained rapid expansion through replication. As a result, this type 
of selection tended to constrain variation. A top executive explained that “by 
having [the CoralSet] as the de facto standard [in a given industry], we then have 
a control of the revenues and potential growth of the marketplace”. On the other 
hand, new knowledge assets were selected by local conditions. As an informant 
pointed out, “Telco is a difficult [industry for asset reutilization] simply, because 
Telco solutions are typically comprised of a number of partners, [and] partner-
rich industries are less prone to accept these assets. Whereas […] insurance and 
certain areas of banking, and as we are finding out, certain areas of government, 
are more adept to accepting this. The healthcare industry, for example, […] they 
want to go to electronic medical-record systems, and so they are looking to get 
that transformation going. So to the extent we have something that is already 
pre-built in that space, it tends to go over well”. And another interviewee 
observed that “financial services are not a very efficient industry because, when 
you go internally into these big organizations, they have 2,000 applications in the 
investment bank, and every night there is some sort of fix on those applications. 
That is not a stable system that is supportive of a commoditized volume-based 
business”. 
Other factors of selection related to the broader environment included cultural 
and legal specificities. An informant underlined that “there are constraints that 
mean you can’t necessarily do everything the same way. These tend to show up 
in places you might not expect. For example, they may show up in things like 
privacy laws. For example, in Germany, which has very strong privacy laws, 
we’ve often had debates with the customers about who can replenish paper in a 
printer, because, if you can replenish paper in the printer, you could probably see 
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some of the output from that printer, and, you know, should [Coral] employees be 
able to see healthcare records printed out on a printer? […] So, inevitably, local 
cultural and legal differences end up having impacts on how you do service 
delivery.” 
Apart from environmental and client-specific characteristics, selective forces 
operated also within the firm-client relationships. Many client organizations, in 
fact, had a fundamental, strategic interest to differentiate themselves from other 
organizations, especially competitors, and tried to prevent or limit the diffusion of 
knowledge that they had contributed to create. In order to preserve the client’s 
competitive differentiation, “any customization that is harvested back to [Coral] 
will be contractually agreed with the client”. This type of selection tended to 
enhance variation and sustain diversity. A chief technology officer gave us an 
account of the delicate balance that negotiations with customers about 
appropriation and reproduction of knowledge had to strike. 
 
There is a process to make sure that, whatever we are doing [with a 
customer], we can capitalize that in the [CoralSet]. If you see that there is 
not just benefit for that customer but also for other customers, and even for 
our [solutions], there are some negotiations. […] ‘Are you willing to share with 
us all of this? More or less, of course, with any relevant information from 
you, but to put that into the new release, because other banks are going to 
benefit from that’. […] The legal aspect is very important. We don’t want to 
have any troubles with our customers. But they know that our models, apart 
from our [Coral] input, are also benefiting indirectly from the work we are 
doing with other customers. […] If you want to make sure you earned the 
intellectual property, you need to make sure that that ownership is stipulated 
and clear in the contract with the client. […] Now, of course not only do you 
have to protect it in the first instance, it’s even more important when you 
reuse the asset. Because after having invested all your effort in the asset, the 
last thing you want to do is then give away that intellectual property when 
you use it on a new project. 
 
Retention. During firm-client exchanges for implementation, solutions-related 
knowledge was transferred from Coral to the clients and vice versa. A project 
consultant explained his contribution “as being a knowledge transfer activity, 
[aiming to] skill the client, […] working with the clients, explaining what it is that 
we’re doing as we go, and when they become fairly self-sufficient, then they start 
to do it themselves”. Similarly, elements of knowledge about the client’s 
organization, culture, business, markets, industry, and technologies were retained 
by Coral as new “learning”, or “understanding”, and inherited by novel versions 
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of the firm’s knowledge assets. As a result, the CoralSet got periodically changed, 
expanded, and updated. At the outset of this hereditary process there was an 
activity of “looking at what aspects of this field-developed intellectual property 
[…] need to get harvested back into the core products themselves, where you then 
get the greatest leverage”. Elements of knowledge altered during a client project 
were then transmitted into future generations of assets across subsequent client 
projects, so “you have the challenge of how do you essentially harvest that value 
back into the business, so that you can reuse it with other customers, or begin to 
embed more of it in your products”. In fact, “if our team implements this in a 
customer and we learn some new business processes, we then come back to the 
center and start to take some of that learning back into the [CoralSet], and that 
becomes the next release”. Interviewees provided many examples of knowledge 
that was retained for reproduction: 
 
Anything that we learn about trends and, you know, future requirements 
that we get from our projects with banks, we would be able to come up with 
an idea of, how should it be standardized, and what would every bank want 
to know. So it’s kind of translating it into a new language that […] will 
become standard for all banks. [Our European lab] helped do it for the first 
time with [Bank A]. They then took those ideas back and created a demo 
center, which we then did with other organizations. […] The model was 
transformed into the US model as well, and it’s now available in the 
[American] system center as well as the [European] center, so there are a 
number of sites that are now showing the same kind of design. 
Evolvability 
The fourth dimension of the model, evolvability, emerged as the firm’s ability 
to change and adapt the CoralSet reiteratively, that is, to dynamically generate 
variations that were at the same time compatible with existing assets and their 
interdependencies and regularities (the knowledge context), and suitable for 
satisfying external constraints (the knowledge environment). Fostering 
evolvability was a crucial part of the firm’s strategy: it entailed being able to 
constantly adapt products and services to ever changing external conditions, and 
do it faster and more effectively than competitors. For example, a senior 
executive explained that “ten years ago we felt that we had pretty much done all 
we could in the data warehouse space, we couldn’t really see where we’d go next. 
Along came the whole post-Enron compliance focus, the post-9/11 Patriot Act 
focus, and so on. The whole area of risk compliance became important, and we 
found out all of a sudden that [clients] were swamped with not one but three, 
four, five new different areas of compliance”. Evolvability comprises three themes: 
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1) Supporting variability, the capacity to generate new and diverse knowledge 
structures via combination and recombination of basic elements of knowledge; 2) 
Ensuring functionality, the capacity to create new knowledge assets capable of 
being reused regularly as functional and interdependent parts of the overall 
knowledge context around the CoralSet, and; 3) Achieving fitness of the new 
knowledge assets in the environment of utilization. 
Supporting variability. Variability refers to the range and diversity of new 
knowledge structures created out of individuals’ knowledge endowment, through 
ever new combinations of substantive knowledge and metaknowledge. This was 
fundamental to generate new assets or update existing ones. A business 
development manager explained that mutations and adaptations of assets during 
customer projects laid down the basis for creating new families of assets for future 
use. He described such activity as “stand back from several projects that we’re 
working in on the same subject matter and say, okay, if we wanted to make [a 
new software application] very homogenized, […] how would we build this to 
represent the 80% generic [for all other clients in the same industry]?”. 
Variability appeared as “built-in”, in that the firm’s knowledge endowment had 
the potential to generate a great variety of new, different assets out of existing 
knowledge elements. To illustrate this property, a project consultant for the 
implementation of the solutions explained that, for instance, “in our data 
warehouse [component], when we talk about an individual, we say, okay, is that 
individual male or female, married or single? What is the income that they have? 
[…] We can include what is the race of that person. […] Sometimes, religion could 
be important. Now, all of that is in our standard [CoralSet]. If you bring that 
[component] to a bank in the United States, they will say, guys, I cannot ask 
another person about his race. […] If I ask that, they will sue me, and they will 
say that, because [of my race], I didn’t get this mortgage. […] For a bank in Saudi 
Arabia, […] maybe for them it’s important to know if the person is Muslim or not, 
because if he’s Muslim they have to apply the Islamic bank rules that are 
different from the standard Western banking rules. So, what we are showing is 
that our [data warehouse component] has a lot of ways of identifying an 
individual but, of course, depending on the culture, the country, the legislation, 
you cannot implement all of that”. 
Ensuring functionality. The second theme of evolvability refers to the 
capacity of newly acquired or created knowledge assets to become part of the 
knowledge context and relate to other assets of the CoralSet effectively. For 
example, “codifying anything is valueless unless somebody uses that knowledge. I 
could write a fantastic method which sits in repository until it ages off and it 
disappears into the ether”. Functionality needs to be “maintained” over time, in 
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that “there’s even a half-life to that, because over time your consultants move on, 
are promoted, leave, and so on. So within three years, 25% of the people who 
could notionally use it on that new opportunity, they’re not there anymore”. The 
ability to generate assets that are viable and functional implied that the firm 
stored in its knowledge context memory of past experiences. The development 
director stressed that “what you’re buying, when you buy the [CoralSet], is 
experience and risk mitigation. If you think about what the [CoralSet] are, 
they’re really a distillation of the experience of many organizations formalized 
into a formal set of things. […] Most likely, your risk is lower because it’s the 
distillation of what many people have done”. When needed, knowledge of the 
past was used to solve new problems of clients. For example, “the United States 
just published new regulations to help control the way banks operate, particularly 
in their market operations, and so [Coral] would have a group of developers who 
would then research that regulation, and then interpret it as to how does it affect 
the data [component], the process [component], the object [components of the 
CoralSet]? You know, do we have new subject matter of interest? Do we have to 
add new nouns and new verbs to cover this type of regulation? Interpreting the 
requirements of the regulation then would manifest itself in developing pieces in 
each of those [components]. Each [component] needs to be developed in concert, 
so that if we’ve got a new noun being developed, we need to know about it, not 
only from data, but also from process and object view, so that we can extend all 
the [components] using the same definitions”. 
Achieving fitness. The third theme of evolvability refers to the capacity of 
the CoralSet knowledge assets to meet the specificities of diverse environments of 
utilization. A chief technology officer responsible reported that “Japan, for 
example, has been extremely open to accepting [reusable] assets, and they are 
leading in how they consume these assets. […] But as you look at North America, 
they ask you twenty questions before they even begin to look at the asset. With 
China, for example, once you educate them, the adoption is better”. A business 
development manager of the software division clarified that achieving fitness in 
diverse environments involved combining and recombining existing knowledge in 
a way that captured both commonalities and specificities. For example, “the 
financial regulator in each country has different rules, perhaps taxes, VAT, the 
levies that you have to pay in each country are different. In Ireland you have to 
pay the stamp duty, in the US you don’t […]. In Latin America, you have to pay 
some taxes that you don’t have to pay in China. All of that we have to consider 
to make our content generic enough to be able to modify [the solutions] to the 
specific situation of the bank but, at the same time, detailed enough that they 
can really get value from that”. Such balance was essentially struck by acquiring 
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and leveraging metaknowledge through interactions with the industry. “At the 
moment, for example, with the banking and financial markets organizations, with 
the credit crisis, where there’s a lot of flux and we ourselves aren’t sure what the 
correct route is, our instinctive reaction is to work very closely with a number of 
key customers; […] and we use them as sounding-boards”. The ability to create 
new solutions by recombining and adapting existing knowledge was developed 
and refined over time by asking questions like “what would be the generic of this? 
Is it standard enough to be able to say, well, every [client in this industry] would 
want to have these basic activities?” 
3.5 A Knowledge-Based Evolutionary Theory 
The data structure in Figure 3.1 displays the concepts and themes emerging 
from the data and subtended by each of the four dimensions. In this section we 
illustrate the dynamic processual interrelationships among themes and 
dimensions, as represented in Figure 3.2, and formulate a knowledge-based 
evolutionary theory (KET) grounded in empirical evidence. In doing so, we draw 
relevant insights from recent advances in the fields of evolutionary and systems 
biology – particularly, Kirschner and Gerhart’s (2005) theory of facilitated 
variation – as they help us attain a better understanding of the nature of and 
relationships between knowledge-related changes at different levels. 
Our theory regards the firm as an organism made of knowledge. Like its 
biological counterpart, our organism interacts with other organisms and with the 
environment, and evolves through a series of intertwined knowledge-based 
changes occurring at three levels: 1) microlevel changes within the knowledge 
endowment; 2) firm-level changes within the knowledge context, and; 3) industry-
level changes driven by interactions between the knowledge context and the 
knowledge environment. In the middle of Figure 3.2, evolvability emerges from 
our findings as an outcome of such process, determined by the dynamic and 
recursive interplay of structuring, contextualizing, and evolving. Consistently 
with the use of the concept in biology – where evolvability is defined as a 
system’s capacity for adaptive evolution (Kirschner & Gerhart, 1998, 2005; 
Wagner, 2005) – this dimension indicates the firm’s ability to generate new 
knowledge assets that can be reproduced, inherited, and adapted to ensure the 
survival and growth of its knowledge context in changing environmental 
conditions. Let us examine in detail how the knowledge-based changes occurring 
at each level contribute to the firm-organism’s evolvability. 
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The knowledge endowment is made of all the elements of substantive 
knowledge and metaknowledge detained by individuals. Altogether, they 
constitute the genotype of the firm. Like genes in biological organisms, different 
types of knowledge elements act as building blocks that can be combined and 
recombined into many different abstract structures. To fully capture the micro-
mechanisms of structuring, we have used a taxonomy of organizational knowledge 
based on how knowledge works, as opposed to how it appears or where it resides. 
We distinguish between two types of organizational knowledge, metaknowledge 
and substantive knowledge, and focus on the different roles they play. While 
substantive elements provide knowledge of what is needed to solve a problem or 
attain a goal, metaknowledge provides the why, how, and when that are necessary 
to regulate and orchestrate the use of the former. The interplay between the two 
endows the firm-organism with variability, that is, the capacity to generate a 
great variety of abstract knowledge structures out of an existing set of basic 
knowledge elements. 
To participate in the firm’s activities and processes, and perform functions 
that are useful to the organization’s life, new structures of substantive knowledge 
and metaknowledge need to be contextualized, that is, translated into assets and 
integrated into the broader knowledge context. Contextualizing means connecting 
new artifacts, routines, and individuals so as to sustain the purposeful 
functionality of the knowledge context. The knowledge context, intended as the 
complex of all these knowledge assets, with their interdependencies and 
regularities, constitutes the phenotype of the organization. As in biological 
organisms, the phenotypical characteristics of the organization are expression of 
its genotype – the “fluid” endowment of metaknowledge and substantive 
knowledge – and are subject to the influence of environmental factors. 
The recursive series of knowledge-based transformations is completed by the 
interactions of the firm’s phenotype with the broad knowledge environment. The 
latter includes factors that can influence the evolution of the former, such as the 
knowledge contexts of other organizations – clients, suppliers, partners, and son 
on – and the market, cultural, social, regulatory, or technological factors that 
impact on the dynamics of an industry or a population of firms. The patterns of 
evolutionary change arising from the interactions between the firm’s knowledge 
context and the knowledge environment impact on the third component of 
evolvability, the ability to achieve fitness. The environment, in fact, influences 
the expansion of the firm’s knowledge context by providing favorable or hostile 
conditions for the reproduction of knowledge assets across time and space. The 
circular process displayed in Figure 3.2 is complete when new information about 
fit and unfit assets is acquired by the firm, articulated and structured in terms of 
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substantive knowledge and metaknowledge, and retained and contextualized into 
new or modified knowledge assets. 
In our KET, the firm-organism is controlled by knowledge, and exists and 
evolves through the reproduction of its knowledge context. The environment 
instructs the firm on how to alter and adapt its knowledge assets through 
selection, but it does not create variation. As in biological life, “variation is 
facilitated largely because so much novelty is available in what is already 
possessed by the organism” (Kirschner & Gerhart, 2005: 273). Hence, evolvability 
appears as potentially built-in, in that the knowledge endowment facilitates the 
incorporation of mutations into new generations of viable assets that can be 
adapted to changing environmental conditions. The basic elements of substantive 
knowledge and metaknowledge are versatile, and can be combined and 
recombined in many ways to produce variable outcomes. 
3.6 Discussion 
This study aimed to unveil the process by which organizational knowledge is 
leveraged and adapted dynamically to create idiosyncratic resources. Our data-
driven investigation adopted the “dynamics first!” approach typical of 
evolutionary theories (Dosi & Marengo, 2007), in that it aimed to clarify how 
knowledge-based changes occur, and why some changes have consequences in the 
overall process while others do not. At the same time, this was a study of a 
fundamental organizational resource. The emerging grounded theory model tells 
us that organizations have to be studied for what they do and for what they are 
at the same time, and that the two aspects – activities, and resources – are not 
separate, but need to be analyzed jointly. While our findings provide support for 
further theoretical and methodological integration between evolutionary and 
resource/knowledge-based thinking, several aspects differentiate the emerging 
KET from either approach. 
Advancing Evolutionary Thinking 
Current evolutionary thinking in strategic management has been profoundly 
inspired by Nelson and Winter’s (1982) pioneering work on routines and 
capabilities; and our study makes no exception. However, the KET departs from 
routine-based approaches in several ways. First, evolutionary economics is chiefly 
a theory of large systems, such as industries, or sectors of the economy, and uses 
routines as units of analysis to address the problem of variation within the 
population. The KET, instead, looks at the single organism, and studies the 
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interrelationships between internal and external change as determinants of its 
behavior. The genetic material of this organism is knowledge, a fluid resource 
that undergoes similar patterns of evolutionary change independently of the 
specific type of asset in which it is embedded. Knowledge assets like artifacts and 
routines are instead phenotypic manifestations, that is, the less fluid and more 
persistent features of the organism that enable and condition its life and 
behavior. Resorting to the familiar metaphor of the tennis player, we could say 
that the KET looks beyond the player’s skills, to include in the analysis the 
characteristics of the ball, the racket, and the court, as well as how the player 
elaborates the knowledge he has of them. In other words, not only there’s much 
more than routines to the firm’s knowledge, but all types of knowledge assets 
concur to determine what Nelson and Winter (1982) called “regular and 
predictable behavioral patterns of firms” (p. 14). 
Second, unlike Nelson and Winter’s (1982) profit-maximizing and efficiency-
driven firm, our organism is controlled by knowledge, and responds to the logic of 
survival, reproduction, and expansion of its knowledge context in the 
environment. This crucial distinction implies that behavioral regularities are not 
the choice of an economic and boundedly-rational mind, nor do organizational 
inertia and rigidity arise as avoidance of the costs and conflicts that departing 
from existing assets would entail. They are rather due to the fact that, for 
organizations, “being” means reproducing a behavior, and that behavior is 
reproduced by reiterating actions and replicating structures altogether. While the 
routine-based approach regards mutations as negative events, to which the 
organization responds with control, and the “positive stability” of routines is a 
desirable, profitable condition, in our KET, mutation and change are rather 
integral and non-detrimental aspects of the organism’s life. Emphasis on 
evolvability, then, turns upside down the view of firms as “being typically much 
better at the tasks of self-maintenance in a constant environment” (Nelson & 
Winter, 1982: 9), and puts forward a vision of organizations that perform well 
only when they are able not only to establish regularities but also to change and 
adapt them. In this view, aggregate change results not just from selection forces 
present in the environment, but primarily from the firm’s built-in evolvability, 
that is, its ability to generate viable variation out of a set of available knowledge 
elements. 
Moreover, the view of environment proposed by extant evolutionary thought 
seems to reflect the same rigidity and stability attributed to the firm as bundle of 
routines: the environment appears necessarily as much of the same across firms, 
and the population is exposed to the same or similar external conditions. Our 
notions of knowledge context and knowledge environment reject this view of 
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environmental homogeneity, and circumstantiate the possible interactions of the 
firm with the environment to specific portions of it, represented by the knowledge 
contexts of other organizations (clients, suppliers, partners, and so on). Thus, 
variation across the population arises from a great diversity of specific, unique 
interactions between different knowledge contexts. Shaped and reshaped by such 
interactions, the firm’s knowledge context becomes the locus of a peculiar 
organizational memory, as individual competences, routines, artifacts, and their 
mutual interdependencies provide a path-dependent network of references that 
direct and constrain future interactions. Consistently with a widely accepted 
definition of the notion of context, all assets forming the knowledge context 
constitute those “situational opportunities and constraints that affect the 
occurrence and meaning of organizational behavior” (Johns, 2006: 386), and act 
as “a critical driver of cognition, attitudes, and behavior” (Bamberger, 2008: 
840). 
Advancing Resource- and Knowledge-based Thinking 
By clarifying the processual relationships between knowledge-based changes at 
multiple levels, our theoretical model tackles a central problem of the 
resource/knowledge based view: shedding light on the dynamic creation, 
utilization, and development of the firm’s resources (Eisenhardt & Santos, 2002; 
Kraaijenbrink et al., 2010; Makadok, 2003; Sirmon, Gove, & Hitt, 2008; Sirmon, 
Hitt, & Ireland, 2007). Previous studies have provided invaluable insights into 
resource co-specialization and complementarity (Christensen, 1995, 1996; Stieglitz 
& Heine, 2007; Teece, 2007), but we still did not have a clear understanding of 
the process by which such interdependencies are established, renewed, and 
leveraged dynamically. Knowledge structuring, contextualizing, and evolving 
emerge as processual explanations for how the firm’s knowledge assets are 
created, acquired, deployed, and altered, and how new assets are matched with 
existing ones to sustain the ability to evolve and adapt. In the KET, the 
organizational context is made of knowledge, and shaped by the dynamic 
interplay of cognition, actions and structures across the individual, 
organizational, and inter-organizational levels. Accepting that all types of 
knowledge-embedding assets concur equally to determine and constrain 
organizational life entails revisiting recent studies on the embeddedness of firm 
resources that put routines center-stage in the interaction with artifacts 
(D’Adderio, 2003, 2008), technology (Edmondson, Bohmer, & Pisano, 2001), 
human actors (Howard-Grenville, 2005), and organizational culture and schemata 
(Rerup & Feldman, 2011). 
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A second important consideration addresses the intrinsic nature of knowledge 
and its role in preventing the imitation of idiosyncratic resources. Our data show 
that the structuring of elements of substantive knowledge through the use of 
metaknowledge underlies the creation of new knowledge assets as well as the 
alteration of existing ones. Substantive knowledge and metaknowledge are 
functional types, and their use transcends the distinction between the tacit and 
explicit dimensions (Nonaka, 1994; Polanyi, 1962, 1967). In other words, both 
explain how specific elements of knowledge work in relation to other elements as 
interdependent components of  knowledge systems, or architectures, regardless of 
whether they are implicitly detained by individuals or articulated and shared in 
social interactions. This suggests that the process of organizational knowledge 
creation (Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Nonaka et al., 2000a; Nonaka, 
Umemoto, & Senoo, 1996a; Nonaka et al., 1996b; von Krogh et al., 2000) may 
have to encompass an additional activity of knowledge structuring – as intended 
in this study – to be effectively capable of producing new knowledge. Our data 
remain consistent with tenet that knowledge assets can only be created or altered 
through reiterative socialization, externalization, combination, and internalization 
– a process referred to as the SECI by (Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka & Toyama, 2003; 
Nonaka et al., 2000a; Nonaka & von Krogh, 2009; Nonaka et al., 2006). However, 
in the experience of our case study firms the SECI would result in an exercise of 
mere transformation – or conversion from form to form – if the two 
interdependent tasks of clarifying what new knowledge is needed (substantive 
dimension), and understanding why, when, and how that new knowledge needs to 
be employed and connected with other knowledge (metaknowledge dimension) 
were not both accomplished through structuring. This essential role of structuring 
in knowledge creation is further underlined by the observation that, while the 
four knowledge conversion activities of SECI are fundamentally based on 
interactions between individuals (articulation, imitation, shared experience, 
knowledge exchange, and social processes in general), the abstract use of 
metaknowledge to reconnect and reorganize elements of substantive knowledge 
was commonly experienced by individual employees also as tacit intuition and 
autonomous reflection. Yet, only through interaction did the new knowledge so 
created become “organizational”, that is, contextualized as part of a broader 
knowledge system. 
Our findings suggest that extant knowledge taxonomies such as tacitness and 
explicitness (Kogut & Zander, 1992; Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka & von Krogh, 2009; 
Polanyi, 1962), stickiness, ambiguity (Szulanski, 1996; von Hippel, 1994), and 
complexity (Rivkin, 2000, 2001; Szulanski & Jensen, 2006), are usefully describe 
crucial aspects of the internal dynamics of the knowledge endowment that give 
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rise to contextually functional and environmentally suitable assets, but do not 
provide a complete picture. Such dynamics seem to be fully captured by 
appreciating and studying the interplay between substantive knowledge and 
metaknowledge as a mechanism generating idiosyncratic outcomes. In particular, 
whether tacit or explicit, detained by individuals or codified and shared in teams, 
metaknowledge appears to play a fundamental role in the origin and functioning 
of dynamic capabilities (Adner & Helfat, 2003; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Helfat 
et al., 2007; Salvato, 2009; Teece, 2007; Teece et al., 1997). In fact, it was this 
particular type of organizational knowledge that underpinned our case study 
firms’ ability to leverage adaptively the endowment of available resources. From 
this point of view, our findings contribute important insights into what is 
emerging as a pressing problem of strategic management research: understanding 
the linkage between individuals and collective-level constructs such as routines 
and capabilities across multiple levels of analysis (Abell, Felin, & Foss, 2008; 
Felin & Foss, 2009; Parmigiani & Howard-Grenville, 2011; Salvato, 2009; Salvato 
& Rerup, 2011). 
Finally, the study advances knowledge-based thinking by bridging two 
epistemologies (Cook & Brown, 1999; Eisenhardt & Santos, 2002). Throughout 
our analytical and conceptual elaborations, knowledge is treated both as a firm 
resource (Grant, 1996; Kogut & Zander, 1992), and as the process of knowing 
influenced by the characteristics of the context in which it takes place (Blackler, 
1993, 1995; Tsoukas, 1996; Weick & Roberts, 1993). In particular, our model 
highlights that knowing is never a merely cognitive process of individuals (Simon, 
1991), but it involves also routines and artifacts (Argote, 2012; Cohen & 
Bacdayan, 1994; Cohen & Sproull, 1996) as distinct but interconnected parts of 
an overall organizational intelligence (Dosi, Nelson, & Winter, 2000). As a 
necessary consequence, the KET extends the “collective view” of knowing and 
learning (Dosi & Marengo, 2007) in two ways. First, it includes forms of knowing, 
such as physical products and artifacts, that do not necessarily entail codification 
of tacit knowledge. Second, it suggests that no form of knowing, including 
codification, can be considered long-lasting, as changes in a single knowledge 
asset tend to produce at least minimal alterations that interest the whole system. 
Hence, although “ridden with path-dependencies” (Dosi & Marengo, 2007), 
organizational knowledge is never completely persistent. 
Limitations and Future Research 
A study of change that does not rely on longitudinal analyses typical of 
process research (Pettigrew, 1990, 1997; Van De Ven, 2007; Van de Ven & 
Huber, 1990; Van De Ven & Poole, 1995) bears the inherent risk of missing firm- 
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or time-specific variation (Bowen & Wiersema, 1999; Tsoukas & Hatch, 2001). To 
overcome this limitation, we elicited historical and processual data from our 
interviewees, and used them in combination with real-time data and with data 
from other sources to build, compare, and contrast the ‘stories’ of our cases 
(Langley, 1999, 2007). This allowed us to trace the logical and chronological 
series of events that constituted the structures of our model, and to explicate the 
overall pattern that such events described (Van de Ven & Poole, 2005). However, 
future longitudinal research might help us understand how contextual factors 
affect the model, and identify other boundary conditions for our findings. 
An interpretive study of a single case can raise questions about the 
transferability of its findings (Guba & Lincoln, 1985). Indeed, case studies have 
the advantage of providing thick and accurate observations, and supporting 
relatively simple and effective conceptualizations, but they generally entail a 
compromise in terms of generalizability (Thorngate, 1976; Weick, 2005). A 
reflection on the characteristics of the empirical setting as situational boundary 
conditions of the study may help assess transferability. Notwithstanding the 
knowledge-intensiveness of the IT industry and the possible peculiarities of Coral 
– which made it an especially interesting, ideal case for new theorizing 
(Siggelkow, 2007) – we believe that the findings and the grounded theory 
reported here describe constructs and activities that are common to organizations 
in many different industries. A crucial empirical circumstance that might affect 
how the KET works in other settings is the magnitude of change. Change as we 
observed it during our research occurred in small and continuous shifts; hence, we 
do not know how the model works in a punctuated equilibrium scenario (Gersick, 
1991, 1994; Romanelli & Tushman, 1994). Our data on the successful expansion 
of Coral across similar industries seem to suggest that evolvability is enhanced 
when environmental conditions change in a regular, nondramatic way. This 
conclusion is supported by recent studies that use computational modeling to 
predict how the pace and extent of environmental change influences a system’s 
ability to store and reuse information about past environments and adapt 
effectively to future environments (Parter, Kashtan, & Alon, 2008). However, 
further research should explore the impact of sudden and dramatic events on 
knowledge combination and contextualization. 
Overall, our findings demonstrate that investigating the microfoundations of 
organizational phenomena can help achieve a more complete understanding of the 
interdependencies between multiple levels of strategy (Kor & Leblebici, 2005). 
But if studying microfoundations revolves essentially around knowledge resources 
and their dynamics, one may plausibly wonder what space is left to the 
motivation, choice, and decision-making of individuals – which means asking, 
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what is “strategy” in the knowledge-driven organization? Any answer to such 
question should certainly entail acknowledging the need for further research and 
additional insights into the relationship between cognitive processes and 
individual characteristics, behavior, and heterogeneity (Felin & Hesterly, 2007; 
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The architectural properties of systems of different nature – physical, 
biological, social – have been extensively investigated in order to identify and 
understand the constitutional elements of world’s complexity. In biology, for 
example, root system architectures are studied in relation to the role they play in 
plants’ nutrition and life (Fitter, Nichols, & Harvey, 1988). In medicine, the 
architectural characteristics of synthetic implants have been found to heavily 
influence tissue regeneration (Hollister, 2005). In computer science, appropriate 
software architectures are critical to system-level evolvability, reliability, and 
performance (Bass, Clements, & Kazman, 2012). Holding a similar approach, a 
number of management scholars have investigated systems such as products, 
processes, organizations, markets, and industries to understand the relationship 
between architectural form and system performance, and the possible matching 
and interplay among system architectures at multiple levels (Chesbrough, 2003; 
Fixson & Park, 2008; Garud, Kumaraswamy, & Langlois, 2009; Jacobides, 
Knudsen, & Augier, 2006; Schilling & Steensma, 2001). Such studies have been 
echoed by practitioner-oriented management literature that has fruitfully applied 
architectural thinking to product design and organizational strategies (Morris & 
Ferguson, 1993; Sauer & Willcocks, 2002). 
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In this domain, the notion of architecture refers to the overall design of a 
system, and describes the general form of and the particular interrelationships 
between the whole and its parts – a product and its components, a process and 
its phases, an organization and its units, and so forth. Since artificial systems 
behave according to design choices, the architect’s first problem is to render a 
given architecture capable of supporting intended dynamics and performance. 
This leads to the notion of architectural innovation, defined as a change in the 
way system components are linked to each other (Henderson and Clark, 1990). 
As soon as the architecture is formalized, the architect’s next goal, in fact, is to 
experiment with new configurations, in order to understand whether architectural 
innovations affect the way the system performs, and/or impact on the behavior of 
other, interdependent systems. The characteristics and dynamics of system 
architectures are interesting to study at multiple levels of analysis. For example, 
Galunic and Eisenhardt (2001) underline the importance of architectural 
innovation at the organizational level when they talk of “leaders as architects”. 
They explain that in their case study firm “corporate executives played roles that 
went beyond the traditional ones of managing corporate boundaries and 
overseeing performance. Perhaps their most important role […] lay in the process 
of architectural innovation” (p. 1246). Similarly, the study of the effects of 
changes in the architecture of products, processes, organizations, and industries is 
attracting increasing attention of scholars and practitioners alike (Baldwin & 
Clark, 2000; Brusoni & Prencipe, 2001; Galunic & Eisenhardt, 2001; Hoetker, 
2006; Pil & Cohen, 2006; Schilling, 2000; Schilling & Steensma, 2001). 
Central to the cross-disciplinary discussion on architectural innovation and the 
reconfiguration of products, organizations, and industries are the concepts of 
modularity and integrality (or integration). Both the product design literature 
and an increasingly coherent body of management studies have been using the 
modularity-integrality tradeoff to underpin a conceptual view of architectural 
problems whose two main cornerstones can be articulated as follows: 
1. The architectural evolution of systems involves a bidirectional shift from 
integrality to modularity (Baldwin & Clark, 2000; MacCormack, Rusnak, & 
Baldwin, 2006; Schilling, 2000; Shibata, Yano, & Kodama, 2005) and vice 
versa (Christensen, Verlinden, & Westerman, 2002; Fine, 2010; Fixson & 
Park, 2008), which produces performance variations. For example, when the 
system architecture gets more modular, it acquires higher flexibility and 
adaptability. If it gets more integrated, efficiency and/or effectiveness will be 
enhanced. Modularity and integrality are conceived, then, as either 
dichotomous or extremes of a continuum along which system architectures 
may alternatively evolve by means of cross-type architectural innovations. 
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For example, Ulrich (1995) introduces a typology of product architectures 
based on the distinction between modular and integral. Similarly, in an 
attempt to lay down the foundations of a general modular systems theory, 
Schilling (2000) talks of a “bidirectional trajectory” along which systems shift 
when subject to forces that push for either greater modularity or greater 
integration. According to this view, modularity is the result of a process of 
disaggregation of originally integral (or integrated) architectures into non-
integral ones. Following the same approach, Schilling and Steensma (2001) 
carry out an industry-level analysis of organizational forms and oppose 
modular systems to “integrated, hierarchical structures”; and Ethiraj and 
Levinthal (2004) tackle the problem of designing and managing complex 
systems by modeling and simulating the performance of system architectures 
that range from fully integrated to highly modular. 
2. Systems can also evolve independently of migrations towards higher 
integrality or higher modularity, by means of within-type architectural 
innovations. For example, a system’s components can be “mixed and 
matched” without altering the overall degree of modularity or integrality of 
the system. In this respect, though, extant literature posits a primacy of 
modularity over integrality, because it is the modular nature of the system 
that allows for interchangeability among components, so that new systems 
configurations can be explored. In this view modularity is paired with 
versatility, flexibility and evolvability, and appears per se sufficient to 
enhance recombinant innovation (Foray & Freeman, 1993). On the contrary, 
integrality is paired with, efficiency, hierarchy, and control; all features that 
would hinder architectural recombination and innovation. 
Summarizing, a process of modularization entails loss of integrality, while 
increasing integration means decreasing modularity. Moreover, architectural 
innovation and system recombination are enhanced by high levels of modularity 
and correspondently low levels of integrality. 
This interpretation of the structural characteristics and dynamics of systems is 
so central to the discussion on architectural innovation in management that the 
vast majority of studies of form, structure, and design of products, organizations, 
and industries adopt it more or less explicitly. Indeed, the modularity-integrality 
tradeoff has represented a useful conceptual and analytical tool for students of 
architectural problems within and across systems. However, growing evidence 
shows that treating modularity and integrality as mutually exclusive properties, 
and in particular emphasizing modularity as the only precondition for easier and 
more effective system recombination, is fundamentally wrong. System 
architectures at all levels show a higher degree of complexity than a linear 
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relationship between modularity and integrality can capture and explain (Brusoni 
& Prencipe, 2001; Galunic & Eisenhardt, 2001; Hoetker, 2006; Tiwana, 2008). In 
this paper we tackle the problems associated with the modularity-integrality 
tradeoff, and introduce a new framework which attempts to overcome such 
problems. 
4.2 Problems with the Modularity-Integrality 
Tradeoff 
Our study focused on issues arising from the use of the modular-integral 
tradeoff in the product design, engineering, and management literatures. In 
particular, we have reviewed studies of architectural innovation in products and 
organizations whose analytical and interpretive standpoint hinged on such 
tradeoff. The scrutiny of contradictory findings provided hints of theoretical 
inconsistencies affecting the use of both concepts in the management literature, 
and allowed us to locate conceptual sources of misalignment between theory and 
empirical evidence. Rather than providing a comprehensive review of the relevant 
literatures (an extensive, cross-field review can be drawn from: Campagnolo & 
Camuffo, 2010; Fixson, 2001; Jose & Tollenaere, 2005; Reijers & Mendling, 2008; 
Salvador, 2007), for the sake of brevity we will discuss a few selected works that 
exemplify the problems emerged. 
The Modularity-Integrality Tradeoff 
The concepts of modularity and integrality as alternative properties of systems 
have been used in fields as diverse as industrial engineering, construction, 
robotics, computer science, mathematics, biology (Andrews, 1998), medicine, 
cognitive science (Coltheart, 1999; Fodor, 1983), psychology, and art (interesting 
examples from multiple disciplines can be found in Schilling, 2003). The product 
design and engineering field has carried out pioneering investigation on 
modularity and integrality as alternative design principles, and contributed 
important insights into their respective features, advantages, and limits (Baldwin 
& Clark, 1997; Chang & Ward, 1995; Chen, Rosen, Allen, & Mistree, 1994; Ernst, 
2005; Parnas, 1972; Suh, 1984). In particular, it has been found that, when 
pursued and implemented strategically, modularity can lead to greater product 
variety, shorter time-to-market, and lower production costs (Corbett, 1991; Jose 
& Tollenaere, 2005; Mikkola & Gassmann, 2003; Nevins, Whitney, & De Fazio, 
1989; Sanchez, 1999; Thomke & Reinertsen, 1998), whereas the benefits of 
integral architectures include easier and faster designing, protection of innovation 
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from imitation, and higher entry barriers for components suppliers (Jose & 
Tollenaere, 2005). In general, designing modular products as opposed to integral 
ones assures firms greater flexibility, agility and adaptability to a changing 
environment (Thomke & Reinertsen, 1998; Thomke, 1997; Worren, Moore, & 
Cardona, 2002), but it also facilitates imitation, impacting negatively on the 
durability of firms’ performance (Ethiraj, Levinthal, & Roy, 2008; Pil & Cohen, 
2006). 
In the management field, the modular-integral tradeoff has been increasingly 
employed to study the relationship between architectural forms and systemic 
performances – such as flexibility, versatility, evolvability, and reconfigurability – 
of products, processes, and organizations, and has proved a useful 
conceptualization tool at different levels of analysis (Campagnolo & Camuffo, 
2010). Scholars have compared modular and integral organizational forms to 
understand the different role they played in the dynamics of organizational 
recombination. Similarly to what happens with products, organizational 
modularity enhances the reconfiguration of organizational components (Karim, 
2006; Lei, Hitt, & Goldhar, 1996; Sanchez, 1995; Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996), and 
represents an essential prerequisite for leveraging dynamic capabilities, and 
pursuing innovation, recombination, and diversity (Galunic & Eisenhardt, 2001). 
Furthermore, diversified firms have relied on organizational modularity to 
facilitate the achievement of economies of scope, and reduce the need for 
centralized coordination (Helfat & Eisenhardt, 2004). More recently, the 
modularity-integrality tradeoff has been applied to the analysis of processes for 
the delivery of services (Böhmann & Krcmar, 2006; Pekkarinen, 2008). Voss and 
Hsuan (2009) reckon that the concepts of architecture and architectural 
modularity are particularly important to service design and innovation. 
Consistent with this view, Bask, Tinnilä, and Rajahonka (2010) analyze the 
relationships between modular business processes, business models, and strategic 
service positioning. Finally, the modular-vs.-integral conversation has been 
enriched by analyses of the cross-level relationships between architectural forms 
of different kinds of systems, with special emphasis on the interplay between 
product and organizational modularity (Argyres & Bigelow, 2010; Hoetker, 2006; 
Sako, 2003). On the one hand, a “mirroring hypothesis” has been put forward to 
explain empirical evidence of a close matching between product and 
organizational architectures (Cabigiosu & Camuffo, 2012; Henderson & Clark, 
1990; Hoetker, 2006; MacCormack, Baldwin, & Rusnak, 2012). On the other 
hand, these far-reaching effects of modularity have been contrasted by the fact 
that fundamental differences between knowledge boundaries and production 
process boundaries impede an exact correspondence between product and 
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organizational architectures (Brusoni & Prencipe, 2001, 2006; Brusoni, Prencipe, 
& Pavitt, 2001). 
Semantic Inconsistencies and Conceptual Vagueness 
Overall, scholars recognize that the study of system architectures in the 
management field is still immature, and the science behind it is still embryonic 
(Ethiraj & Levinthal, 2004; Pil & Cohen, 2006). A major issue concerns 
semantics. There is a variety of different approaches to the use of the modularity 
construct and its underlying structure of meanings (Campagnolo & Camuffo, 
2010; Gershenson, Prasad, & Zhang, 2003, 2004). Let us consider, for example, 
the conceptual association between modularity and “loose coupling”. Orton and 
Weick (1990) clarify a causal relationship between loose coupling (the antecedent) 
and modularity (the effect); Schilling and Steensma (2001) treat the two terms as 
synonyms; Sanchez (1999) and Sanchez and Mahoney (1996) reverse the causal 
relationship; and finally, Lei et al. (1996) associate loose coupling with increasing 
integration. Although modularity follows from the notion of decomposability of a 
system into subsystems or components (Alexander, 1964; Marples, 1961; Simon, 
1962), and with this notion is tightly associated, the concept of modularity does 
not simply designate the property of a system of being made up of components. If 
that were the case, any system intended as a set of interacting elements (von 
Bertalanffy, 1950) would be modular by definition, and a general theory of 
modular systems (Schilling, 2000) would be redundant. Instead, there is 
something beyond the decomposition of a system into components that makes 
modularity a property dense with important implications for architectural 
innovation. Scholars have agreed on the principle of decomposability as a 
prerequisite of modularity (Campagnolo & Camuffo, 2010; Langlois, 2002), and 
on its relative nature along a continuum which opposes it to integrality 
(Schilling, 2000; Ulrich, 1995); yet they have then striven to qualify further the 
idea of relative independence that the concept entails. 
The lack of consensus on conceptualizations is not surprising if we consider 
that modularity is a multifaceted concept. The product design and engineering 
literature has provided the most influential definitions (for an exhaustive review 
of the definitional efforts see Gershenson et al., 2003, 2004), and two dominant 
approaches have emerged which characterize the module’s independence from 
other modules as either functional or structural. The “functional approach” refers 
to a module as a system’s component that is functionally independent from other 
components within the same system (Suh, 1984, 1990). Ishii, Juengel, and 
Eubanks (1995) associate the concept of modularity with the minimization of the 
number of functions for each component. According to Ulrich (1995: 422), “a 
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modular architecture includes a one-to-one mapping from functional elements in 
the function structure to the physical components of the product, and specifies 
de-coupled interfaces between components”. And even more neatly, Ulrich and 
Eppinger (2004) state that a strictly modular architecture requires that all of the 
components implementing a function reside in the same subsystem with few 
interactions among subsystems. By contrast, the “structural approach” bases the 
definition of module on purely structural elements, so that a module is made of 
components that are tightly connected among themselves and loosely connected 
with the components of other modules (Baldwin & Clark, 2000).2 Studies of 
modularity in the management field do not show the same definitional zeal. The 
only exception (Schilling, 2000) builds on the structural approach typical of 
product design (Baldwin & Clark, 2000) to state that modularity “is a continuum 
describing the degree to which a system’s components can be separated and 
recombined, and it refers both to the tightness of coupling between components 
and the degree to which the ‘rules’ of the system architecture enable (or prohibit) 
the mixing and matching of components” (Schilling, 2000: 312). This definition 
has the merit of being inclusive of multiple types of constraints to modularity, 
but does not specify what these ‘rules’ are. 
The problems associated with extant conceptualization efforts seem to descend 
from the fact that systems normally encountered in management research have 
complex architectures, that is, they are multidimensional (Mitleton-Kelly, 2003). 
Even very simple systems like products with elementary physical structures 
present higher degrees of complexity when analyzed in relation to the larger 
technical, organizational, or social systems they are part of and interact with 
(Sako, 2003). For example, when we investigate a product’s architecture and try 
to understand whether it is modular-in-production, modular-in-design, or 
modular-in-use (Baldwin & Clark, 1997), we are conceptually building a super-
system which is technical, organizational, and social at the same time, so 
encompassing many different dimensions of modularity. Hence, any definition of 
modularity based on just one dimension – either structural or functional – 
inevitably fails to harness such complexity (Fixson, 2001). On the other hand, 
comprehensiveness of dimensions should not lead to vagueness, and theoretical 
prescriptions aiming to be generic and inclusive (Schilling, 2000) should carefully 
discern between structural and non-structural factors. Moreover, the degree of 
modularity as an architectural attribute can vary over time based on what one 
can possible do with the system or, within the system, with its components, as 
                                                 
2 For completeness, both functional and structural elements are simultaneously contemplated for 
the definition of modularity in studies that hold a hybrid approach but trade off some analytical 
sharpness (Allen & Carlson-Skalak, 1998; Pimmler & Eppinger, 1994; Ulrich & Tung, 1991). 
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component separability and mixing-and-matching possibilities tend to change 
hand-in-hand with the advancement of scientific knowledge. 
Similar issues affect the other side of the tradeoff. To signify the idea of unity 
of a system as arrangement of parts into a whole, scholars in different areas have 
mainly employed the concepts of integrality and integration. These have often 
been used interchangeably (e.g., Ethiraj & Levinthal, 2004; Ethiraj et al., 2008; 
Fixson & Park, 2008; Krishnan & Ramachandran, 2011; Shibata et al., 2005; 
Worren et al., 2002), and associated with control, hierarchy, consolidation, and 
tight coupling (Schilling, 2000; Schilling & Steensma, 2001), but have not been 
treated as design principles in their own right. In particular, the concept of 
integrality has been used by students of product architectures without finding an 
autonomous formalization, so that its definition has been residually obtained from 
that of modularity: if a system is not modular, it is integral; or, in relative terms, 
if a system is to some extent modular, it is to the complementary extent integral 
(Frigant & Talbot, 2005; MacDuffie, 2013; Mikkola, 2006; Mikkola & Gassmann, 
2003; Muffatto & Roveda, 2002; Robertson & Ulrich, 1998; Ulrich, 1995). Unlike 
modularity and integrality, which were borrowed by management scholars from 
technical disciplines relatively recently, the concept of integration has a much 
longer history in management studies. It was first used in organizational theory 
in association with that of coordination (Barnard, 1968; Chandler, 1962; Follett, 
1987; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967a, 1967b; Thompson, 1967). Although they 
referred specifically to organizational systems – and not to systems in general – 
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967a: 4) defined integration in a way that is particularly 
relevant to this study: “the process of achieving unity of effort among the various 
subsystems in the accomplishment of the organization’s task” (emphasis added). 
This definition captures an aspect of functioning as a whole towards an outcome 
that plays a central role in any system’s design – not just organizational systems 
– as it refers to each component’s ability to contribute to the system’s overall 
performance, or behavior. Such characterization has been largely neglected by 
studies of system architectures, with the sole exception of a handful of authors. 
Clark and Fujimoto (1990) referred to product integrity as a multifaceted 
characteristic of product systems involving two dimensions: one external, “the 
consistency between a product’s performance and customers’ expectations”, and; 
one internal, “the consistency between a product’s function and its structure: the 
parts fit smoothly, the components match and work well together” (p. 108). 
Similarly, in Iansiti (1993) and Iansiti and Clark (1994) the concept of “system 
focus” expressed how technological choices on a single component fit the product 
as a whole. Finally, Schilling (2000) used the term “synergistic specificity” to 
indicate “the degree to which a system achieves greater functionality by its 
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components being specific to one another” (p. 316). Although product integrity, 
system focus, and synergistic specificity have a number of limitations (i.e., 
vagueness, challenging formalization, and dimensional limitedness of the first two, 
and static and non-relative nature of the third), they represent interesting 
attempts at capturing complex sets of interdependences among system’s 
components, and provide useful hints for a better reconceptualization and precise 
formalization of integrality as a system property. 
Table 4.1 summarizes the extant conceptualizations of modularity and 
integrality and the related definitions. 
 
Table 4.1. Extant conceptualizations of modularity and integrality 
MODULARITY 
Approach Definition(s) Key references 
Functional approach 
(functions performed by 
the system’s modules) 
Modules are system components that perform a specific 
function independently of other components within the same 
system. A fully modular system presents a one-to-one 
mapping between components and functions. 
Ishii et al. (1995); Suh (1984, 
1990); Ulrich (1995); Ulrich & 
Eppinger (2004) 
Functional approach 
(functions performed on 
the system’s modules) 
A module is a system’s component on which a specific 
function can be performed independently of other modules – 
for example, modularity in design, production, use, recycling, 
and so forth. 
Baldwin & Clark (1997) 
Structural approach 
(modularity of the 
system’s structure) 
A system is modular when its components can be easily 
separated and recombined. 
A module is made of components that are tightly connected 
among themselves and loosely connected with the 
components of other modules. 
Baldwin & Clark (2000); 
Schilling (2000) 




Similar concept(s) Meaning(s) Key references 
Integration 
(organizational level) 
Intended as coordination, and unity of effort among various 
parts of a system. 
 Barnard (1968); Chandler 
(1962); Follett (1987); 
Lawrence & Lorsch (1967a, 
1967b); Thompson (1967) 
Integrity Multifaceted characteristic of product systems capturing “the 
consistency between a product’s performance and 
customers’ expectations”, and “the consistency between a 
product’s function and its structure: the parts fit smoothly, the 
components match and work well together” (p. 108). 
Clark & Fujimoto (1990) 
System focus Describes whether and how the technological choices about 
a single component fit the product as a whole. 
Iansiti (1993); Iansiti & Clark 
(1994) 
Synergistic specificity The degree to which a system achieves greater functionality 




Examples of Contradictory Empirical Findings 
Empirical studies of product and organizational architectures often provide 
contradictory results that clash with the aforementioned cornerstones of the 
modularity-integrality tradeoff. On the one hand, large part of the literature 
describes modularity as a situation where “a tightly integrated hierarchy is 
supplanted by ‘loosely coupled’ networks of organizational actors” (Schilling & 
Steensma, 2001: 1149), so that organizational components that are loosely 
coupled can be easily recombined into many different configurations. On the 
other hand, several studies have found that hierarchy and modularity can co-
exist, and that the two need to be treated as separate and unrelated phenomena. 
For example, simultaneous evidence of high modularity and tight integration 
within the same organizational architecture was found by Galunic and Eisenhardt 
(2001: 1232) in what they called the “dynamic community”, an organizational 
form whose dynamism is made possible by “the raw material for recombination – 
the modular, loosely coupled, yet related, business divisions” (emphasis added). 
This type of corporate structure “displays modularity (generating vital diversity 
in the corporate ‘gene pool’), yet also displays relatedness (facilitating charter 
recombination)”. According to Hoetker (2006), research on whether modular 
products lead to modular organizations “reveals that the question was overly 
simplistic and that organizational modularity is a more multiplex phenomenon 
than previously recognized (p. 502)”. In particular, if the modules are 
fundamental ingredients for “mixing and matching” strategies, they are not 
enough to explain the all recipe for architectural recombination innovation. In 
other words, modularity sustains recombination but cannot act without 
mechanisms of integration. Hence, there must be other factors that allow highly 
modular units to work together as a whole. The same conclusion is supported by 
the literature on product modularity. Exploring the relationship between product 
and organizational design, Brusoni and Prencipe (2001) find that the overall 
consistency of large and complex products is guaranteed by pairing modularity 
with the integrating role of knowledge and organizational coordination. As 
modularity increases the separation and specialization of modules, a bigger effort 
of organizational integration and coordination is needed to ensure fit among 
modules, and “to search and explore alternative paths of product and process 
configurations” (Brusoni & Prencipe, 2001: 185). In a nutshell, as Tiwana (2008) 
puts it, modularity is not a substitute for coordination, or control.  
The Need for a Reconceptualization 
The above examples show that the modularity-integrality tradeoff does not 
account for modular systems that at the same time show or require high degrees 
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of integrality. The logical consequence is that increasing modularity does not 
necessarily entail decreasing integrality, and that high levels of modularity are 
not always a sufficient condition to facilitate system reconfiguration, or 
architectural innovation. In agreement with other scholars (Fixson, 2001, 2003; 
Hoetker, 2006; MacDuffie, 2013; Sako, 2003), we note that it is necessary to 
define modularity and integrality in a way that takes into account bundles of 
architectural characteristics and captures the context of which the system is part, 
with special attention paid to the multiple facets of both constructs. Definitional, 
conceptual, and analytical inconsistencies as well as controversial empirical 
evidence (Campagnolo & Camuffo, 2010) strengthen our belief that modularity 
and integrality cannot be treated as monolithic concepts. The body of studies 
that we have examined has produced undisputedly valuable insights, but at the 
same time it has relied, often uncritically, on assumptions, formulations, and 
approaches typical of the product design and engineering fields, and has applied 
them to new kinds of system architectures – i.e., processes, organizations, 
industries – that can reveal by far more complex than the most complex 
products. Contradictory empirical evidence, lack of consensus on definitions, and 
not fully rigorous use of meanings undermine the “modular vs. integral” thinking, 
in that they prevent capturing the complexity of systems architectures, fully 
appreciating the preconditions of architectural innovation and reconfiguration, 
and drawing comparisons between the findings of different studies. We propose 
that the starting point of this indispensable reconceptualization be the following 
question: Can two equally-modular architectures have different degrees of 
integrality? Evidence suggests that they can, and that the modularity-integrality 
tradeoff must be rejected. These two fundamental properties of systems are not 
simply opposites; they may push system architectures towards different 
directions, but those directions do not necessarily lay on an intuitively simple, 
linear relationship. Modularity and integrality rather act separately, their 
determinants are crucially different, and using the two concepts in a tradeoff – 
and the same metrics to measure them invariantly – is evidently misleading. 
4.3 The Modularity-Integrality Framework 
New Definitions 
Our goal is to provide renewed conceptual lenses for the analysis of system 
architectures in general and for a better understanding of problems of 
architectural innovation. Therefore, we reconceptualize modularity and 
integrality as distinct and non-opposite architectural properties of systems. We 
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posit that looking at them in terms of dynamic interplay, rather than mutual 
exclusion, can help solve the conceptual problems identified, and overcome some 
of the contradictions emerged from empirical studies. The proposed 
reconceptualization entails the formalization of new, general definitions of 
modularity and integrality. New, because, unlike previous ones, they separate the 
two attributes, and take into account their multidimensionality, that is, the fact 
that they refer to complex, multidimensional systems. General, because they can 
be applied to whatever kind of systems and not just to systems normally object of 
management research. Afterwards, we consider the interplay between modularity 
and integrality within a framework that describes four main types of systems. 
Finally, we discuss the implications of adopting such interplay to study systems’ 
behavior, with special emphasis on the characteristics that facilitate architectural 
innovation. 
 
Modularity redefined. Modularity is the systems’ property of being made 
up of modules. A module is a system’s element that presents a high, albeit not 
complete, independence of other elements. Modularity is a relative property in 
dimension and degree: a system is fully modular along a given dimension when all 
of its elements behave independently of other elements along the same dimension. 
 
This definition allows encompassing multiple dimensions of modularity. In the 
analysis of product architectures, for example, specific dimensions can be assigned 
to the system’s physical structure, composition, and types of interfaces, in order 
to measure the separability of the system’s elements under given circumstances; 
other dimensions can be assigned to functions performed on or around the 
system, so as to measure its modularity in design, in production, and in use 
(Baldwin & Clark, 2000; Sako, 2003); and yet other dimensions can capture the 
component-function mapping. According to this definition, assessing the degree of 
modularity of a system makes sense only if one or more dimensions are 
specifically chosen for the analysis, as the same system can be modular to a 
certain degree along a specific dimension, to a lower or higher degree along a 
second dimension, and not modular at all along a third one. As we move across 
dimensions, the representation of the system architecture can vary, as new 
elements are included, and/or new interactions among elements are examined. So 
intended, modularity is no more a monolithic property, but an eminently relative 
one, not only in degree but also in dimension, as it can capture many variable 




Integrality redefined. Integrality is the systems’ property of being made up 
of elements that behave consistently as a whole. It is a relative property in 
dimension and degree. A system is fully integral along a given dimension when all 
of its elements consistently concur to determine the system’s behavior along that 
dimension.  
 
This definition allows encompassing multiple dimensions of integrality. The 
dimensions along which a system is integral identify its factors (or mechanisms) 
of integration; hence, a system can have multiple factors of integration, that is, it 
can be integrated along different dimensions. For example, in IT product-service 
systems different dimensions of integrality can be assigned to the modules’ ability 
to support the overall system behavior in terms of scalability, availability, or 
performance, so as to counterbalance the limitations of applying modular 
approaches to the delivery of services (Böhmann & Krcmar, 2006). 
So defined, modularity and integrality are separate and concurring properties 
of complex systems. Dimensions of modularity reflect the different traits of 
independence among modules and describe component level interrelationships. 
Dimensions of integrality encompass factors that affect the relationship between 
the component level and the system level, and describe cross-level 
interrelationships. The interplay between modularity and integrality is crucial to 
the dynamics and evolution of systems, in that, effective system reconfiguration 
cannot take place if both properties do not act simultaneously. On the one hand, 
modularity facilitates the interchangeability and separability of the modules, 
enhancing system decomposability and flexibility; this has direct impact on the 
ease of architectural innovation and recombination. On the other hand, 
integrality implies the presence within the system of factors of integration, thanks 
to which the modules can be recombined effectively without diminishing neither 
their contribution to the overall system behavior nor the level of system 
performance: this has direct impact on the effectiveness of architectural 
innovation and recombination. 
A System Typology Based on the Modularity-Integrality Framework 
The interplay between modularity and integrality can give rise to variable 
configurations of system architectures. We identify four ideal types of such 
configurations, as shown in Figure 4.1. 
Recombinant systems (or recombinant architectures) are characterized 
simultaneously by high degrees of modularity and integrality, and combine the 
advantages of both. High modularity provides the system with the building 
blocks for changes in the architectural configuration, whereas integrality ensures 
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system’s cohesiveness and consistency toward a given performance, so that 
recombination can be effectively and successfully implemented. At the product 
level, technological platforms offer, perhaps, the most powerful example of 
recombinant architectures. Platforms are a special type of modular architectures 
made of two different types of components: core components, and complements 
(Gawer & Cusumano, 2008). Core components occupy a central position in the 
platform architecture, which they hold together and coordinate “by constraining 
the linkages among the other components” (Baldwin & Woodard, 2009: 19). In 
other words, they act as factors of integration. Complements are fully modular 
components with high degree of reusability and interchangeability, which render 
the overall architecture highly flexible and variably configurable. Typical 
examples of technological platforms are mobile handset systems (Mudambi, 
2008), wherein the interplay between modular core components (hardware device, 
and operating system) and modular complements (hardware accessories, and 
applications) that contribute to the system’s functions and performance makes 
the platform highly integral and highly modular at the same time, and supports 
rapid and effective architectural recombination. 
 
Figure 4.1. System typology based on the Modularity-Integrality Framework 
 Modularity 
















e.g. personal computers,  
mobile handsets, and technological  
platforms in general 
Specialized Systems 
e.g. specialized software  




e.g. office automation packages  
and bundled applications in general 
 
Chaotic Systems 




Specialized systems (or specialized architectures) are characterized by a high 
degree of integrality and a low degree of modularity. The system’s components 
have strong mutual interdependences that condition each one’s behavior within a 
given configuration, so that they are relatively difficult to recombine. These 
systems can enjoy exceptionally high performance (for example, in terms of 
efficiency), as they can count on easy and fast coordination of components into 
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choral action, but suffer from low levels of flexibility and recombinability (for 
example, to adapt to exogenous change) in the short run. Highly specialized 
architectures can be found in software applications whose components contribute 
altogether to perform distributed functions. For example, Thomke and Reinertsen 
(1998) discuss the scarce flexibility of large telecommunications switches in which 
volatility – a perturbing variables present in each components – affects the 
system performance, and suggest that architectural flexibility can be enhanced by 
partitioning certain functions into a single module. 
Bundled systems (or bundled architectures) are characterized by high degree of 
modularity and low degree of integrality. These systems are made of independent, 
interchangeable, and highly specialized modules, whose contribution to the 
behavior (or performance) of the overall system is limited. The system is held 
together by weak, often external, mechanisms of integration. For example, in 
office automation packages and bundled applications in general the integration 
among the components is ensured by the user. Despite the high level of 
modularity (independence along multiple dimensions) effective architectural 
recombinations of this kind of systems are difficult to perform due to the limited, 
and sometimes even detrimental, contribution of the components. 
Finally, chaotic systems are characterized by low degrees of modularity and 
integrality. Their components’ behavior is conditioned by mutual 
interdependences, but the scarce integrality at the system level does not translate 
cross-component interactions into a definable and predictable behavior of the 
overall system. Systems belonging to this type are ubiquitous in nature as well as 
the artificial world, with stock markets being a typical example. 
The above examples help build a more concrete representation of the four 
architectural types identified by the modularity-integrality framework, but their 
specific characterization as recombinant, specialized, bundled, or chaotic systems 
depends on the scope of the analysis, and on the number and nature of the 
dimensions of integrality and modularity selected. In reality, few systems will 
present extremely high or low degrees of modularity and integrality (Christensen 
et al., 2002), but the four sectors of the modularity-integrality matrix offer ideal 
types useful to the analysis. 
4.4 Discussion 
This work sought to point out conceptual problems and controversial empirical 
evidence emerging from the “modularity-vs.-integrality” way of looking at the 
design of system architectures, and to the related phenomenon of architectural 
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innovation and recombination. The analysis of the conceptual foundations on 
which the modularity-integrality tradeoff has been built has highlighted 
inconsistencies and contradictions in the use of the two concepts and the 
underlying structures of meanings. We have proposed that such problems be 
overcome through a reconceptualization based on new definitions of modularity 
and integrality as separate, concurring, and multidimensional properties of 
systems. To guide our discussion of the solution proposed, we draw a comparison 
between the extant approach and the new framework (Table 4.2). 
 
Table 4.2. Comparison between extant approach and proposed new approach 
 Extant approach: 
Modularity-Integrality Tradeoff 
Proposed new approach: 
Modularity-Integrality Framework 
Definition of  
key attributes 
Modularity is defined as a continuum. 
Integrality is conceived residually,  
as opposite or complementary to modularity 
along the same continuum. 
Modularity and integrality are defined as 
separate, orthogonal attributes of systems. 
Both encompass multiple dimensions, and can 




Monodimensional approach: either structural, or 
functional – i.e., each of the two dimensions are 
considered, but one at a time. 
Multidimensional approach, multiple dimensions 
must be considered as a bundle in order to 




Focused and purposeful approach,  
oriented towards rapid assessment 
of architectural problems. 
Static view, based on monodimensional metrics,  
generally leading to simplistic measurements. 
There is no interplay between  
modularity and integrality. 
Comprehensive approach, aiming at a  
more consistent assessment  
of architectural problems. 
Dynamic view, based on multidimensional 
metrics, to capture systems’ complexity better. 
The interplay between modularity  
and integrality affects systems’ behavior. 
Relationship 
between the  
two attributes 
Mutually exclusive if considered as discreet 
attributes, or complementary if considered  
as extremes of a continuum. 
The interplay between the two attributes gives 
rise to a great number of different combinations 





The components of a modular system can be 
mixed and matched without affecting the 
system’s degree of integrality. 
Systems that are modular to a degree are also 
necessarily integral to a complementary degree. 
The components of a modular system can be 
mixed and matched, but different configurations 
will likely have different degrees of integrality. 
Systems that are modular to the same degree 





A variation in the degree of modularity  
entails an opposite and complementary  
variation in the degree of integrality,  
and vice versa. 
A variation in the degree of modularity  
does not necessarily entail a variation  
in the degree of integrality,  
and vice versa. 
 
The proposed new definitions of modularity and integrality are consistent with 
a view of systems as “composed of units (or modules) that are designed 
independently but still function as an integrated whole” (Baldwin & Clark, 1997: 
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86). However, emphasis on modularity and integrality as concurring – rather than 
alternative – architectural properties allows taking into account factors that 
explain how effective the integration among components is, that is, the 
dimensions that make a modular system function well as a whole. Thus, our 
framework provides new conceptual and analytical basis for appreciating the 
layered nature of modularity and integrality, and seizing the interplay among the 
multiple dimensions subtended by each of these architectural properties. It offers 
systems designers broader design choices to better grasp the limits of and 
constraints to modularity (Brusoni, 2005; Ernst, 2005; Fleming & Sorenson, 
2001), and attain deeper insights into the economics of modularization (Thyssen, 
Israelsen, & Jørgensen, 2006) and the relationship between modularity and 
system behavior and performance (Antonio, Yam, & Tang, 2007; He & Kusiak, 
1996; Worren et al., 2002). These considerations emphasize the role of systems 
architects and architectural knowledge in management practice (Baldwin, 2010; 
Sauer & Willcocks, 2002).  In particular, they stress the complexity of the 
managerial choices that are linked to systems design and engineering activities. 
System architectures result from the purposeful and subjective choices 
(Gershenson et al., 2004; MacDuffie, 2013) of designers who need to take into 
account multiple dimensions imposed by the context surrounding a system 
(MacCormack et al., 2006). 
Although we agree with previous studies that modularity can be a design 
solution to the growing complexity of product and organizational systems 
(Baldwin & Clark, 1997), we have observed that additional analytical effort is 
needed to capture such complexity. In that direction, taking modularity and 
integrality out of a linear relationship shifts the focus of architectural 
investigation beyond the questions that scholars and practitioners have typically 
tried to answer so far – whether higher modularity is advantageous or 
detrimental to a given system, or how much modularity determines an expected 
system behavior, and so on. Capturing the interplay between dimensions and 
degrees of modularity on one side, and dimensions and degrees of integrality on 
the other, may help address new sets of problems. For example, a promising path 
of investigation could probe into why systems that are equally modular display 
different performance in a given context, what dimensions of modularity would 
explain such differences, what factors of integration foster the effective 
recombination of modules and the reorientation of the system architecture, and 
what specific combinations of modularity and integrality guarantee optimal levels 
of flexibility and efficiency. Reframing architectural problems in these terms 
makes clear that a mere statement ‘modularity yes/modularity no’, or a simple 
measure of the ‘right’ degree of modularity can be too partial, as modularity 
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alone is not enough to support system-level flexibility, innovation, and 
recombination (Thomke & Reinertsen, 1998). 
Conceptually, the framework proposed in this paper is an attempt to bring 
together several conversations on different kinds and levels of system 
architectures – products, organizations, industries, and so forth – into a common 
basis (Campagnolo & Camuffo, 2010) underpinned by a general systems 
approach. As a methodological stance for future studies, the framework 
encourages the adoption of analytical tools such as hierarchical clustering 
(AlGeddawy & ElMaraghy, 2013) that are capable of overcoming the flat, 
monodimensional representations of basic Design Structure Matrixes (Eppinger & 
Browning, 2012; Steward, 1981). The framework can be employed to study 
diverse kinds of systems, and implies selecting multiple dimensions of modularity 
and integrality, and carrying out separate sets of observations for each dimension 
of analysis. Multidimensionality and separateness of observations are expected to 
lead to more precise and detailed analyses, and to constitute a better reference for 
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